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INTRODUCTION
Drones, also referred to as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs),1 have
become the poster child for America’s continuing fight against terrorism
under President Barack Obama, filling the role that torture had occupied
during the George W. Bush Administration: as a morally, legally, and
politically controversial issue that drives a wedge between the United
* Irving Younger Professor of Law and Director, Institute for International Legal &
Security Studies, University of Minnesota Law School. Earlier drafts of this Article were
presented as the Irving Younger Professorship in law renewal lecture at the University of
Minnesota Law School, February 11, 2014, as well as at the World Summit on CounterTerrorism at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism, the Interdisciplinary Center
Herzliya, in Israel; the New America Foundation; Arizona State University Sandra Day
O’Connor College of Law; and to the Faculty of Law at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, in
Israel. I wish to thank Stephanna Szotkowski for her excellent research assistance.
1. The U.S. military prefers to refer to drones as remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs) or
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), emphasizing the fact that they are controlled by human
operators. Ulrike Franke, Commentary, On “Drones and US Strategy: Costs and Benefits,” 43
PARAMETERS 119, 119 (2013). In fact, by some accounts, the military needs about thirty people
to operate a Predator or Reaper drone, and another eighty people to analyze the incoming
information. Kate Brannen, U.S. Options Limited by Lack of Drones Over Syria, FOREIGN POL’Y
(Oct. 7, 2014), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/10/08/us_options_limited_by_lack_
of_drones_over_syria. That article notes that this personnel burden has constrained the U.S.
military’s use of drones in Syria. Id.
1
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States and much of the rest of the world. While the United States has
relied increasingly on drones to carry out an ever-greater portion of its
military operations overseas, including targeted killing of individuals
suspected of terrorist activities,2 many of America’s allies regard drone
attacks as a manifestation of the United States’ unilateralism, arrogance,
and disregard for international law.3 The use of drones is not only
fraught with difficulties in the international sphere,4 but is also saddled
with severe constitutional and legal challenges under U.S. law.5
The United States has been conducting drone programs with
increasing frequency since the mid-2000s.6 One program, run by the
military, operates armed drones in Afghanistan and has similarly
deployed drones in Iraq and Libya, targeting those fighting against U.S.
2. See Joseph Pugliese, Prosthetics of Law and the Anomic Violence of Drones, 20
GRIFFITH L. REV. 931, 932 (2011); Nathalie Van Raemdonck, Vested Interest or Moral
Indecisiveness? Explaining the EU’s Silence on the US Targeted Killing Policy in Pakistan 3–4
(Instituto Affari Internazionali, Working Papers No. 1205, 2012), available at
http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/iaiwp1205.pdf.
3. See PEW RESEARCH CTR., GLOBAL OPINION OF OBAMA SLIPS, INTERNATIONAL POLICIES
FAULTED 11 (2012), available at http://www.pewglobal.org/files/2012/06/Pew-GlobalAttitudes-U.S.-Image-Report-FINAL-June-13-2012.pdf (providing that “U.S. drone strikes—a
key element of the Obama administration’s anti-terrorism policy—are widely unpopular nearly
everywhere, although the U.S. itself is a clear exception”).
4. See Rosa Brooks, Drones and the International Rule of Law, 28 ETHICS & INT’L AFF.
1, 1–2 (2014) (explaining that the United States’ use of drones challenges the international rule
of law because it defies straightforward legal categorization); Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, War
Everywhere: Rights, National Security Law, and the Law of Armed Conflict in the Age of
Terror, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 675, 751 (2004) (questioning the salience of international human
rights law in elucidating a satisfactory principle with respect to U.S. predator drone attacks on
suspected terrorists); cf. Patrick A. McDade, A Legal Analysis of the Obama Administration’s
Position on Targeted Killings 3 (May 5, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2175677 (providing that, in the context of targeted killings by means of
drone attack, “no universal definition of targeted killings has been established in international
law”).
5. See David W. Opderbeck, Drone Courts, 44 RUTGERS L.J. 413, 418–19, 456–57
(2014) (noting the “thorny” legal and constitutional issues associated with the use of drones);
Michael McAuliff & Ryan Grim, Obama Rebuffs Democrats on Drone Kill Memos, Asserts
Executive Secrecy Prerogative, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 13, 2013, 5:38 PM), http://www.huff
ingtonpost.com/2013/03/13/drones-obama-rebuffs-demo_n_2869156.html; Geert-Jan Alexander
Knoops, Legal, Political and Ethical Dimensions of Drone Warfare Under International Law: A
Preliminary Survey, 12 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 697, 701 (2012) (presenting the argument that the
War Powers Resolution may not limit the President’s power to conduct drone attacks as these
are “limited operations” and if the “war on terror” does not necessarily trigger the laws of war
then this leaves Congress powerless to control the use of drones by the President).
6. Jane Mayer, The Predator War, NEW YORKER (Oct. 26, 2009),
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2009/10/26/091026fa_fact_mayer; see also Ryan J.
Vogel, Drone Warfare and the Law of Armed Conflict, 39 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 101, 104–
05 (2010) (“In 2001, the Predator UAV fleet numbered only ten and was typically relegated to
reconnaissance missions, when used at all. By 2007, Predators numbered more than 180, with
plans to nearly double that number over the next few years.” (footnote omitted)).
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and NATO troops in those countries.7 Recently, the United States
deployed drones in airstrikes against forces of the Islamic State in Iraq
and Syria.8 The second, much more controversial program is a covert
operation run by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA),9 which is
aimed at targeting and killing al-Qaeda and Taliban commanders who
are mostly based in Pakistan’s northwestern region and who use their
Pakistani bases to stage attacks against NATO forces in Afghanistan,10
as well as to plan attacks against “soft” targets in Europe and the United
States.11 This covert CIA program has targeted top al-Qaeda leaders, alQaeda’s external operations network, and Taliban leaders and fighters.12
7. See Shashank Bengali & David S. Cloud, U.S. Drone Strikes up Sharply in
Afghanistan, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/feb/21/world/la-fgafghanistan-drones-20130222 (discussing the drone program in Afghanistan); Christopher
Drew, Drones Are Playing a Growing Role in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 20, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/20/world/asia/20drones.html (same); Mayer, supra note 6
(providing that the military’s drone program “operates in the recognized war zones of
Afghanistan and Iraq, and targets enemies of U.S. troops stationed there”); Dylan Matthews,
Everything You Need to Know About the Drone Debate, in One FAQ, WASH. POST (Mar. 8,
2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/03/08/everything-you-needto-know-about-the-drone-debate-in-one-faq/ (“[D]rones have seen service in Libya, Afghanistan
and Iraq as part of the United States’s more traditional military campaigns in those countries.”);
Mark Thompson, The New U.S. “Smalls” Air Force Over Afghanistan, TIME (June 26, 2011),
http://nation.time.com/2011/06/26/the-new-u-s-smalls-air-force-over-afghanistan/ (discussing
the proliferation of drone use by the U.S. military in Afghanistan, Libya, Pakistan, and Yemen);
Ryan Grim & Michael McAuliff, Afghanistan Drone Strike Data No Longer Reported by U.S.
Air Force, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 10, 2013, 5:57 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/
10/afghanistan-drone-strike-data-no-longer-reported-us-air-force_n_2847296.html (same).
8. Brannen, supra note 1; Chelsea J. Carter et al., U.S. Jet Fighters, Drones Strike ISIS
Fighters, Convoys in Iraq, CNN.COM (Aug. 9, 2014, 12:43 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/
08/world/iraq-options/; Paul D. Shinkman, U.S., Arab Coalition Attack ISIS in Syria, U.S. NEWS
(Sept. 23, 2014, 8:40 AM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/09/23/us-arab-coalitionattack-isis-in-syria.
9. Hillel Ofek, The Tortured Logic of Obama’s Drone War, NEW ATLANTIS, Spring
2010, at 35, 36–37.
10. See id. at 36; Adam Entous et al., CIA Escalates in Pakistan, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 2,
2010, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB100014240527487040293045755262707510
96984 (“The secret deal to beef up the CIA’s campaign inside Pakistan shows the extent to
which military officials see the havens there, used by militants to plan and launch attacks on
U.S. and NATO troops in Afghanistan, as the primary obstacle to the Afghan war effort.”); see
also Melina Sterio, The United States’ Use of Drones in the War on Terror: The (Il)legality of
Targeted Killings Under International Law, 45 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 197, 199 (2012) (noting
that the “United States has used drones in other areas of the world, such as Yemen, where alQaeda forces have been targeted and killed”).
11. See Paul Cruickshank et al., Evidence Suggests that Al-Shabaab is Shifting Focus to
‘Soft’ Targets, CNN (Sept. 26, 2013, 8:38 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/26/world/londonbombing-plot-qaeda/; Entous et al., supra note 10.
12. See Mayer, supra note 6 (noting the drone program’s proclivity for extinguishing
senior al-Qaeda leaders and their allies, including Taliban targets); Ofek, supra note 9, at 36–37
(providing that the drone program “targets al[-]Qaeda and Taliban commanders outside of
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The Obama “[A]dministration has enthusiastically embraced the
CIA’s drone program, an ambitious and historically unusual war
campaign by American spies,”13 and Leon Panetta, the former director
of the CIA, famously proclaimed that drones were “the only game in
town in terms of confronting and trying to disrupt the al-Qa[e]da
leadership.” 14 However, the Obama Administration has continued to
refuse to discuss key aspects of its drone program and much of the
information about the number of drone strikes or casualties from these
strikes remains unknown.15 While the United States launched a total of
ten attacks in the territory of Pakistan from 2004 to 2007,16 in 2008—
the last year of the Bush Administration—the number of such attacks
rose to thirty-six.17 In 2009, the first year of the Obama Administration,
the number of drone attacks in Pakistan jumped up to fifty-four.18 From
2010 to 2013, the Obama Administration launched 122, 73, 48, and 27
drone attacks per year, respectively.19 By the time the Norwegian Nobel
combat zones” and that there is “no denying that the CIA program is achieving its central goal”
of killing al-Qaeda and Taliban targets).
13. Mark Mazzetti & Eric Schmitt, C.I.A. Steps up Drone Attacks on Taliban in Pakistan,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/09/28/world/asia/28drones.html.
14. Mary Ellen O’Connell, Unlawful Killing with Combat Drones: A Case Study of
Pakistan, 2004–2009, in SHOOTING TO KILL: SOCIO-LEGAL PERSPECTIVES ON THE USE OF LETHAL
FORCE 12 (Simon Bronitt et al. eds., 2012); accord Vogel, supra note 6, at 115 (quoting a
statement from former CIA Director Leon Panetta). Similarly, General David Petraeus, former
head of U.S. Central Command, announced in January 2010, that the army “can’t get enough
drones.” Will Foreign Drones One Day Attack the U.S.?, NEWSWEEK (Mar. 13, 2010, 6:21 PM),
http://www.newsweek.com/will-foreign-drones-one-day-attack-us-75331 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
15. Ofek, supra note 9, at 36 (explaining that while the Obama Administration “has
refused to talk about the program’s key aspects,” what we do know is taken from press reports,
mainly the “National Journal reports and a widely cited article by Jane Mayer in The New
Yorker”); see also Julian E. Barnes, U.S. Rethinks Secrecy on Drone Program, WALL ST. J.
(May 17, 2012, 7:25 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000142405270230387960457
7410481496895786 (reporting that the Obama Administration is considering “policy changes
that would lift a tattered veil of secrecy from its controversial campaign of drone strikes”
(emphasis added)); Van Raemdonck, supra note 2, at 3; cf. Greg Miller et al., Documents Reveal
NSA’s Extensive Involvement in Targeted Killing Program, WASH. POST (Oct. 16, 2013),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/documents-reveal-nsas-extensiveinvolvement-in-targeted-killingprogram/2013/10/16/29775278-3674-11e3-8a0e-4e2cf80831fc_
story.html (“[D]ocuments provided to The Washington Post by former NSA contractor Edward
Snowden confirm [Hassan Ghul’s] demise in October 2012 and reveal the agency’s extensive
involvement in the targeted killing program that has served as a centerpiece of President
Obama’s counterterrorism strategy.”).
16. Drone Wars Pakistan: Analysis, NEW AM. FOUND., http://natsec.newamerica.net/
drones/pakistan/analysis (last visited Dec. 28, 2014).
17. Id.
18. Id. (noting fifty-two drone strikes by President Obama and two drone strikes by
President Bush).
19. Id.
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Committee decided to award President Obama the Nobel Peace Prize in
October 2009,20 after merely ten months in office, he had already
authorized more drone attacks in Pakistan than President Bush
authorized “during the entirety” of his presidency.21 The increase in
drone attacks has also led to a dramatic rise in the number of casualties
stemming from those attacks: approximately 51 casualties among
militants were reported in 2006 and 2007.22 The number of militant
casualties went up to 223 in 2008.23 In the years from 2009 to 2013, the
numbers of militant casualties were 387, 788, 420, 268, and 145 per
year, respectively.24
In addition, a third drone program has come to light with reports that
20. The Nobel Peace Prize for 2009, NOBELPRIZE.ORG (Oct. 9, 2009),
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2009/press.html; see supra notes 13–15
and accompanying text.
21. Ofek, supra note 9, at 36 (“The first strike under the new administration occurred just
three days after President Obama’s inauguration. Fifty-three drone attacks have been reported
just in Pakistan in 2009—more than during the entirety of the Bush presidency.”).
22. NEW AM. FOUND., supra note 16 (finding that approximately 106 civilians were killed
between 2006 and 2007); Peter Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann, The Year of the Drone: An
Analysis of U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004–2010, NEW AM. FOUND. 3 (Feb. 24, 2010)
[hereinafter Bergen & Tiedemann, The Year of the Drone], http://www.newamerica.net/sites/
newamerica.net/files/policydocs/bergentiedemann2.pdf (showing that there were nine civilian
deaths from 2004 to 2007).
23. NEW AM. FOUND., supra note 16.
24. Id. In addition, each of these years saw significant civilian deaths. See id. In 2008–
2013, there were twenty-eight, seventy, sixteen, sixty-two, five, and around four or five civilian
deaths respectively. Id. However, analysts Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedemann reported
much higher numbers for 2008–2009 of 175 and 120 civilian deaths, respectively. Bergen &
Tiedemann, The Year of the Drone, supra note 22, at 3. Some scholars, comparing the numbers
of civilian to militant deaths, have noted the precision in the targeting capabilities of drones. The
Constitutional and Counterterrorism Implications of Targeted Killing: Hearing Before the S.
Judiciary Subcomm. on the Constitution, Civil Rights, and Human Rights, 113th Cong. 2–4
(2013) (statement of Rosa Brooks, Professor, Georgetown University Law Center) (explaining
that the use of drones permits greater precision in targeting than using traditional manned
aircrafts, though conceding that precise data does not exist on civilian deaths and that
disagreement exists about what constitutes the baseline for “a lot” or “relatively few” civilian
deaths (internal quotation marks omitted)). Former CIA Director Leon Panetta claimed that
drone attacks were “precise,” and that they cause only “limited collateral damage.” Mary Ellen
O’Connell, Seductive Drones: Learning from a Decade of Lethal Operations, 21 J.L. INFO. &
SCI. 116, 136 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, few drone strikes are
successful in killing high-level militant leaders. For example, in Pakistan, only one in seven
drone strikes killed a militant leader; the majority killed low-level fighters and civilians. Peter
Bergen & Katherine Tiedemann, Washington’s Phantom War: The Effects of the U.S. Drone
Program in Pakistan, 90 FOREIGN AFF. 12, 12 (2011) [hereinafter Bergen & Tiedemann,
Washington’s Phantom War]. Drone video quality might also be insufficient for “remote
operators to recognize a particular face with reasonable certainty.” Thomas Michael McDonnell,
Sow What You Reap? Using Predator and Reaper Drones to Carry Out Assassinations or
Targeted Killings of Suspected Islamic Terrorists, 44 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 243, 259 (2012)
[hereinafter McDonnell, Sow What You Reap?].
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even after the departure of American troops from Iraq in December
2011, the State Department has been operating a “small fleet of
[unarmed] surveillance drones” to help protect the U.S. Embassy and
Consulates, as well as American personnel in that country.25 According
to reports, the State Department may be considering plans to expand the
program to additional “high-threat” countries.26 There are also growing
concerns about the use of drones domestically, either by law
enforcement agencies27 or by private commercial entities.28
Drones are here to stay.29 In fact, both the CIA and the U.S. military
increasingly rely on drones, making these flying platforms America’s
“weapon of choice” for combatting terrorism.30 When the United States
invaded Iraq in 2003, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) had fewer

25. Eric Schmitt & Michael S. Schmidt, U.S. Drones Patrolling Its Skies Provoke Outrage
in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 29, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/30/world/middleeast/iraqis-angered-by-us-drones-patrolling-its-skies.html (internal quotation marks omitted). The
Schmitt and Schmidt article was characterized by President Obama as “a little overwritten.”
Mark Landler, Civilian Deaths Due to Drones Are Not Many, Obama Says, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/31/world/middleeast/civilian-deaths-due-to-dronesare-few-obama-says.html (internal quotation marks omitted).
26. Schmitt & Schmidt, supra note 25.
27. See Matthew L. Wald, Domestic Drones Stir Imaginations, and Concerns, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 17, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/18/business/domestic-drones-on-patrol.html
(noting the “rapidly expanding” market for private domestic drone use and the controversy
stemming from that expanding market); see, e.g., Glenn Greenwald, The Growing Menace of
Domestic Drones, SALON (Dec. 12, 2011, 11:58 AM), http://www.salon.com/2011/12/12/
the_growing_menace_of_domestic_drones/ (detailing use of a Predator B drone by local police
in North Dakota to apprehend suspects); Adam Klasfeld, FBI Drones Flew Since 2006, Audit
NEWS
SERVICE
(Sept.
26,
2013,
10:38
AM),
Says,
COURTHOUSE
http://www.courthousenews.com/2013/09/26/61530.htm (discussing the FBI’s use of drones for
domestic surveillance).
28. See, e.g., Don Reisinger, Amazon Urges US to Let Its Drones Take Flight, CNET
(Dec. 9, 2014, 6:40 AM), http://www.cnet.com/news/amazon-warns-us-to-let-its-drones-takeflight-or-else/.
29. See News Release, Office of the High Comm’r, Statement by Ben Emmerson, UN
Special Rapporteur on Counter-Terrorism and Human Rights Concerning the Launch of an
Inquiry into the Civilian Impact, and Human Rights Implications of the Use [sic] Drones and
Other Forms of Targeted Killings for the Purpose of Counter-Terrorism and Counter-Insurgency
2 (2013) [hereinafter Statement by Ben Emmerson], http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/
Terrorism/SRCTBenEmmersonQC.24January12.pdf (last visited Dec. 28, 2014).
30. See Alan W. Dowd, Drone Wars: Risks and Warnings, 42 PARAMETERS 7, 7–8 (2013)
(“In the past decade, the US drone fleet has swelled from 50 planes to 7,500 . . . .”); Spencer
Ackerman & Noah Shachtman, Almost 1 in 3 U.S. Warplanes Is a Robot, WIRED (Jan. 9, 2012,
1:31 PM), http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/01/drone-report/ (“According to a new
congressional report acquired by Danger Room, drones now account for 31 percent of all
military aircraft.”); Unmanned Aerial Warfare: Flight of the Drones, ECONOMIST (Oct. 8, 2011),
http://www.economist.com/node/21531433 (noting the precipitous growth in drone use by the
United States).
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than fifty UAVs on hand.31 By early 2010, it had more than 7000.32
Indeed, so many drones fly at any given time over parts of Pakistan that
“command-and-control issues” have emerged.33 Since 2009, the U.S.
Air Force has trained more drone “pilots” than fighter or bomber
pilots.34 And since 2011, the Air Force has “trained more drone pilots

31. See Dowd, supra note 30, at 7; Peter W. Singer, How the U.S. Military Can Win the
Robotic Revolution, BROOKINGS (May 17, 2010) [hereinafter Singer, How the U.S. Military Can
Win], http://www.brookings.edu/research/articles/2010/05/17-robots-singer (“When the U.S.
military went into Iraq in 2003, it used only a handful of unmanned systems in the air, none of
them armed.”).
32. Lora G. Weiss, Autonomous Robots in the Fog of War, IEEE SPECTRUM (July 27,
2011, 5:43 PM) (citing Singer, How the U.S. Military Can Win, supra note 31),
http://spectrum.ieee.org/robotics/military-robots/autonomous-robots-in-the-fog-of-war (“Back in
2000, the U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) had fewer than 50 UAVs in its inventory; by
early 2010, it had more than 7000.”).
33. Mayer, supra note 6 (“At any given moment, a former White House counterterrorism
official says, the C.I.A. has multiple drones flying over Pakistan, scouting for targets. According
to the official, ‘there are so many drones’ in the air that arguments have erupted over which
remote operators can claim which targets, provoking ‘command-and-control issues.’”).
34. Chris Jenks, Law from Above: Unmanned Aerial Systems, Use of Force, and the Law
of Armed Conflict, 85 N.D. L. REV. 649, 650 (2009); see also James Dao, Drone Pilots Are
Found to Get Stress Disorders Much as Those in Combat Do, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 22, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/23/us/drone-pilots-found-to-get-stress-disorders-much-as-thos
e-in-combat-do.html (“Since 2008, the number of pilots of remotely piloted aircraft . . . has
grown fourfold, to nearly 1,300. The Air Force is now training more pilots for its drones than for
its fighter jets and bombers combined. And by 2015, it expects to have more drone pilots than
bomber pilots, although fighter pilots will remain a larger group. Those figures do not include
drones operated by the C.I.A. in counterterrorism operations over Pakistan, Yemen and other
countries.”). The Air Force has integrated and accepted drone operators into its legions of pilots.
Jim Michaels, Drones Change ‘Top Gun’ Culture of Air Force, USA TODAY (Dec. 1, 2012, 9:00
AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2012/11/30/drone-wars/1737991/ (noting that
drone pilots are “100% accepted and integrated,” and that they receive nicknames or call signs,
wear flight suits in the Air Force Weapons school like other pilots, and that the Air Force “pins
more wings on new drone pilots than fighter and bomber pilots” (internal quotation marks
omitted)). However, the creation of a controversial new medal that would honor drone pilots and
cyber warriors has been canceled. Amanda Terkel, Distinguished Warfare Medal Honoring
Drone Pilots Canceled by Chuck Hagel, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 15, 2013, 3:23 PM), http://ww
w.huffingtonpost.com/2013/04/15/distinguished-warfare-medal_n_3086660.html
(explaining
that the Defense Secretary canceled the new medal after it was approved by former Defense
Secretary Leon Panetta as a result of congressional outrage that “it would outrank some
battlefield medals like the Purple Heart”). It is also contested in the blogosphere whether drone
operators can really be called “pilots.” Brent Owens, Drone Pilots or Drone Operators?,
IFLYBLOG (Nov. 20, 2013), http://iflyblog.com/2013/11/20/drone-pilots-drone-operators/.
Further nomenclature issues exist about calling drones “drones”—or instead, remotely piloted
aircrafts (RPAs). Elijah Solomon Hurwitz, Drone Pilots: “Overpaid, Underworked, and
Bored,” MOTHER JONES (June 18, 2013, 6:30 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2013/
06/drone-pilots-reaper-photo-essay (“‘Drone’ conjures images of brainless bots on autopilot, an
implication not appreciated by the three-person crew (pilot, sensor operator, intelligence
analyst) typically tasked with operating the military’s high-tech workhorses.”).
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than fighter and bomber pilots combined.”35 But even that may not be
sufficient. Recent reports indicate that the Air Force is not keeping pace
with the increased demand for drone pilots and is facing a “crisis” in the
Force’s ability to fulfill its critical missions.36
Covert drone attacks orchestrated by the CIA around the world,
including in areas that lie outside recognized war zones,37 raise a range
of difficult questions that have been, and continue to be, heavily
discussed by scholars, policy makers, and the general media.38 They
raise jus ad bellum issues such as the legal authority, if any, for the
United States to exercise force inside the territory of another state, e.g.,
Pakistan, which is an ally of the United States that lies outside the zone
of military operations.39 Did Pakistan give its consent to such attacks?40
Is such consent even necessary if the United States is exercising its
inherent right of self-defense?41 Does the law of armed conflict apply to
drone attacks in Pakistan, and if so, what is the nature of the relevant

35. Alan W. Dowd, Unmanned Combat, CLAREMONT INST. (Mar. 20, 2013),
http://www.claremont.org/article/unmanned-combat/ (emphasis added).
36. Kate Brannen, Air Force’s Lack of Drone Pilots Reaching ‘Crisis’ Levels, FOREIGN
POL’Y (Jan. 15, 2015), http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/01/15/air-forces-lack-of-drone-pilotsreaching-crisis-levels/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_term=%2Asituation%
20Report&utm_campaign=Sit%20Rep%20January%2016%202015.
37. See Peter W. Singer, Do Drones Undermine Democracy?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2012)
[hereinafter Singer, Do Drones Undermine Democracy?], http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/22/
opinion/sunday/do-drones-undermine-democracy.html (arguing that CIA drone strikes “outside
of declared war zones are setting a troubling precedent”).
38. See, e.g., Afsheen John Radsan & Richard Murphy, The Evolution of Law and Policy
for CIA Targeted Killing, 5 J. NAT’L SECURITY L. & POL’Y 439, 442–43 (2012) (discussing the
positions of critics who decry the CIA drone program as “illegal” and noting the legal and
policy implications of the CIA’s drone program); Singer, Do Drones Undermine Democracy?,
supra note 37 (setting forth a critique of CIA drone strikes that blur “the civilian and military
roles in war and circumvent[] the Constitution’s mandate for authorizing it”).
39. See O’Connell, supra note 14, at 276–85 (discussing jus ad bellum issues vis-à-vis
drone attacks in Pakistan and concluding that “[t]he strongest conclusion to draw under the jus
ad bellum is that there is no legal right to resort to drone attacks in Pakistan”).
40. See id. at 282 (“The US has put itself in a vulnerable position. Without express, public
consent of the kind the US received from Afghanistan and Iraq, Pakistan is in a position to claim
the US is acting unlawfully . . . .” (emphasis added)); Office of the High Comm’r for Human
Rights, Statement of the Special Rapporteur Following Meetings in Pakistan (Mar. 14, 2013),
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13146 (noting the
statement of the Special Rapporteur that “[a]s a matter of international law the US drone
campaign in Pakistan is . . . being conducted without the consent of the elected representatives
of the people, or the legitimate Government of the State. It involves the use of force on the
territory of another State without its consent and is therefore a violation of Pakistan’s
sovereignty”).
41. See Brooks, supra note 4, at 91–93; Harold H. Koh, Legal Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of
State, The Obama Administration and International Law (Mar. 25, 2010), available at
http://www.state.gov/s/l/releases/remarks/139119.htm.
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“armed conflict?”42 Drone attacks also raise significant jus in bello
questions,43 such as the legality of targeted killing in general,44 and of
“signature strikes” in particular.45 Does the United States have a duty to
try to capture the targets of its drone strikes prior to using lethal force
against them?46 What is the status of CIA personnel who operate
drones?47 Last, but not least, drone attacks raise complex legal questions
under the Constitution and laws of the United States: May the President

42. See Michael W. Lewis, Drones and Transnational Armed Conflicts, 3 ST. JOHN’S J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 1, 6–14 (2012). See generally Noam Lubell & Nathan Derejko, A Global
Battlefield? Drones and the Geographical Scope of Armed Conflict, 11 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 65
(2013) (discussing the difficulty of applying traditional laws of armed conflict to drone use
designed to combat the war on terror); McDade, supra note 4, at 4–11 (developing each of the
laws of armed conflict principles—necessity, humanity, dignity, and proportionality—as applied
to the Obama Administration’s use of drone strikes to kill targeted individuals).
43. See O’Connell, supra note 14, at 276 (“The drones used in Pakistan can be lawfully
employed only on the battlefield. The right to resort to them must be found in the jus ad bellum;
the way they are used must be based on the jus in bello and human rights.”).
44. See Laurie R. Blank, Targeted Strikes: The Consequences of Blurring the Armed
Conflict and Self-Defense Justifications, 38 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1655, 1657–58, 1662–69
(2012) [hereinafter Blank, Targeted Strikes] (discussing the legal justifications for targeted
strikes “outside of the zone of active combat in Afghanistan”); Sterio, supra note 10, at 209–11
(discussing the question of whether drone attacks, and the targeting of particular individuals, can
satisfy the requirements of jus in bello); see also Daniel Brunstetter & Megan Braun, The
Implications of Drones on the Just War Tradition, 25 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 337, 347–52 (2011);
Pugliese, supra note 2, at 933.
45. See Arianna Huffington, ‘Signature Strikes’ and the President’s Empty Rhetoric on
Drones, HUFFINGTON POST (July 10, 2013, 5:56 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/ariannahuffington/signature-strikes-and-the_b_3575351.html (criticizing the indiscriminant nature of
the “signature strike,” i.e., when “the CIA or the military makes the decision to fire based not on
who the targets are but on whether they are exhibiting suspicious patterns of behavior thought to
be ‘signatures’ of terrorists”). See generally Kristina Benson, “Kill ‘Em and Sort It out Later”:
Signature Drone Strikes and International Humanitarian Law, 27 PAC. MCGEORGE GLOBAL
BUS. & DEV. L.J. 17 (2014).
46. See, e.g., Ryan Goodman, The Power to Kill or Capture Enemy Combatants, 24 EUR.
J. INT’L L. 819, 819–26 (2013), available at http://www.ejil.org/pdfs/24/3/2427.pdf.
47. NIKLAS SCHÖRNIG, PEACE RESEARCH INST. FRANKFURT, ROBOT WARRIORS: WHY THE
WESTERN INVESTMENT INTO MILITARY ROBOTS MIGHT BACKFIRE, PRIF-REPORT No. 100 18–19
(2010), available at http://www.hsfk.de/fileadmin/downloads/prif100.pdf; Van Raemdonck,
supra note 2, at 12 (noting the controversial issue of the CIA’s role in targeted killing by drones
because CIA agents who operate drones are civilians, even if they are employed by the U.S.
government or in its service); Rebecca Perlman, Targeted Killings: Does Drone Warfare Violate
International Law?, 22 J. PUB. & INT’L AFF. 68, 71–72 (2011) (“CIA officials are not trained in
the laws of war and do not bear the uniforms that serve to adequately distinguish them from
civilians. In the eyes of many, this makes them unlawful combatants, subject to attack
‘whenever and wherever they may be found, including Langley [VA].’” (alteration in original)
(footnote omitted) (quoting Gary Solis, CIA Drone Attacks Produce America’s Own Unlawful
Combatants, WASH. POST (Mar. 12, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2010/03/11/AR2010031103653.html).
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order the killing of an American citizen abroad?48 May he do so when
the target is on U.S. soil?49 Do drone strikes constitute impermissible
“assassinations”?50 What sort of supervisory mechanisms are, and ought
to be, in place before a drone attack is authorized?51 What systems
ought to exist in order to ensure effective and impartial investigations
into drone attacks ex post?52 What criteria are used in order to
48. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LAWFULNESS OF A LETHAL OPERATION DIRECTED AGAINST A
U.S. CITIZEN WHO IS A SENIOR OPERATIONAL LEADER OF AL-QA’IDA OR AN ASSOCIATED FORCE
1, available at http://msnbcmedia.msn.com/i/msnbc/sections/news/020413_DOJ_White_Paper.
pdf (setting forth legal justification for the use of lethal force by the U.S. government “in a
foreign country outside the area of active hostilities against a U.S. citizen who is a senior
operational leader of al-Qa’ida”); cf. Emily Swanson, Drone Poll Finds Opposition to Use
Against American Citizens in U.S., Even to Stop a Terrorist Attack, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 8,
2013, 4:08 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/03/08/drone-poll-drones-us-citizens_n
_2838819.html (showing 42% approval, in a poll, of the use of drones by the U.S. government
to kill American citizens “suspected of terrorism,” while 30% of the respondents disapproved of
such measures).
49. Letter from Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen., Office of the Attorney Gen., to Rand
Paul, Senator, U.S. Senate (Mar. 4, 2013), available at http://big.assets.huffingtonpost.com/
BrennanHolderResponse.pdf. U.S. Attorney General Eric Holder noted that: “It is possible, I
suppose, to imagine an extraordinary circumstance in which it would be necessary and
appropriate under the Constitution and applicable laws of the United States for the President to
authorize the military to use lethal force within the territory of the United States.” Id. However,
he described the question as “entirely hypothetical” and that the U.S. government “has not
carried out drone strikes in the United States and has no intention of doing so.” Id.; see also
Swanson, supra note 48 (finding that while 33% of those polled indicated that it would be
legal—in extraordinary circumstances—for the President to target a U.S. citizen inside the
United States using a drone strike, 47% answered that such an attack could never be legal).
50. See McDonnell, Sow What You Reap?, supra note 24, at 261–63 (characterizing
targeted killings as assassinations); Van Raemdonck, supra note 2, at 3 (providing that “targeted
assassinations of suspect terrorists in Afghanistan and Pakistan” through UAVs are among
“controversial” U.S. counterterrorism practices).
51. Many have noted the lack of congressional oversight over drones. See, e.g., Eric
Black, Investigative Reporter Seymour Hersh Describes “Executive Assassination Ring,”
MINNPOST (Mar. 11, 2009), http://www.minnpost.com/ericblackblog/2009/03/11/7310/
(reporting journalist Seymour Hersh’s comments calling the Joint Special Operations Command
(JSOC) an “executive assassination ring,” over which “Congress has no oversight” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Some have suggested re-coordination of the executive branch
authorities. Micah Zenko, Policy Innovation Memorandum No. 31, Transferring CIA Drone
Strikes to the Pentagon, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Apr. 2013), http://www.cfr.org/drones/trans
ferring-cia-drone-strikes-pentagon/p30434 (“To take a meaningful first step toward greater
transparency, President Barack Obama should sign a directive that consolidates lead executive
authority for planning and conducting nonbattlefield targeted killings under DOD.”). Others
have pointed to a new role for “drone courts.” See, e.g., Garrett Epps, Why a Secret Court Won’t
Solve the Drone-Strike Problem, ATLANTIC (Feb. 16, 2013, 9:54 AM), http://www.theatlantic.
com/politics/archive/2013/02/why-a-secret-court-wont-solve-the-drone-strike-problem/273246/.
52. See HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov’t of Isr. 62(1) PD 507, ¶
54 [2006] (Isr.) (advocating for “ex post examination” subject to judicial review when targeted
killings cause civilian deaths), available at http://www.haguejusticeportal.net/Docs/NLP/Israel/
Targetted_Killings_Supreme_Court_13-12-2006.pdf; Statement by Ben Emmerson, supra note
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determine who may be put on the “kill list”?53 How do we ensure
accountability in the absence of transparency?54 Is Congressional
approval required under the Declaration of War Clause when military
operations are going to be conducted mainly by drones with no “boots
on the ground”? In other words, does such a military engagement
constitute a “war” in the constitutional sense?55

29, at 1 (noting the possibility of UN investigations into individual drone strokes if certain
interested states did not establish impartial investigations); Written Statement of Naureen Shah,
Acting Director, Columbia Law Sch. Human Rights Clinic, For an Ad Hoc Hearing on Drones,
Civilian Harm from Drone Strikes: Assessing Limitations & Responding to Harm 3–7 (May 8,
2013), available at http://cpc.grijalva.house.gov/uploads/Naureen%20Shah%20DronesHearing
WrittenTestimony1.pdf.
53. See Blank, Targeted Strikes, supra note 44, at 1660, 1669–76; Jo Becker & Scott
Shane, Secret ‘Kill List’ Proves a Test of Obama’s Principles and Will, N.Y. TIMES (May 29,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/29/world/obamas-leadership-in-war-on-al-qaeda.html;
Inside the CIA’s “Kill List,” PBS FRONTLINE (Sept. 6, 2011, 10:34 AM), http://www.pbs.org/
wgbh/pages/frontline/iraq-war-on-terror/topsecretamerica/inside-the-cias-kill-list/.
54. No clear answer exists. See Philip Alston, The CIA and Targeted Killings Beyond
Borders, 2 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 283, 308–23, 352–406 (2011) (providing a detailed account of
both transparency and accountability issues); RODERIC ALLEY, CTR. FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES,
THE DRONE DEBATE: SUDDEN BULLET OR SLOW BOOMERANG, DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 14/13, at
24–28 (2013); Bergen & Tiedemann, Washington’s Phantom War, supra note 24, at 17; Radsan
& Murphy, supra note 38, at 457–58, 461–62.
55. A memorandum prepared by the Office of the Legal Counsel of the Department of
Justice (OLC) setting out the President’s authority to use military force in Libya, in 2011,
argued that not every military engagement, however limited, that the President initiates falls
within the Declaration of War Clause of the Constitution. Authority to Use Military Force in
Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1, 8 (2011), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opin
ions/2011/04/31/authority-military-use-in-libya.pdf; see also Harold Hongju Koh, Legal
Adviser, U.S. Dep’t of State, Statement Regarding Use of Force in Libya (Mar. 26, 2011),
available at http://go.usa.gov/QUdF. Rather, the “nature, scope, and duration” of the
engagement ought to be evaluated. Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1, 8
(2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the context of the intervention in Libya, the OLC
concluded that the use of military force would not amount to “war” in the constitutional sense
and thus would not require prior congressional approval pursuant to the Declaration of War
Clause. Id. at 12–13. In particular, the opinion emphasized the limited nature of the mission, as
well as the fact that the use of force would be limited to air strikes and that no ground troops
were going to be deployed. Id. at 13. The anticipated military operation would be “time-limited,
well-defined, discrete and aimed at preventing an imminent humanitarian catastrophe,” and the
air strikes “limited in their nature, duration, and scope.” Koh, supra. Pointing to “historical
gloss” placed on the Constitution by two hundred years of practice, the OLC opined that “war”
in the constitutional sense mostly refers to “prolonged and substantial military engagements,
typically involving exposure of U.S. military personnel to significant risk over a substantial
period.” Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1, 7–8 (2011) (internal
quotation marks omitted); cf. Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor W. Morrison, Presidential Power,
Historical Practice, and Legal Constraint, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 1097, 1099–1100, 1147–48
(2013) (“[D]espite a low likelihood of judicial involvement in the issue, the Obama
Administration offered public legal justifications, based heavily on arguments from historical
practice, for the Libya operation.” (emphasis added)). See generally Curtis A. Bradley & Trevor

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

11

Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 1

12

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

These vexing questions have been the subject of much heated
debate. However, relatively little attention has been given to the use of
drones by the army to carry out attacks in battlefield zones such as
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Libya. Professor David Cole, himself a vocal
opponent of the current policy of using drones, readily concedes that
“drone strikes against enemy fighters in Afghanistan . . . are not
inherently illegal . . . . Nor is it wrong or unlawful to deploy a drone
where there is no other way to halt an imminent attack.”56 Similarly,
Professor Philip Alston, who served as the U.N. Special Rapporteur on
Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, acknowledged in his
Study on Targeted Killings that “a missile fired from a drone is no
different from any other commonly used weapon, including a gun fired
by a soldier or a helicopter or gunship that fires missiles. The critical
legal question is the same for each weapon: whether its specific use
complies with [International Humanitarian Law].”57 Drones may
therefore be deployed in the “battlespace”58 as long as their actual use
comports with the law of armed conflict (LOAC). As such, the
W. Morrison, Historical Gloss and the Separation of Powers, 126 HARV. L. REV. 411, 417–32
(2012) (discussing the arguments supporting historical “gloss” on executive power).
56. David Cole, What’s Wrong with Obama’s Drone Policy, NATION (Mar. 4, 2013),
http://www.thenation.com/article/172898/whats-wrong-obamas-drone-policy.
57. Philip Alston, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or
Arbitrary Executions: Study on Targeted Killings, May 28, 2010, U.N. Doc.
A/HRC/14/24/Add.6, ¶ 79 (May 28, 2010), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/
hrcouncil/docs/14session/A.HRC.14.24.Add6.pdf.
58. Michael N. Schmitt, War, Technology and the Law of Armed Conflict, 82 INT’L L.
STUD. 137, 149 (2006) (“Range, the ability to locate and fix distant enemies, and penetrable
enemy defenses, have made battlefields four dimensional (land, sea, air/space, and cyberspace)
and spatially unlimited. War is no longer necessarily linear, i.e., fought along fixed lines of
troops . . . . Battlefields have been replaced by ‘battlespaces.’” (footnote omitted)). Some have
differentiated the idea of a territorially-contained battlefield and a “global battlefield.” Laurie R.
Blank, After “Top Gun”: How Drone Strikes Impact the Law of War, 33 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 675,
711–12 (2012) [hereinafter Blank, After “Top Gun”] (“[A]fter the September 11th attacks,
President George W. Bush laid the foundation for the notion of the whole world as a battlefield
when he pronounced that ‘our war on terror will be much broader than the battlefields and
beachheads of the past. This war will be fought wherever terrorists hide, or run, or plan.’”
(quoting Radio Address of the President to the Nation, WHITE HOUSE, http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010929.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2014));
Michael N. Schmitt & Jeffrey S. Thurnher, “Out of the Loop”: Autonomous Weapon Systems
and the Law of Armed Conflict, 4 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 231, 246 (2013) (“Not all battlespaces
contain civilians or civilian objects. When they do not, a system devoid of an ability to
distinguish protected persons and objects from lawful military targets can be used without
endangering the former.”); Vogel, supra note 6, at 109. There has been a linguistic shift from
the term “battleground” to “battlespace,” which “recognizes the current reality of forces
operating in a multidimensional battleground against complex opponents.” John P. Sullivan &
Adam Elkus, Police Operational Art for a Five-Dimensional Operational Space, SMALL WARS
J. 1 (July 23, 2009, 6:06 PM), http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/docs-temp/274sullivan.pdf.
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discussion has, to date, focused on whether states have the legal right to
deploy drones and to use them in order to carry out military operations
in combat areas.
But must they be so used? In his 2013 State of the Union address,
President Obama declared that he had imposed “prudent limits on the
use of drones,” because “we will not be safer if people abroad believe
we strike within their countries without regard for the consequence.”59
But what if not using drones amounts to conducting military strikes
without regard for the consequence? Consider a scenario in which a
military commander engages in the planning of an operation against the
enemy in a densely populated urban area. Unfortunately, such an
operation may result in collateral damage—loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, or damage to civilian objects.60 Yet, despite such harms, the
attack may still be carried out lawfully under the law of armed conflict
since LOAC merely aims at minimizing civilian casualties, not
eliminating them altogether. But, if the commander is to attempt to
minimize such casualties, must not she employ the most precise of
weapons in her arsenal? Should not she deploy the most discriminating
means of warfare at her disposal, allowing her to distinguish combatants
from civilians, attacking the former while sparing the latter? And if, in
fact, drones offer the twin promises of greater precision and reduced
lethality, ought not the commander to deploy them rather than call for
alternative methods of air support or bombardment or introduce “boots
on the ground”? Does international law impose a legal duty on states
that possess the relevant advanced technology to use that technology in
battlespace?61 If so, what are the contours of such legal duty, and what
59. President Barack Obama’s State of the Union Address, WHITE HOUSE (Jan. 28, 2014),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2014/01/28/president-barack-obamas-stateunion-address.
60. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Conflicts (Protocol I), art. 51, § 5(b), June 8, 1977,
1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter AP I], available at https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/
Volume%201125/volume-1125-I-17512-English.pdf (describing indiscriminate acts as anything
that “may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to
civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete
and direct military advantage anticipated”); id. art. 57, § 2(a)(iii) (stating that militaries should
“[r]efrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of
civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated”); Rome
Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8, § 2(b)(iv), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
[hereinafter Rome Statute] (prohibiting “[i]ntentionally launching an attack in the knowledge
that such attack will cause incidental loss of life or injury to civilians or damage to civilian
objects or widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment which would be
clearly excessive in relation to the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated”).
61. As of 2012, seventy-six countries have acquired UAV systems. U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-536, NONPROLIFERATION: AGENCIES COULD IMPROVE
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is its temporal and substantive scope? And if not, should such a duty
exist? These are the questions with which this Article grapples.
Part I of this Article briefly describes the newest battlespace
occupants. Robotic systems have been taking active part in combat.
They now inhabit the air, the land, and the sea. They carry out missions
ranging from surveillance and bomb disposal to “destroy and disable.”
Part II examines the relevant principles of LOAC. It argues that drones
are not, per se, unlawful under LOAC. Rather, the critical question is
the same for drones as for other types of weapons, i.e., whether the
specific use of the weapon complies with LOAC. In this context, the
weapon must be deployed in accordance with LOAC’s fundamental
principles of humanity, proportionality, distinction, taking precautions,
and military necessity. Even if a specific type of weapon is not unlawful
per se (or has not been specifically prohibited by particular treaties), it
may not be used improperly, e.g., in a manner that would run afoul of
these principles. Part III applies the principles of LOAC to drones. First,
it analyzes the general trajectories of the development of new weapons
throughout human history, which has involved trading off between three
main considerations, namely distance, accuracy, and lethality. Second, it
examines the rise of precision-guided munitions as an attempt to
balance these three considerations, increasing military efficiency while
minimizing harm to civilians and civilian objects. Part IV discusses the
ability of drones to combine both remote exercise of force and high
accuracy to reduce lethality. Part IV also closely examines both the
promised benefits that the use of drones may bring to battlespace and
the challenges to their deployment. Part V returns to the question of
whether states and their military commanders have an obligation to use
drones in the context of an armed conflict. It argues that although there
are no treaties that deal specifically with the use of drones in armed
conflict and no customary norms obligating the use of drones, such a
duty may be derived from the cardinal principles of the law of armed
conflict. It suggests that such an interpretation is merited if we accept
that drones offer the possibility of a more humane war by combining
remote and accurate use of force to reduce lethality among both friendly
forces and innocent civilians. Part V concludes by setting out further
challenges that ought to receive careful attention in developing and
elaborating on the obligation to use drones in the battlefield.
One clarification is necessary before proceeding. Most of the
(heated) debate regarding the use of drones to date has revolved around
INFORMATION SHARING AND END-USE MONITORING ON UNMANNED AERIAL VEHICLE EXPORTS
9–10 (2012), available at http://dronewarsuk.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/us-gao-_noproliferation-of-uavs.pdf. Over fifty countries have been developing UAV systems, with the
United States and Israel being the global leaders in both manufacturing and exporting such
systems on both the tactical and strategic level. Id. at 13.
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the covert operations of the CIA in countries such as Pakistan, Yemen,
and Somalia although numerically more drone attacks have been carried
out by the military in active combat zones such as Afghanistan, Libya,
and Iraq.62 However, this Article focuses exclusively on the current and
future deployment of drones by the armed forces that operate under the
law of armed conflict in active combat zones.
I. BATTLESPACE’S NEW INHABITANTS
Robotic systems are ubiquitous. They are used on manufacturing
floors, in warehouses, and throughout the various stages of industrial
processes.63 They clean our homes and our clothes.64 They are in
classrooms,65 hospitals,66 and nursing homes.67 They fulfill a myriad of
62. See Jack Serle & Chris Woods, September 2012 Update: US Covert Actions in
Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia (Oct. 1, 2012), http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2012/10/0
1/september-2012-update-us-covert-actions-in-pakistan-yemen-and-somalia/ (reporting that
Somalia suffered three to nine U.S. drone strikes from 2007–2012, Pakistan was subjected to
346 drone strikes from 2004–2012, and Yemen experienced forty to fifty drone strikes from
2002–2012); Chris Woods & Alice K. Ross, Revealed: US and Britain Launched 1,200 Drone
Strikes in Recent Wars, BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (Dec. 4, 2012), http://www.the
bureauinvestigates.com/2012/12/04/revealed-us-and-britain-launched-1200-drone-strikes-in-rec
ent-wars/ (discussing U.S. drone use in Afghanistan and Iraq); U.N. Secretary General,
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering
Terrorism, ¶¶ 29, 32, 34, 36–38, U.N. Doc. A/68/389 (Sept. 18, 2013), available at
http://justsecurity.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/2013EmmersonSpecialRapporteurReportDro
nes.pdf (reporting U.S. drone usage in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Libya, Iraq, and Somalia);
AMNESTY INT’L, LIBYA: THE FORGOTTEN VICTIMS OF NATO STRIKES 6 (2012), available at
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/MDE19/003/2012/en (reporting fifty-five named
civilian casualties in Libya due to airstrikes); Get the Data: Drone Wars, BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM, http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/category/projects/drones/dr
ones-graphs/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2014) (discussing U.S. drone usage in Pakistan, Yemen, and
Somalia); NEW AM. FOUND., supra note 16; Drone Wars Yemen: Analysis, NEW AM. FOUND.,
http://natsec.newamerica.net/drones/yemen/analysis (discussing U.S. drone usage in Yemen)
(last visited Dec. 28, 2014).
63. See, e.g., Greg Bensinger, Amid Drone Talk, Amazon Has Real Robots, WALL ST. J.
(Dec. 6, 2013), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2013/12/06/amid-drone-talk-amazon-has-real-robots/
(discussing Amazon’s use of robots to pare the cost of satisfying a typical order); David J. Hill,
1 Million Robots to Replace 1 Million Human Jobs at Foxconn? First Robots Have Arrived,
SINGULARITY HUB (Nov. 12, 2012, 8:57 AM), http://singularityhub.com/2012/11/12/1-millionrobots-to-replace-1-million-human-jobs-at-foxconn-first-robots-have-arrived/
(noting
one
company’s push to incorporate robots into the company’s manufacturing processes).
64. See, e.g., Vince Lattanzio, Dry Cleaner Drone Delivers Clothes to Customers, NBC10
(July 10, 2013, 11:20 AM), http://www.nbcphiladelphia.com/entertainment/the-scene/DryCleaning-Drone-Delivering-Clothes-to-Customers-214736141.html; Charlie Payne, See Robots
Clean and Patrol Your House, CNN MONEY (Dec. 17, 2013), http://money.cnn.com/video/techn
ology/2013/12/17/robots-drone-parrot-roomba-vacuum-winbot-window-cleaner-google-techn
ology.cnnmoney/.
65. See Damien Kee, Educational Robotics—Primary and Secondary Education, IEEE
ROBOTICS & AUTOMATION MAG., Dec. 2011, at 16, available at http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/
stamp.jsp?arnumber=06096018 (“The use of robotics in education . . . has seen a rapid growth
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socially assistive and entertainment functions.68 They drive on roads
and fields and on the surface of Mars.69 Bill Gates has estimated that the
robotics industry “is developing in much the same way that the
computer business did 30 years ago.”70
Robotic systems also play many roles in the modern battlespace.
They are used in reconnaissance, surveillance, and communication

over the last few years.”).
66. See, e.g., Jason Falconer, Walkbot Exoskeleton Rehabilitates Stroke Survivors,
GIZMAG (Jan. 3, 2013), http://www.gizmag.com/walkbot-exoskeleton-gait-rehab-stroke/25627;
Frank Tobe, Accurary Launches New TomoHDA and Gets FDA Okay for CyberKnife M6,
ROBOHUB (Nov. 1, 2012), http://robohub.org/accuray-launches-new-tomohda-and-gets-fdaokay-for-cyberknife-m6/; Teleoperated Robots, CONSORTIUM ON COGNITIVE SCI. INSTRUCTION,
http://www.mind.ilstu.edu/curriculum/medical_robotics/teleo.php (last visited Dec. 28, 2014)
(noting use of teleoperated robots in medicine); Implement Watson, IBM, http://www03.ibm.com/innovation/us/watson/putting_watson_to_work.shtml (last visited Dec. 28, 2014)
(follow URL and click “Healthcare”); Brain Gate: Researching Neural-Interface System Embedded in
the Brain, PLANET INFOWARS (Nov. 11, 2012), http://planet.infowars.com/technology/brain-gateresearching-neural-interface-system-embedded-in-the-brain; RoboCourier Autonomous Mobile Robot,
SWISSLOG, http://www.swisslog.com/en/Products/HCS/Automated-Material-Transport/RoboCourierAutonomous-Mobile-Robot (last visited Dec. 28, 2014).
67. Heather Kelly, Robots: The Future of Elder Care?, CNN (July 19, 2013),
http://whatsnext.blogs.cnn.com/2013/07/19/robots-the-future-of-elder-care/.
68. See, e.g., Tim Carmody, How Facial Recognition Works in Xbox Kinect, WIRED (Nov.
5, 2010, 11:06 AM), http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2010/11/how-facial-recognition-worksin-xbox-kinect/ (describing face recognition technology); Matthew White et al.,
Assistive/Socially Assistive Robotic Platform for Therapy and Recovery: Patient Perspectives,
2013 INT’L J. OF TELEMEDICINE & APPLICATIONS 1, 1 (2013), http://www.hindawi.com/journals/
ijta/2013/948087/ (noting cost reduction benefits); Wii U Patents Reveal Options for Facial
Recognition, 3D/HD Controller Display and More, GO NINTENDO (Feb. 16, 2012),
http://gonintendo.com/?mode=viewstory&id=172074 (describing Wii U’s possibilities for face
and voice recognition).
69. Chris Anderson, Farm Robots Only Pick the Ripe Strawberries, DIY DRONES (Aug.
10, 2012, 6:00 PM), http://diydrones.com/profiles/blogs/farm-drones-only-pick-the-ripestrawberries (reporting on the waste reduction of vision-based classification for fruit ripeness);
Jerry Hirsch, Self-Driving Cars? They’re Already Here, CHI. TRIB. (Oct. 17, 2013, 5:30 PM),
http://www.chicagotribune.com/classified/automotive/chi-self-driving-cars-20130923,0,778053
0.story (referencing self-driving, range sensing, avoidance, and geotracking); Jesse Hirsch, This
Tractor Drives Itself, MODERN FARMER (Apr. 11, 2013), http://modernfarmer.com/2013/04/thistractor-drives-itself/ (describing a newly invented automated tractor); Ben Schonberger & Steve
Gutmann, A Self-Driving Future, SIGHTLINE DAILY (June 4, 2013, 11:29 AM),
http://daily.sightline.org/2013/06/04/a-self-driving-future/ (considering possibilities that come
with increased automation in cars); In-situ Exploration and Sample Return: Autonomous
Planetary Mobility, NASA JET PROPULSION LAB. CAL. INST. OF TECH., http://mars.jpl.nasa.gov/
mer/technology/is_autonomous_mobility.html (last visited Dec. 28, 2014).
70. Bill Gates, A Robot in Every Home, SCI. AM. (Jan. 2007),
http://www.scientificamerican.com/article/a-robot-in-every-home/; see also F. Patrick Hubbard,
“Sophisticated Robots”: Balancing Liability, Regulation, and Innovation, 66 FLA. L. REV. 1803,
1860–61 (2014) (further elaborating on the wide variety of robots available and the numerous
functions they may fulfill).
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missions,71 and in explosive hazard identification and explosive
ordnance disposal operations.72 They also carry out hazardous-materials
and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosive materials
detection assignments.73 They are used in checkpoints and for “route
clearance.”74 They assist in search and rescue operations.75 They
function as sentries.76 They can also take active part in combat.77
The advent of unmanned aircraft began with vehicles such as the
Kettering Bug during World War I and “evolved through the firstgeneration cruise missiles during World War II and the decade
following.”78 Over the past few decades, the U.S. use of UAV platforms
and operations has grown significantly.79 The U.S. UAV fleet has
grown from less than fifty to 6800 units as of 2009.80 The current aerial
drone landscape includes a variety of UAVs used for military and
civilian purposes.81 The DOD currently has “five [types of] UAVs in
large numbers: the Air Force’s Predator, Reaper, and Global Hawk, and

71. See Blank, Targeted Strikes, supra note 44, at 676 (providing that the surveillance and
reconnaissance capabilities of drones make them the “workhorse of modern intelligence
gathering and targeting determinations”).
72. See, e.g., Gary E. Marchant et al., International Governance of Autonomous Military
Robots, 12 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 272, 288 (2011) (“[M]any explosive devices in Iraq
and Afghanistan that might otherwise have killed and maimed soldiers have been identified, and
eliminated, by robots.” (emphasis added)).
73. David F. Salisbury, Robot Evolution: Partnship Intensifies Between Vanderbilt
Engineers, Physicians, VAND. SCH. OF ENG’G (Dec. 6, 2013), http://engineering.vanderbilt.edu/
news/2013/robot-evolution-partnership-intensifies-between-vanderbilt-engineers-physicians/.
74. Ian Graham Ronald Shaw, The Spatial Politics of Drone Warfare 114 (2011)
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Arizona) (internal quotation marks omitted).
75. See, e.g., Alistair Barr & Elizabeth Weise, Underground Drone Economy Takes
Flight, USA TODAY (Dec. 2, 2013, 9:37 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2013/12/02/
underground-drone-economy/3805387/.
76. See, e.g., Description of iRobot Product Line for Defense and Security, IROBOT,
http://www.irobot.com/us/learn/defense (last visited Dec. 28, 2014) (“These robots allow those
on scene to quickly acquire valuable information and determine the safest response.”).
77. Id. (noting “battle-tested” iRobot product); see infra text accompanying note 101.
78. See BILL YENNE, ATTACK OF THE DRONES: A HISTORY OF UNMANNED AERIAL COMBAT
15 (2004). The earliest UAVs were “small, flimsy, piston-engine, pilotless airplanes.” Id.
79. Dowd, supra note 30, at 7 (“In the past decade, the US drone fleet has swelled from
50 planes to 7,500 . . . .”); Unmanned Aerial Warfare: Flight of the Drones, supra note 30
(“Since 2005 there has been a 1,200% increase in combat air patrols by UAVs. . . . There are
now more hours flown by America’s [unmanned aerial systems] that by its manned strike
aircraft . . . .”).
80. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-10-331, UNMANNED AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS
1, 1 (2010), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/310/302236.pdf.
81. Ian Bott et al., Great and Small: The Many Types of Drone, FIN. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2013,
6:53 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2eeba9b0-21d5-11e3-bb64-00144feab7de.html; Barry
Neild, Not Just for Military Use, Drones Turn Civilian, CNN (June 12, 2013, 6:57 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/07/12/world/europe/civilian-drones-farnborough.
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the Army’s Hunter and Shadow.”82 Aerial drones have a broad sizespectrum: from hummingbird-sized helicopter-like devices to large
solar-powered fixed-wing aircraft.83 Two recent developments on both
ends of the size spectrum are of note. The first is the Black Hornet, a
four-inch-by-one-inch, half-ounce, camera-equipped drone that the
British Army has used in Afghanistan.84 At the other end, in September
2013, Boeing flew the first unmanned F-16 Fighting Falcon,85
suggesting that a fighter pilot in the cockpit may soon become truly
optional. Drones also have varying purposes, depending on their type.86
For example, the military uses the MQ-1B Predator for “mediumaltitude, long endurance missions” because of its dual intelligencegathering and munitions capabilities.87 The MQ-9 Reaper takes on a
“hunter/killer role” with a secondary intelligence purpose.88 Drones rely
82. JEREMIAH GERTLER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42136, U.S. UNMANNED AERIAL
SYSTEMS, at S (2012). This list is not exhaustive, nor does it attempt to classify different types of
UAVs, “e.g. operational v. developmental, single mission v. multi mission, long range v. short
range.” Id. at 31. A sixth type of UAV was revealed in California in October 2014 with the
landing in of the X-37B, a military space plane that spent 675 days in orbit. The U.S. Air
Force’s precise purpose for the X-37B is classified. See Olivia Solon, Top-Secret Military Space
Drone Lands After Two Years in Orbit, MIRROR (Oct. 20, 2014), http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/
technology-science/technology/top-secret-military-space-drone-lands-4467730.
83. John Pring, An Interactive Look at the Different Types of Drones, VISUAL BROADCAST
(Oct. 13, 2013), http://visualbroadcast.com/an-interactive-look-at-the-different-types-of-drones.
An example of the larger type of drone is the Global Hawk, a 32,000 pound, $104 million
system. Kelsey D. Atherton, Flying Robots 101: Everything You Need to Know about Drones,
POPULAR SCI. (Mar. 7, 2013, 3:30 PM), http://www.popsci.com/technology/article/201303/drone-any-other-name.
84. Erik Schechter, Palm-Size Drones Buzz Over Battlefield, LIVE SCI. (Nov. 3, 2013,
9:24 PM), http://www.livescience.com/40908-palm-size-drones-buzz-over-battlefield.html;
Black Hornet Spycam Is a ‘Lifesaver’ for British Troops, BBC NEWS (Feb. 13, 2013, 11:36
AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-21450456. See also Allison Barrie, Insects Inspire Military
Mini Drones, FOX NEWS (Sept. 18, 2014), http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2014/09/18/insectsinspire-military-mini-drones/ (describing developments in miniature drone technology in the
Army’s Micro Autonomous Systems and Technology program, including a BAE prototype that
looks like a fly, weighs less than an ounce, and beats its wings 110 times per second, a
University of Pennsylvania robot that weighs less than three quarters of an ounce and travels at
fifty-three body lengths per second, and other robots inspired by spiders and lizards).
85. Colin Dunjohn, Boeing Converts F-16 Fighter Jet into an Unmanned Drone, GIZMAG
(Sept. 27, 2013), http://www.gizmag.com/boeing-f16-jet-unmanned-drone/29203/; Robert
Sterling,
On
Target:
F-16
Flies
with
an
Empty
Cockpit,
BOEING,
http://www.boeing.com/boeing/Features/2013/09/bds_qf16_09_23_13.page (last visited Dec.
28, 2014).
86. Josh Levs, CNN Explains: U.S. Drones, CNN (Feb. 8, 2013), http://www.cnn.com/
2013/02/07/politics/drones-cnn-explains/.
87. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
88. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (referencing its role in carrying out the “kill
chain (find, fix, track, target, execute, and assess) against high value, fleeting, and time sensitive
targets” (internal quotation marks omitted)). “The MQ-9 can [also] employ four laser-guided
Hellfire missiles.” Id.
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on global positioning system (GPS), long-range data links, lightweight
materials, and visual sensors for navigation, stabilization, and focusing
on targets—all features that their remotely controlled pilots can utilize
in attacks.89 Aerial drone capabilities have also recently been combined
with the capability to land at sea on aircraft carriers. In July 2013,
Northrop Grumman’s X-47B Unmanned Combat Air System
(UCAS)—a strike-fighter-sized machine—made the first unmanned
autonomous aircraft landing on the U.S.S. George H.W. Bush.90 In
addition to performing autonomous carrier-based launches and
recoveries, it is also designed to carry out autonomous air refueling.91
Using GPS data to anticipate the carrier’s movement, the X-47B is able
to refine its own flight path twenty times per second—forty times faster
than the best human pilot.92 Furthermore, it does so without any realtime human control.93 The X-47B may well be the swallow that foretells
an era of permanent, carrier-based fleets of unmanned aircraft.94 The use
of aerial drones is also not limited to international battlespaces or armed
conflicts; the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has recently
approved their limited use in U.S. airspace.95
89. Lauren S. Aguirre, How Dumb are Drones?, NOVA (Jan. 17, 2013),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/tech/how-dumb-are-drones.html.
90. Shane McGlaun, U.S. Navy Moves Ahead with Carrier Drone Project, DAILY TECH
(Aug. 19, 2013, 9:55 AM), http://www.dailytech.com/US+Navy+Moves+Ahead+with+Carrier+
Drone+Project/article33196.htm.
91. Navy Autonomous Aerial Refueling Tests Underway, NAVAIR NEWS (Sept. 11,
2013), http://www.navair.navy.mil/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.NAVAIRNewsStory&id=5451
(reporting on the testing of autonomous aerial refueling capability in a Calspan Learjet
“outfitted with the X-47 B’s navigation, command and control, and vision processor hardware
and software to assess autonomous air refueling functionality”).
92. Michael Milstein, *Pilot Not Included: Military Aviation Prepares for the Inevitable,
AIR & SPACE MAG. (July 2011), http://www.airspacemag.com/military-aviation/pilot-notincluded-161589548.
93. Spencer Ackerman, Navy’s Historic Drone Launch from an Aircraft Carrier Has an
Asterisk, WIRED (May 14, 2013, 3:54 PM), http://www.wired.com/2013/05/drone-carrier/
(providing that the X-47B’s flight plan is pre-programmed, “a matter of an algorithm”).
94. Capabilities: X-47B UCAS, NORTHROP GRUMMAN, http://www.northropgrumman.com
/Capabilities/X47BUCAS/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Dec. 28, 2014) (“The successful flight
test program [for the X-47B] is setting the stage for the development of a more permanent,
carrier-based fleet of unmanned aircraft.”).
95. See Lily Hay Newman, Amazon Says It Will Take Its Drone Research Overseas If
FAA Regulations Are Too Strict, SLATE (Dec. 9, 2014, 5:45 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/
future_tense/2014/12/09/amazon_drone_research_could_move_abroad_if_faa_regulations_aren
_t_permissive.html?wpsrc=slatest_newsletter&sid=5388d502dd52b85a7a00bb72; Alwyn Scott,
U.S. Cracks Open Skies to Testing, Use of Aerial Drones, REUTERS (Dec. 30, 2013, 7:33 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/12/31/us-usa-aircraft-unmanned-idUSBRE9BT0GT20131
231 (“The Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International (AUVSI), estimates the
industry could contribute more than $80 billion to the U.S. economy over a decade and create
more than 100,000 jobs.”); Micahel Berry & Nabiha Syed, The FAA’s Slow Move to Regulate
Domestic Drones, WASH. POST (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
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Aerial robots are not alone on the frontlines. A myriad of military
robotic systems populate the land and the sea. At the time of writing, the
company iRobot had delivered more than 4500 PackBots to defense
forces worldwide.96 Its manufacturer describes the twenty-four pound
PackBot97 as a “tactical mobile robot that performs multiple missions
while keeping warfighters and first responders out of harm’s way.”98
The tele-operated PackBot is a platform that has eight separate payload
bays and hookups allowing the operators to plug-in extendable arms,
mine detectors, power packs, and cameras, as well as weapons
systems.99 Its manufacturer, iRobot, boasts a 95% out-of-the-box
reliability rate.100 The U.S. military has extensively used the PackBot in
Iraq and Afghanistan.101 The PackBot’s “modular digital architecture
accommodates a wide variety of interchangeable payloads that enable a
wide variety of missions.”102 Similar to iRobot, robot developer QinetiQ
also emphasizes the role of its unmanned robotic system in, first and
foremost, helping warfighters and first responders “stay out of harm’s
way.”103 Like iRobot, QinetiQ offers an extensive line of unmanned
systems such as the TALON, the Modular Advanced Armed Robotic
System (MAARS), and the Dragon Runner.104 The payloads of the
various systems that companies manufacture also include weapons.105
For instance, the Special Weapons Observation Reconnaissance
Detection System (SWORDS) TALON—the “first armed robot
conspiracy/wp/2014/09/24/the-faas-slow-move-to-regulate-domestic-drones/ (tracing the history
of FAA regulation of domestic drones); Donna Tam, Amazon Asks FAA to Let It Ramp up
Drone Development, CNET (July 10, 2014), http://www.cnet.com/news/amazon-asks-faa-to-letit-ramp-up-drone-developments/ (highlighting the FAA’s current restrictions on domestic
drones with Amazon asking the government if it can test drones on its own property rather than
on one of the six testing sites designated by the FAA).
96. iRobot 510 PackBot, IROBOT, http://www.irobot.com/~/media/Files/Robots/Defense/
PackBot/iRobot-510-PackBot-Specs.pdf (last visited Dec. 28, 2014).
97. Id.
98. iRobot STEM, EXPO21XX, http://www.expo21xx.com/industrial-robots/18917_st3
_junior-robotics/default.htm (last visited Dec. 28, 2014).
99. P. W. SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR: THE ROBOTICS REVOLUTION AND CONFLICT IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 22 (2009) [hereinafter SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR].
100. Id. at 29.
101. PackBot Tactical Robot, DEF. UPDATE, http://defense-update.com/products/p/pacbot.
htm (last visited Dec. 28, 2014).
102. iRobot 510 Packbot – Unmanned Ground Vehicle (UGV) Specifications, UNMANNED
(July
4,
2011),
http://www.unmanned.co.uk/autonomous-unmanned-vehicles/ugv-dataspecifications-fact-sheets/irobot-510-packbot-unmanned-ground-vehicle-ugv-specifications/.
103. Unmanned Systems, QINETIQ, http://www.qinetiq-na.com/products/unmanned-systems/
(last visited Dec. 28, 2014).
104. Id.
105. See, e.g., MAARS, QINETIQ, https://www.qinetiq-na.com/products/unmanned-systems/
maars/ (last visited Dec. 28, 2014) (showing the MAARS sporting a machine gun and noting
that MAARS “can also carry either a direct or indirect fire weapon system” (emphasis added)).
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designed to roam the battlefield”—can carry assault rifles, machines
guns, and grenade and rocket launchers and it has “nasty” accuracy.106
The Multi-Function Agile Remote-Controlled Robot (MARCbot),
which resembles a toy truck mounted with a camera, is used to scout out
where the enemy might be and “drive under cars and search for hidden
explosives.”107 Whereas the MARCbot goes under things, the Sand
Flea—a ten-pound robot fitted with a camera that resembles a laptop on
wheels—is designed to go over them.108 The Sand Flea can jump
twenty-four to thirty feet in the air and land on its wheels.109 Remotely
operated, it can be launched to jump over walls into compounds or
suspected enclosed areas (or, indeed, into windows and openings on the
second floor of buildings) and send back pictures of whatever is going
on inside before hopping off again to its next destination.110 This robot
answers a perennial problem facing soldiers on patrol: “saddled with
100-pound loads [soldiers] either must scale the walls or kick down the
doors to search the compounds, putting soldiers at risk from booby traps
or utter exhaustion. Without access to an overhead unmanned air
system, the units are also left vulnerable to an ambush.”111 The Sand
Flea joins a range of other robotic systems designed to enable soldiers
to extend their range of vision beyond the direct line of sight and
beyond obstacles, including systems such as the Recon Scout XT—a
1.2-pound robot colloquially known as the “throwbot”—that can be
thrown manually as far as its human thrower can manage and upon
landing, (on wheels) can be driven off remotely.112
The proliferation of drones is not limited to above-land
environments; it now includes drones that skim above and that glide
beneath the surface of water. Water-surface drones fit within a class of
106. SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR, supra note 99 at 29–31 (internal quotation marks omitted).
107. P.W. Singer, Military Robots and the Laws of War, NEW ATLANTIS, Winter 2009, at
25, 36. Famously, the MARCbot was also “the first ground robot to draw blood” in Iraq. Id. at
36. One unit jury-rigged a Claymore antipersonnel mine on their units. SINGER, WIRED FOR
WAR, supra note 99, at 32. If they suspected an ambush, they would send the robot ahead. Id. If
an insurgent was seen, the Claymore would be detonated. Id.
108. Michael Hoffman, Leaping Sand Flea Robot Heading to Afghanistan, MARINE CORPS
TIMES (Nov. 12, 2011, 9:03 AM), http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/article/20111112/NEWS/
111120315/Leaping-Sand-Flea-robot-heading-to-Afghanistan.
109. Id.; see also Jesse Emspak, Robotic Sand Flea Jumps 30 Feet, DISCOVERY NEWS
(Mar. 29, 2012, 4:45 PM), http://news.discovery.com/tech/robotics/robotic-sand-flea-jumps-30feet-120329.htm.
110. See Michael Hoffman, Jumping Robot to Get Tested in Afghanistan, ARMY TIMES
(Nov. 7, 2011, 7:35 AM), http://www.armytimes.com/news/2011/11/army-jumping-robot-sandflea-110711w/.
111. Id.
112. See Recon Scout XT: The Throwable Micro-Robot for Dismounted Troops, RECON
ROBOTICS, http://www.reconrobotics.com/pdfs/Recon-Scout_XT_Spec_Sheet_Military.pdf (last
visited Dec. 28, 2014). A similar robot is iRobot’s 110 Firstlook. See IROBOT, supra note 76.
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unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) or autonomous surface vehicles
(ASVs).113 The United States began focusing increasingly on USVs in
the 1990s and developed the “SAIC/Navtec Owl and Owl II
programmes,” which “investigate[] the role of small (3m) USVs in
surveillance and harbor protection operations.”114 The United States has
also developed the “Spartan USV programme,” which focuses on the
adaptation of larger, rigid inflatable boats (RIBs) to produce semiautonomous, multi-role USVs.115 In 2013, the U.S. Navy awarded four
development contracts “to develop designs to compete for the
Unmanned Carrier Launch Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS)
Air Vehicle.”116 The Coast Guard has petitioned for rapidly deployable
Unmanned Port Security Vessels (UPSVs) that map environments and
infrastructure where it would be unsafe for humans.117 The United
States Navy has tested “launch[ing] six Spike missiles from an
unmanned surface vessel precision engagement module (USV PEM)” in
an effort to respond to possible swarms of small attack crafts.118
A new cadre of remotely operated underwater vehicles (ROVs) or
unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) is being designed that are
capable of doing, underwater, “what the Air Force has been doing in the
sky: prowl stealthily for long periods of time, and gather the kind of
data that could turn the tide in war.”119 ROVs and UUVs are not new,
113. See John Joyce, Navy Integrates Weapon Systems with Unmanned Vehicles for New
Surface Warfare Capability, AMERICA’S NAVY (Oct. 2, 2014, 5:26 PM),
http://www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=83664 (describing the Navy’s demonstration
in late September 2014 of a new integrated surface warfare capability in a maritime environment
on the Potomac River Test Range. The demonstration featured unmanned surface and air
vehicles integrated with naval guns and defense missile systems that relayed data to operators
facing fictional threats); see also Thomas Claburn, Navy Tests Swarming Autonomous Boats,
INFORMATIONWEEK (Oct. 7, 2014, 9:06 AM), http://www.informationweek.com/
government/mobile-and-wireless/navy-tests-swarming-autonomous-boats/d/d-id/1316410.
114. INST. OF ENG’G & TECH., ADVANCES IN UNMANNED MARINE VEHICLES 313 (G.N.
Roberts & R. Rutton eds., 2006).
115. Id.
116. Christopher P. Cavas, US Navy Moves Ahead to Develop Unmanned Carrier Aircraft,
DEF. NEWS (Aug. 14, 2013, 3:45 AM), http://www.defensenews.com/article/20130814/
DEFREG02/308140022/Us-Navy-Moves-Ahead-Develop-Unmanned-Carrier-Aircraft.
117. Harbor Drones Will Help Coast Guard Collect Data in Marine Disasters, HUFF POST
TECH, (Oct. 16, 2013, 11:22 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/10/16/harbordrones_n_4112153.html (explaining that water drones are “a cross between the sleek, aerial
drones . . . and the remote control boats that young boys race in park ponds”).
118. No Hands on Deck—Arming Unmanned Surface Vessels, NAVAL-TECH. (Nov. 23,
2012),
http://www.naval-technology.com/features/featurehands-on-deck-armed-unmannedsurface-vessels/.
119. Mark Thompson, The Navy’s Amazing Ocean-Powered Underwater Drone, TIME
(Dec. 22, 2013), http://swampland.time.com/2013/12/22/navy-underwater-drone/. See generally
A. Alvarez, Redesigning the SLOCUM Glider for Torpedo Tube Launching, 35 IEEE J. OF
OCEANIC ENGINEERING 984 (2010) (discussing advancements—and the need for further
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but the wave of varieties and cheaper, smaller alternatives has
ballooned.120 The U.S. Navy calls its underwater drone—with the
potential to ride “a roller-coaster-like path for up to five years”—the
“glider.”121 A fleet of gliders could “swarm an enemy coastline” en
masse.122 These winged and propellerless drones look like miniature
Tomahawk missiles.123 In 2009, the Navy contracted for up to one
hundred and fifty “Littoral Battlespace-Sensing gliders”—part of the
Tactically Exploited Reconnaissance Node (TERN) to be delivered by
2014—and has more recently contracted for “continued research
efforts” on Slocum Gliders.124 The U.S. Navy has also demonstrated an
“all-electric, fuel cell-powered,” UAV called “eXperimental Fuel Cell
Unmanned Aerial System” (XFC UAS), which can be fired from a
“submarine’s torpedo tube using a Sea Robin launch vehicle system”
and “is designed to fit within an empty Tomahawk launch canister.”125
Once at the surface, the XFC launches vertically from the Sea Robin
into the air, while streaming live video.126 The U.S. Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency (DARPA)—“tasked with expanding
technology and science for use in defense projects”—has also
announced “plans to develop an unmanned, submersible ‘mothership’ to
transport and deploy aerial and underwater drones.”127 This project
integrates new and existing UUV technologies into the Hydra UUV,
which will be used as a platform to deploy UAVs and UUVs from
underwater.128 Robots such as RHex by Boston Dynamics combine this
advancement—in underwater gliders and autonomous underwater vehicles, which are “designed
to observe vast areas of the interior ocean”).
120. Will Connors, Underwater Drones Are Multiplying Fast, WALL ST. J. (June 24, 2013,
7:35 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324183204578565460623
922952.
121. Thompson, supra note 119 (describing how the glider gathers “energy from the
ocean’s thermocline, a pair of layers of warm water near the surface and chillier water below”
and explaining how the glider changes its density through a process of hydraulic buoyancy). The
information that the glider gathers about water temperature, salinity, clarity, currents, etc. could
be readily converted into useful military data and may be critical for calibrating sonar. Id. In a
recent exercise, Navy Captain Walt Luthiger noted that gliders have “helped everyone in that
very difficult job of finding submarines that don’t want to be found.” Id. (internal quotation
marks omitted).
122. Id.
123. William Herkewitz, Ocean Drones Plumb New Depths, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/12/science/earth/ocean-drones-plumb-new-depths.html.
124. Thompson, supra note 119 (internal quotations marks omitted).
125. Tiffany Kaiser, U.S. Navy Fires “XFC” Drone from Underwater Submarine, DAILY
TECH (Dec. 6, 2013 2:35 PM), http://www.dailytech.com/US+Navy+Fires+XFC+Drone+from+
Underwater+Submarine+/article33882.htm.
126. Id.
127. DARPA Looking to Build Underwater Drone ‘Mothership,’ RT (July 24, 2013, 5:16
AM), http://rt.com/usa/darpa-underwater-drone-mothership-502/.
128. Id.
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UUV technology with on-land capabilities and are capable of swimming
and driving, as well as pulling themselves up onto ledges several times
their own height.129 However, the underwater environment is not
without difficulties that do not exist on land or in the air.130
Whether in the air, on land, or under the sea, drones are now at the
forefront of the new American way of war. The strategy underlying the
old way of war was one of destruction and annihilation rather than of
attrition and exhaustion; the goal was to eliminate the enemy’s forces on
the battlefield.131 This meant, among other things, amassing forces on
the battlefield to crush the enemy.132 This strategy also led, all too
frequently, to great harm to civilians.133 By contrast, in the “new”
American way of war, U.S. forces are “expected to bring military power
to bear against an enemy quickly, decisively, and with minimal risk of
heavy casualties” to both American combatants and to enemy
civilians.134 This new way of war gives primacy to agility and precision
over massive force and to effects-based operations leading to the
destruction of specific targets—with the intention of forcing the enemy

129. Evan Ackerman, IROS 2013: Aqua Hexapod Gets New Amphibious ‘Ninja Legs,’
IEEE SPECTRUM (Dec. 9, 2013, 4:39 PM), http://spectrum.ieee.org/automaton/robotics/roboticshardware/iros-2013-rhex-ninja-legs (explaining RHex’s unique ability to travel in land or water
using the same appendages); Rob Bricken, Meet RHex, the Robot that Can Get to You No
Matter Where You Run, ROBOTS (July 25, 2013, 4:30 PM), http://io9.com/meet-rhex-the-robotthat-can-get-to-you-no-matter-wher-915110961 (“RHex can . . . traverse most terrains, hurl
himself over gaps around a couple of feet, and pull himself up onto ledges several times his own
height, which has been enough to get him nicknamed ‘the parkour robot.’”).
130. See, e.g., Connors, supra note 120 (describing the perils of barracudas who want a
“quick bite” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
131. RUSSELL F. WEIGLEY, THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR, at xxii (1973) (“In the history of
American strategy, the direction taken by the American conception of war made most American
strategists, through most of the time span of American history, strategists of
annihilation. . . . [T]he strategy of annihilation became characteristically the American way in
war.”).
132. This also meant heavy casualties to American forces: approximately 405,000 dead
American soldiers in World War II, 36,500 in the Korean War, and 58,200 in the Vietnam War.
ANNE LELAND & MARI-JANA “M-J” OBOROCEANU, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32492,
AMERICAN WAR AND MILITARY OPERATIONS CASUALTIES 2–3 (2010).
133. See PAUL G. GILLESPIE, WEAPONS OF CHOICE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRECISION
GUIDED MUNITIONS 156 (2006) (noting that “under the old American way of war, generals
regularly made war on civilians,” and giving the examples of “William T. Sherman in Georgia
and Curtis LeMay in Japan”).
134. GILLESPIE, supra note 133, at 148; Michael Ignatieff, The New American Way of War,
N.Y. REV. BOOKS (July 20, 2000), http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2000/jul/20/thenew-american-way-of-war/ (explaining that the reduction of risk to American personnel and the
concomitant reduction of collateral damage to the nation’s enemies were consequences of the
political development of American military affairs).
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to abandon key interests—over total destruction of the enemy.135 This
new way of war revolves around technology. Its components include
precision-guided weapons, computers, and information networks.
Operation Desert Storm and Operation Allied Force (NATO’s aerial
intervention in Kosovo in 1999) led many to adopt a vision for the
future of warfare—known as Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)—
which was inexorably linked to technological advancements, the first
and foremost being the computerization of battlespace.136 Imagining
continuing wars against clearly identifiable, professional armies, RMA
was supposed to capitalize on America’s technological advantages such
as fighter planes and aerial dominance, reconnaissance and surveillance
satellites, communications networks, computerized systems, and
precision weapons and munitions.137 But where the realities of
asymmetric warfare have, to a large extent, undermined the usefulness
of technology and RMA thinking,138 drones have emerged as an answer
to those very challenges.
II. THE FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF ARMED
CONFLICT
LOAC regulates, among other things, the means and methods of
warfare—the weapons used and the tactics employed. The overarching
135. See DAVID A. DEPTULA, AEROSPACE EDUC. FOUND., EFFECTS-BASED OPERATIONS:
CHANGE IN THE NATURE OF WAR, at iii (2001); Michael N. Schmitt, Effects-Based Operations
and the Law of Aerial Warfare, 5 WASH. U. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 265, 271–72 (2006).
136. See MICHAEL E. O’HANLON, THE SCIENCE OF WAR 172–74 (2009); cf. U.S. JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., JOINT VISION 2010, at 7–8, 11–14 (2010) [hereinafter
JOINT VISION 2010], available at http://www.dtic.mil/jv2010/jv2010.pdf (noting importance of
“[t]echnologically superior equipment” in contributing to the success of combat forces); U.S.
JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., JOINT VISION 2020 1–3 (2000) [hereinafter JOINT
VISION 2020], available at http://www.pipr.co.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/jv2020-2.pdf
(providing that attaining the goal of “full spectrum dominance” requires the “steady infusion of
new technology and modernization and replacement of equipment”); U.S. DEP’T OF DEF.,
TRANSFORMATION PLANNING GUIDANCE 3–6, 11 (2003), http://www.defense.gov/brac/
docs/transformationplanningapr03.pdf.
137. See THOMAS X. HAMMES, THE SLING AND THE STONE: ON WAR IN THE 21ST CENTURY
6–7 (2006) (noting the DOD’s preference for technology over people); Ignatieff, supra note 134
(providing that RMA represented the “use of computers and knowledge management systems to
improve battlefield command and control; the development of precision-guided conventional
weapons; and the deployment of stealth systems, new types of armor, and unmanned platforms,
which reduced risk for American combatants”); MICHAEL J. MAZARR ET AL., THE MILITARY
TECHNICAL REVOLUTION 26 (1993) (“The trend in warfare over at least the last 200 years has
been dominated by the increasing destructiveness of warfare and weapons. Greater lethality was
achieved through the application of overwhelming firepower. . . . The advent of precision
weapons represents a break in this trend as it allows greater degrees of lethality to be achieved
without corresponding increases in destructiveness . . . .”).
138. DAVID A. KOPLOW, DEATH BY MODERATION: THE U.S. MILITARY’S QUEST FOR
USEABLE WEAPONS 229 (2010).
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principle that pertains to weapons systems is the prohibition of
superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering.139 Weapons that cannot be
directed at specific military objectives and that by their very nature
violate the principle of distinction140 are also unlawful per se.141
Furthermore, even if a specific type of weapon is not unlawful per se or
is not specifically prohibited by particular treaties,142 governments may
not use it improperly—in a manner that would result in unnecessary
suffering or in the targeting of civilian population.143 Such use is also
unlawful under the relevant rules of LOAC. It is in light of these
principles that the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12
August 1949 (AP I) imposes a positive obligation on each “High
Contracting Party” to determine whether the employment of a new
weapon will be prohibited under international law.144 That obligation is
imposed as part of any “study, development, acquisition or adoption of
a new weapon.”145
Judged in light of the above-mentioned tests, drones are obviously
not unlawful per se. Indeed, as noted below, drones have the potential to
be a more discriminating weapon than the alternatives. Nor is there
139. See AP I, supra note 60, art. 35, § 2; Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and
Customs of War on Land and its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War
on Land, art. 23(e), Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter Hague Regulations IV], available
at http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=61CD
D9E446504870C12563CD00516768.
140. See infra note 157–63 and accompanying text.
141. See AP I, supra note 60, art. 51, § 4(b).
142. Examples of weapons that have been specifically prohibited include expanding
bullets, blinding lasers, anti-personnel landmines, chemical weapons, and biological weapons.
Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of AntiPersonnel Mines and on Their Destruction, art. 1, Sept. 18, 1997, 36 I.L.M. 1507 (prohibiting
the use of anti-personnel mines); Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May be Deemed to be Excessively Injurious or to Have
Indiscriminate Effects: Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, BoobyTraps and Other Devices (Protocol II) As Amended, and Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons
(Protocol IV), Protocol II, art. 5, Protocol IV art. 1, Oct. 13, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 1206 (prohibiting
anti-personnel landmines in Protocol II and laser weapons in Protocol IV); Convention on the
Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on
Their Destruction, art. 1, Jan. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 800 (prohibiting use of chemical weapons);
Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of
Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their Destruction, art. 1, Apr. 10, 1972,
26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163 (prohibiting use of biological weapons, inter alia);
Declaration Respecting the Prohibition of the Use of Expanding Bullets, July 29, 1899, 187
Consol. T.S. 459, 26 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 2) 1002.
143. AP I, supra note 60, art. 35, § 2.
144. Id. art. 36.
145. Id.; see, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 5000.01, THE DEFENSE ACQUISITION
SYSTEM 7 (2003), available at http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/500001p.pdf
(requiring a LOAC compliance review to be conducted for every new weapon and weapon
system acquired by the U.S. Department of Defense).
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anything unique about the armaments and munitions carried and used
by drones and their pilots. Thus, Alston, who served as the U.N. Special
Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions,
acknowledged in his Study on Targeted Killings that, “a missile fired
from a drone is no different from any other commonly used weapon,
including a gun fired by a soldier or a helicopter or gunship that fires
missiles.”146 Thus, the critical question is the same for drones as for
other types of weapons—whether the specific use of the weapon
complies with LOAC’s fundamental principles of humanity,
proportionality, distinction, taking precautions, and military
necessity.147
Notwithstanding the popular adage that all is fair in love and war,
article 35(1) of AP I sets out the contrary basic premise of LOAC: “In
any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the conflict to choose
methods or means of warfare is not unlimited.”148 LOAC reflects a
compromise between the demands of military necessity and
humanitarian considerations that are aimed at “alleviating as much as
possible the calamities of war.”149 LOAC allows the economic and
efficient use of force while also minimizing the suffering caused by
armed conflict.150 The equilibrium that LOAC reaches between the
competing principles of military necessity and humanity is reflected in
several “cardinal principles”151 that are “intransgressible”152 and which
form “red threads weaving through the whole tissue” of LOAC.153
The principle of military necessity is a principle of controlled
146. Alston, supra note 57, ¶ 79.
147. Id.
148. AP I, supra note 60, art. 35, § 1; see also Hague Regulations IV, supra note 139, art.
23.
149. YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL
ARMED CONFLICT ¶¶ 9, 11 (2d ed. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (providing that
LOAC “must be predicated on a subtle equilibrium between the two diametrically opposed
stimulants of military necessity and humanitarian considerations” and that LOAC “amounts to a
checks-and-balances system, intended to minimize human suffering without undermining the
effectiveness of military operations”); see also Declaration Renouncing the Use in Time of War
of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes Weight, Dec. 11, 1868, THE CONSOLIDATED
TREATY SERIES 297 (Clive Parry ed., 1976). An English translation of the treaty is available at
Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles Under 400 Grammes
Weight.
Saint.
Petersburg,
29
November/11
December
1868,
ICRC,
http://www.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/52d68d14de6160e0c12563da005fdb1b/dbe0afb2065e0d7e
c125641e0031f38c?OpenDocument (last visited Dec. 28, 2014).
150. CHIEFS OF STAFF, MINISTRY OF DEF., THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL OF THE LAW OF
ARMED CONFLICT, 2004, JSP 383, ¶ 2.1 (U.K.), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/
uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/27874/JSP3832004Edition.pdf.
151. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J.
226, ¶ 78 (July 8).
152. Id. ¶ 79.
153. DINSTEIN, supra note 149, ¶ 19.
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violence.154 While not defined in treaty law, military necessity is
generally accepted as authorizing the use of force so long as it is not
forbidden by international law and is necessary and indeed
indispensable for securing the submission of the enemy as soon as
possible.155 Violence may be lawful, but not all violence is permissible.
Only force necessary to attain definite military objectives and
advantages is lawful under LOAC.156
The principle of distinction is a rule of customary international
law157 and is codified in article 48 of AP I, which provides that, “[i]n
order to ensure respect for and protection of the civilian population and
civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish
between the civilian population and combatants and between civilian
objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their
operations only against military objectives.”158 Violations of the
principle of distinction are considered a grave breach of AP I159 and a
war crime.160 Aimed at protecting the civilian population, the principle
of distinction does not only prohibit combatants from directly targeting
civilians,161 it also requires combatants to distinguish themselves from
civilians, “so that, unlike civilians, they may be seen to be combatants
and the lawful targets of opposing combatants.”162 Thus, for example, in
154. See, e.g., id. ¶ 8 (providing that military necessity must be divorced from “wanton
acts” and caprice of soldiers, and instead must “be leveraged to the attainment of some
discernible military advantage as a direct result”).
155. CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 150, ¶ 2.1; DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 27-10, at
3; THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE ¶ 3 (1956), available at http://armypubs.army.mil/
doctrine/DR_pubs/dr_a/pdf/fm27_10.pdf; see also Hostages Trial (In re List), 15 I.L.R. 632
(1948); FRANCIS LIEBER, INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF ARMIES OF THE UNITED
STATES IN THE FIELD, art. 16 (Gov’t Printing Office 1898) (1863); JOHN FABIAN WITT,
LINCOLN’S CODE: THE LAWS OF WAR IN AMERICAN HISTORY 234–37 (2012).
156. AP I, supra note 60, art. 52, § 2.
157. CLAUDE PILLOUD ET AL., INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE
ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949, at
598 (Yves Sandoz, et al. eds., 1987).
158. AP I, supra note 60, art. 48; see also Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed
Conflict (Protocol II) art. 13, §§ 1–2, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609; 1 INT’L COMM. OF THE
RED CROSS, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW, 11–13, 79–81, 84–85 (2005).
159. AP I, supra note 60, art. 85, § 3 (providing that making the civilian population the
object of attack and launching “an indiscriminate attack affecting the civilian population . . . in
the knowledge that such attack will cause excessive loss of life, injury to civilians or damage to
civilian objects” constitute grave breaches of the Protocol).
160. Rome Statute, supra note 60, art. 8, § 2(b)(i)–(ii).
161. AP I, supra note 60, art. 85, § 3(a).
162. GARY D. SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 251 (2010); see DINSTEIN, supra note
149, ¶ 218 (“The basic rule [of distinction] has two parts. One is its protective aspect, granting
an exemption from attack to civilians and civilian objects. But no less important is the
corresponding exposure to attack of combatants and military objectives.”).
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order to enjoy the status of lawful combatant, one must, among other
things, wear a fixed, distinctive emblem that is recognizable at a
distance (such as a uniform) and carry arms openly.163
The principle of unnecessary suffering prohibits parties to an armed
conflict from causing unnecessary suffering to combatants.164 In this
context, “unnecessary suffering” is considered to be “a harm greater
than that unavoidable to achieve legitimate military objectives.”165 The
magnitude of the harm caused by a particular weapon is not, in and of
itself, determinative of the legality or illegality of that weapon.166 Thus,
for example, incendiary weapons, such as napalm or white
phosphorous, are considered lawful weapons.167 Rather, the question is
one of proportionality between the suffering caused and the military
advantage gained.
Proportionality, in the context of jus in bello, means that military
attacks that are anticipated to result in “incidental loss of civilian life,
injury to civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof,
which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated,” must be cancelled or suspended.168
Proportionality does not constitute a total prohibition on civilian
deaths.169 Rather, it clearly recognizes that some civilian casualties are
unavoidable and applies to them the doctrine of double effect: when we
seek a goal that is morally justified in and of itself, then it is also
morally justified to achieve the goal even if this may lead to undesirable
consequences, on the condition that the undesirable consequences are
unavoidable and unintentional, and that an effort was made to minimize
their negative effects.170
Finally, article 57 of AP I mandates that those who plan or decide
upon an attack “[t]ake all feasible precautions in the choice of means
and methods of attack with a view to avoiding, and in any event to
163. DINSTEIN, supra note 149, ¶¶ 102–05.
164. AP I, supra note 60, art. 35, § 2; Hague Regulations IV, supra note 139, art. 23(e);
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 257
(July 8).
165. Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 1996 I.C.J. ¶ 78.
166. See DINSTEIN, supra note 149, at 9 (“General revulsion in the face of a particular
conduct during hostilities (even if it transcends fluctuations of public opinion) does not create
an independent criterion regulating weaponry . . . .” (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
167. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, supra note 158, at 287.
168. AP I, supra note 60, art. 51, § 5(b); see also id. art. 57, § 2(a)(iii).
169. SOLIS, supra note 162, at 274.
170. See Laurie R. Blank, A New Twist on an Old Story: Lawfare and the Mixing of
Proportionalities, 43 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 707, 715 (2011); R. George Wright,
Noncombatant Immunity: A Case Study in the Relation Between International Law and
Morality, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 335, 341–42 (1991) (discussing the doctrine of double
effect).
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minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians and
damage to civilian objects.”171 This principle of avoidance (also known
as “taking precautions”) means that it is not enough not to intend to kill
civilians while attacking legitimate targets. Indeed, a deliberate,
affirmative effort has to be made not to harm them. This may mean, for
example, that certain targets ought to be attacked only during certain
hours (e.g., at night, when no civilians may be around),172 that some
attacks may need to be conducted from a certain angle,173 and that
advance warnings to the civilian population must be issued by the
attacker prior to the strike.174
III. DISTANCE, ACCURACY, AND LETHALITY
In order to apply the fundamental principles of LOAC to drones, we
need to evaluate and understand the use of drones and drone technology
in the more general context of weapons development, which, throughout
human history, has involved compromises between three main
considerations—distance, accuracy, and lethality. Drones, this Article
suggests, offer the possibility of recalibrating the equilibrium among
these three considerations by increasing military efficiency while
minimizing harm to civilians and civilian objects. As such, they are
arguably in line with the principles of LOAC and, indeed, offer the
promise of more “humane” wars.175
The story of advancements in weapons technology has been about
enabling the exercise of ever-greater lethal force from increasing
distances.176 It is a human instinct to fight from a distance:177 Increased
physical and mechanical separation from the enemy reduces a soldier’s
fear of being killed and, perhaps even more significantly, his reluctance
to kill others.178 It is easier to kill another human being using a spear
171. AP I, supra note 60, art. 57, § 2(a)(ii).
172. See, e.g., Jean-François Quéguiner, Precautions Under the Law Governing the
Conduct of Hostilities, 88 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 793, 800 (2006), available at
https://www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/irrc_864_queguiner.pdf.
173. Id. at 801.
174. AP I, supra note 60, art. 57, § 2(c).
175. See infra Section V.A.
176. Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Targeted Warfare: Individuating Enemy
Responsibility, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1521, 1570–71 (2013).
177. See, e.g., ARDANT DU PICQ, BATTLE STUDIES: ANCIENT AND MODERN BATTLE (John N.
Greely & Robert C. Cotton trans., 1946), reprinted in 2 ROOTS OF STRATEGY 9, 115 (1987)
(noting that “close formation of men armed with pikes was irresistible” because “pikes fifteen to
eighteen feet long kept you at a distance”).
178. See Rosa Brooks, Drones and Cognitive Dissonance, in DRONES, REMOTE TARGETING
AND THE PROMISE OF LAW (Peter Bergen & Daniel Rothenberg eds., forthcoming), available at
http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/1256 (“If drone strikes enable us to kill enemies
without exposing our own personnel, this should presumably be considered a good thing, not a
bad thing.”). The physical distance, though safe for the drone pilot, means that they are not
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than a knife. It is easier still to use a bow rather than a spear. It is easier
yet to shoot indirectly at the enemy from a great distance than to target
her with direct fire. And it may be easiest of all to kill by dropping
bombs from high altitude. However, an inverse relationship exists
between distance and accuracy.179 Projectiles have not proven the most
efficient way to kill the enemy. No matter how trained their operator,
once released, projectiles—arrows, canon balls, bullets, missiles, and
bombs—are subject to factors that are beyond the operator’s control.180
Weather conditions and the laws of physics participate in shaping the
trajectory of the projectile.181 Moreover, the time that is needed for the
projectile to traverse the distance between its origin and its target may
allow the target to parry the attack by changing his position or taking
cover.
In order to compensate for the inherent inefficiency of projectilebased weapons, their lethality has been continuously increased. Both the
quantity and the quality of projectile weapons had to be augmented. If a
single weapon could not guarantee a sufficient probability of hitting the
target, deploying a large number of weapons (and a large number of
soldiers operating them) against the same target would improve the
odds. Making each projectile more lethal would similarly improve the
chances that, even if the target were not hit with precision, it would be
destroyed.
Increased lethality, both with regard to the number of bombs
dropped on a target and the size of those bombs, was a hallmark of the
old American way of war.182 The air campaign during the Vietnam War
still saw the use of the euphemistic “strategic bombing” and of massive
bombs like the 15,000-pound BLU-82 “Daisy Cutter,” both of which
compensated for a lack of pinpoint accuracy with greater, broader

physically present and able to make split-second, life-or-death decisions. Grigoriy Mishkov &
Thomas Stimmel, The Predator of the Sky; the Avenger Drone 6 (Univ. of Pittsburgh Swanson
Sch. of Eng’g, Working Paper No. 2260, 2012), available at http://136.142.82.187/eng12/
Author/data/2260.docx. This dissociation raises questions about who is qualified to make
decisions about who lives and who dies. See Sterio, supra note 10, at 213.
179. Brooks, supra note 178 (noting that the distance between the drone and operator
makes imprecision unavoidable).
180. See Christopher B. Puckett, In This Era of “Smart Weapons,” Is a State Under an
International Legal Obligation to Use Precision-Guided Technology in Armed Conflict?, 18
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 645, 649 (2004) (providing that projectile accuracy improves when the
user makes adjustments “in response to altitude, range, and poor weather conditions”).
181. See id.
182. See GILLESPIE, supra note 133, at 37 (“[T]he prosecution of World War II epitomized
the previously established American way of war, depending upon a strategy of attrition and the
efficient employment of technology to defeat the enemy. In a war more total than any before or
since, wartime exigencies and the vast resources of the United States combined to produce
innovative technologies in unprecedented quantity and scope.” (emphasis added)).
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force.183 The Vietnam War also saw the emergence of a new way of
fighting, which recognized the value of precision and accuracy over
raw, indiscriminate force.184 It witnessed the first large-scale
deployment of precision-guided munitions (PGMs) and the beginning of
a shift from gravity-directed “dumb” bombs to “smart” weapons.185
That shift captured worldwide attention during Desert Storm186 (despite
relatively little actual use of smart bombs during the operation)187 and
was crystalized during Operation Allied Force in 1999.188 PGMs’
promise of a more accurate and potentially less lethal war, at least for
“our” combatants and “their” civilians, has been wedded to and used in
tandem with drone technology since the mid-2000s.189
A. Distance
The distancing of warriors from their enemies has been a consistent
and critical pattern in the development of weapons throughout human
history. Weapons such as spears, javelins, and bows allowed forces to
engage the enemy from greater horizontal distances than did stones,
sticks, clubs, knives, and swords.190 The harnessing of animals such as
horses, camels, and elephants for warfare lifted their riders vertically
above the battlefield and allowed them to attack the enemy from
above.191 Their use also increased significantly the speed of both attack
183. Id. at 99.
184. JAMES E. HICKEY, PRECISION-GUIDED MUNITIONS AND HUMAN SUFFERING IN WAR 76
(2012) (providing that “operationally effective precision-guided munitions” replaced unguided
“dumb” bombs during the Vietnam era); see also id. (noting that the Vietnam war, despite its
horrors and failures, “serves as a bridging case study between two eras of warfare, and also
serves as the progenitor of the style of warfare so prominently displayed in modern American
combat operations”).
185. Id.
186. Id. at 111.
187. Id. at 154 (noting that just 8% of munitions used in Operation Desert Storm were
precision-guided).
188. See id. at 173 (describing the performance of precision-guided munitions in Kosovo as
“near-perfect”).
189. Another trend worth noting with regard to the emergence of weapons systems is the
increasing development of non-lethal (also known as “less lethal”) weapons systems. Such
weapons strike a different balance between lethality and accuracy—i.e., they compensate for
their lower (or in some cases, absence of) lethality, with less precision. In other words, because
such weapons are less lethal it seems less critical for them to be quite as discriminatory as more
lethal weapons. U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., DIRECTIVE 3000.03E, DOD EXECUTIVE AGENT FOR NONLETHAL WEAPONS (NLW), AND NLW POLICY 2–3 (2013), available at
http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/300003p.pdf.
190. See VIC HURLEY, ARROWS AGAINST STEEL: THE HISTORY OF THE BOW AND HOW IT
FOREVER CHANGED WARFARE 13 (2011).
191. See JARED DIAMOND, THE RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD CHIMPANZEE 217 (1991)
(describing how the domestication of horses revolutionized warfare in a way that no other
animal ever rivaled by pulling battle chariots and carrying saddles and stirrups, allowing
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and defense while offering greater protection to their riders against
conventional attacks mounted by the opposing infantry.192 For its part,
the infantry revolution of the fourteenth century presented two main
tactical responses to the mounted cavalry, both of which have similarly
depended on engagement from a distance: first, deploying archers using
bows, crossbows, longbows, and composite bows (and, later on,
firearms) in order to stop the cavalry at a distance,193 and, second,
meeting those cavalrymen who had managed to survive the onslaught of
arrows with long pikes defending tightly-packed infantry units.194
The story of advancements in weapons technology is, to a large
extent, the story of enabling the exercise of lethal force from increasing
distances and the stretching of the battlespace.195 Distancing addresses
both the soldier’s fear of being killed and her reluctance to kill others.196
The fear for one’s own life affects one’s judgment and may impair the
ability to act effectively in battle.197 The ways in which distancing
affects such fear are complex. Distancing may exacerbate fear of the
unseen enemy and instill a sense of helplessness against an incoming

conquistadors to defeat the Inca and Aztec nations); id. at 243 (“Throughout the world the horse
revolutionized warfare and enabled horse-owning peoples to terrorize their neighbors.”).
192. See id. at 217 (discussing how horses revolutionized warfare).
193. MAX BOOT, WAR MADE NEW 74 (2006) (noting that by the fourteenth century, “Swiss
pikemen and English longbowmen eclipsed mounted knights as the dominant force on the
battlefield”).
194. See DAVE GROSSMAN, ON KILLING: THE PSYCHOLOGICAL COST OF LEARNING TO KILL
IN WAR AND SOCIETY 120 (2009) (“The physical range provided by the spears of the Greek and
Macedonian phalanx provided much of the psychological leverage that permitted Alexander the
Great to conquer the known world. The psychological leverage provided by the hedge of the
pikes was so powerful that the phalanx was resurrected in the Middle Ages and used
successfully in the era of mounted knights.” (footnote omitted)).
195. SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR, supra note 99, at 100 (“In antiquity, when you divided the
number of people fighting by the area they would typically cover, on average it would take a
Greek hoplite and five hundred of his buddies to cover an area the size of a football field. . . . By
the time of the American Civil War, weapons had gained such power, distance, and lethality that
roughly twenty soldiers would fight in that same space of a football field. By World War I, it
was just two soldiers in that football field. By World War II, a single soldier occupied roughly
five football fields to himself. In Iraq in 2008, the ratio of personnel to territory was roughly 780
football fields per one U.S. soldier.”); see DU PICQ, supra note 177, at 138 (“To fight from a
distance is instinctive in man. From the first day he has worked to this end, and he continues to
do so.”).
196. GROSSMAN, supra note 194, at 97–98, 127–28. The ability to destroy the enemy from
a long range also confers political advantages such as being “freed from the constraint of
securing alliance consent for use of their bases, and from the risk of exposing American assets
to attack.” MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, VIRTUAL WAR: KOSOVO AND BEYOND 169 (2000).
197. See generally Gregory A. Daddis, Understanding Fear’s Effect on Unit Effectiveness,
MIL. REV., July–Aug. 2004, at 22 (2004) (describing sources of fear and the ways fear
psychologically inhibits effective war strategy, and offering strategies to counteract fear).
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long-range attack.198 At the same time, distancing offers a sense of
impunity and decreased personal risk and some semblance of force
protection. Perhaps most significantly, distancing minimizes the trauma
that results from what retired Army Lieutenant Colonel Dave Grossman
calls the “Wind of Hate.”199 According to Grossman’s study of killing
in war, a critical factor in the incidence of psychiatric casualties among
soldiers is not the mere existence of fear of death and injury, but rather
the fact that such danger is brought about by and through “close-up,
inescapable, interpersonal hatred and aggression.”200 Soldiers and
civilians can withstand ongoing aerial and artillery bombardments,
because being psychologically protected by distance allows denial that
anyone is personally trying to kill them; the mere threat of close-up
aggression by attacking infantry, however, may cause them to flee.201
Even more importantly, studies about the actual conduct of soldiers
in war have persuasively demonstrated that fear for one’s life is one of
the least significant contributing factors to psychiatric trauma among
soldiers.202 Far more critical to understanding soldiers’ conduct on the
battlefield is the often-underappreciated fact that a significant number of
soldiers choose either not to fire their weapons at all or, when they do
discharge their firearms, not to fire directly at an enemy soldier when

198. See, e.g., JOANNA BOURKE, AN INTIMATE HISTORY OF KILLING: FACE-TO-FACE KILLING
65, 81 (1999); Daddis, supra note 197, at 23.
199. GROSSMAN, supra note 194, at 75–81.
200. Id. at 80.
201. Id. at 77–80. Grossman explains that “[i]t is not fear of death and injury from disease
or accident but rather acts of personal depredation and domination by our fellow human beings
that strike terror and loathing in our hearts.” Id. at 76.
202. See id. at 64. In modern wars the number of psychiatric casualties has consistently
exceeded the number of combat fatalities. RICHARD A. GABRIEL, NO MORE HEROES: MADNESS
AND PSYCHIATRY IN WAR 77 (1987). Gabriel notes that, “[i]n every war in which American
soldiers have fought in this century, the chances of becoming a psychiatric casualty . . . were
greater than the chances of being killed by enemy fire.” Id. While Gabriel provides that the
Vietnam War was an exception, with the chances of being killed in battle and suffering some
psychological injury being almost equal, he also finds that if one includes those who suffered
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, “then once again more soldiers suffered psychiatric collapse
than death from enemy fire.” Id. Similar findings apply to the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF): 30%
of IDF casualties during the 1973 Yom Kippur War were psychiatric whereas in the (first)
Lebanon War of 1982, the number of Israeli psychiatric casualties exceeded the number of dead
by more than 150%. Id.
A recent study found that approximately twenty-two U.S. veterans were estimated to have
committed suicide per day in 2010. See JANET KEMP & ROBERT BOSSARTE, DEP’T OF VETERANS
AFFAIRS, SUICIDE DATA REPORT, 2012, at 15 (2012), available at http://www.va.gov/opa/docs/
Suicide-Data-Report-2012-final.pdf; see also Greg Jaffe, VA Study Finds More Veterans
Committing Suicide, WASH. POST (Feb. 1, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/vastudy-finds-more-veterans-committing-suicide/2013/01/31/1092b330-5a68-11e2-9fa9-5fbdc9
530eb9_story.html (“Every day about 22 veterans in the United States kill themselves . . . .”).
IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY WARFARE

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss1/1

34

Gross: The New Way of War: Is There A Duty to Use Drones?

2015]

IS THERE A DUTY TO USE DRONES?

35

the latter is in their sights.203 Where some regard such conduct as a sign
of panic or cowardice that ought to be overcome by focused training,
others suggest that such behavior results from the compulsion not to kill
that is internalized in most human beings and which retains a hold even
in battle.204 As military historian S.L.A. Marshall famously argues,
based on interviews with World War II veterans,
the average and normally healthy individual . . . has such an
inner and usually unrealized resistance toward killing a
fellow man that he will not of his own volition take life if it
is possible to turn away from that responsibility. . . . At the
vital point, he becomes a conscientious objector,
unknowing.205
On the battlefield, soldiers often choose to fire over the enemy’s head,
or not to fire at the enemy at all, thus exercising their “right to miss.”206
Even if war is a mass act of justified (or excused) killing, for individual
soldiers the tension between their inherent strong reluctance to kill
another human being and the demands of front-line battle may be
overwhelming.207 A soldier in combat is caught in a tragic Catch-22:
203. See GABRIEL, supra note 202, at 75 (noting that during WWII less than 1% of
American fighter pilots accounted for over 40% of all enemy aircraft destroyed in the air, while
most fighter pilots never shot anyone down or even tried to); S.L.A. MARSHALL, MEN AGAINST
FIRE 50 (2000) (arguing that 75% of soldiers, including “well-trained and campaign-seasoned
troops. . . . will not fire or will not persist in firing against the enemy . . . . These men may face
the danger but they will not fight.”). See generally RICHARD HOLMES, ACTS OF WAR: THE
BEHAVIOR OF MEN IN BATTLE (1985) (describing the individual behavior of soldiers during
wartime, including preconceptions, sensations at first contact with the enemy, changing attitudes
towards combat experience, and feelings toward adversaries).
204. See GROSSMAN, supra note 194, at 16. Grossman argues that there exists a powerful,
innate human resistance toward killing one’s own species and that “[t]his singular lack of
enthusiasm for killing one’s fellow man has existed throughout military history.” Id.; see also
BOURKE, supra note 198 at 203–29 (discussing the “burden of guilt” from killing that manifests
both on and off the battlefield); BEN SHALIT, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CONFLICT AND COMBAT 51
(1988); Peter Marin, Living in Moral Pain, in THE VIETNAM READER 40, 44 (Walter Capps ed.,
1991) (arguing that psychiatric literature tended to treat “[r]epugnance toward killing and the
refusal to kill” as “acute combat reaction” (internal quotation marks omitted)); The Soldier’s
Heart: The Impact of Killing & How to Prepare the Soldier, FRONTLINE (Mar. 1, 2005),
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/heart/themes/prep.html.
205. MARSHALL, supra note 203, at 79.
206. GROSSMAN, supra note 194, at 14–15, 21–29.
207. See id. at 30 (describing the soldier’s reluctance to kill as an internalized aversion to
killing a fellow man—even if such reluctance endangered the soldier’s own life); J. GLENN
GRAY, THE WARRIORS: REFLECTIONS ON MEN IN BATTLE 207 (1959) (“Consciousness of failure
to act in response to conscience can lead to the greatest revulsion, not only for oneself, but for
the human species.”). See generally JONATHAN SHAY, ACHILLES IN VIETNAM: COMBAT TRAUMA
AND THE UNDOING OF CHARACTER, at xx–xxiii (1994) (analogizing the psychological trauma
suffered by the soldiers who fought in Vietnam to the “profound grief” suffered by Achilles
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If he overcomes his resistance to killing and kills an enemy
soldier in close combat, he will be forever burdened with
blood guilt, and if he elects not to kill, then the blood guilt
of his fallen comrades and the shame of his profession,
nation, and cause lie upon him. He is damned if he does,
and damned if he doesn’t.208
Not all killing on the battlefield is equal. “[A] direct relationship
[exists] between the empathic and physical proximity of the victim” and
the “difficulty and trauma” of killing.209 Modern warfare has seen little
hand-to-hand combat,210 or even the “intimate brutality” of killing with
a non-projectile weapon such as a spear, bayonet, or knife.211 “Personal
kills”—in which a soldier knows with certainty that he is responsible for
the killing of a specific individual—take immense psychological toll on
the killer and are extremely difficult to perpetrate.212 Instead, most
killing is done at greater distances.213 Most soldiers on the battlefields
since the early nineteenth century have died as a result of long-range
artillery fire, rather than through opposing infantry fire.214 Killing at a
distance is an impersonal, indirect, and uncertain affair. Historian
Joanna Bourke provides the following account by an American soldier
in Vietnam: the “grenade launcher was good because . . . even though
people are getting killed by what you’re firing it’s not a direct
thing. . . . You didn’t have to put your eye on a particular person and
shoot him and kill him.”215 Moreover, engaging the enemy from at least
a mid-range offers deniability. Killing from a distance is similar to the
after the death of his close friend Patroklos, which ultimately led Achilles to commit atrocities
against the living and the dead alike).
208. GROSSMAN, supra note 194, at 86.
209. Id. at 97.
210. HOLMES, supra note 203, at 377–78; cf. GROSSMAN, supra note 194, at 132 (“Man has
a tremendous resistance to killing effectively with his bare hands.”).
211. GROSSMAN, supra note 194, at 120–30. Grossman notes that among these means, “it is
psychologically easier to kill with an edged weapon that permits a long stand-off range,” such as
a spear, rather than with a weapon that allows for a shorter stand-off range, such as a knife. Id.
at 120. Bayonet combat is “extremely rare in military history,” with “one side or the other
invariably flee[ing] before the actual crossing of bayonets occurs.” Id. at 122; see also HOLMES,
supra note 203, at 378.
212. GROSSMAN, supra note 194, at 114–15, 119 (“Looking in a man’s face, seeing his eyes
and his fear, eliminate denial. At this range the interpersonal nature of the killing has shifted.
Instead of shooting at a uniform and killing a generalized enemy, now the killer must shoot at a
person and kill a specific individual. Most simply cannot or will not do it.”).
213. BOURKE, supra note 198, at 39 (“The bayonet charge, for instance, was not
representative of most combatants’ experiences of battle. Even during the First World War,
long-distance shelling by artillery killed two-thirds of all soldiers, while less than half a per cent
[sic] of wounds were inflicted by the bayonet.”).
214. GROSSMAN, supra note 194, at 28; see, e.g., BOURKE, supra note 198, at 39.
215. BOURKE, supra note 198, at 205.
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“conscience round” utilized by firing squads to alleviate the trauma that
may be involved in taking another human being’s life.216 Soldiers often
do not know with certainty—indeed do not want to know—whether
they killed an enemy. If that is true for front-line infantry,217 it is all the
more so for those who fire missiles, bombs, or artillery shells.218 Even
in those increasing distances, there is a discernible difference between
mid-range, long-range, and maximum-range killings.219 Killing done at
maximum or long range further depersonalizes and dehumanizes the
victims of the attack and makes their individual deaths, in some sense,
unintended and easier to deal with.220 Artillery and missile crews,
bomber pilots, and naval gunners are similarly insulated by mechanical
and physical separation from their targets.221 The targets are
depersonalized: a ship (rather than its sailors), a plane (rather than its
pilot).222 Fighter pilots are much more likely to shoot down an enemy
plane today when the engagement is done at extremely high speeds and
often is visualized through radar and electronic systems, than were
pilots in the significantly slower planes of World War I and World War
II, who had the opportunity to look “into the cockpit at another man, a
pilot, a flier, one of the ‘brotherhood of the air,’ a man frighteningly like
themselves.”223 Depersonalization of the enemy may also explain why
killing from behind—whether by an individual commando or by units
of soldiers targeting a fleeing enemy—is easier to carry out.224
216. See, e.g., GEOFFREY ABBOTT, WHAT A WAY TO GO 112 (2007) (explaining that firing
squads’ “inclusion of a blank round [is] in order to salve the consciences of the squad
members”); ROBERT JAY LIFTON & GREG MITCHELL, WHO OWNS DEATH?: CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT, THE AMERICAN CONSCIENCE, AND THE END OF EXECUTIONS 89 (2002) (“One
member of a firing squad is always given a blank. This is for the conscience of the executioners,
so no one knows for sure who fired the live round, . . . noting the need to give the firing squad
members a chance to get over any emotional barrier to pulling the trigger. . . . Efficiency in
killing diminishes pain, while human emotions that interfere with efficiency can increase the
prisoner’s suffering.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
217. See, e.g., HOLMES, supra note 203, at 376 (“Most of the veterans I interviewed were
infantrymen with front-line service, yet fewer than half of them believed that they had actually
killed an enemy, and often this belief was based on the thinnest of evidence.”).
218. See Jimmy Carter, Nobel Lecture (Dec. 10, 2002), available at
http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/2002/carter-lecture.html (“From a great
distance, we launch bombs or missiles with almost total impunity, and never want to know the
number or identity of the victims.”).
219. For distinctions between the various ranges of killing, see GROSSMAN, supra note 194,
at 107–13.
220. See GRAY, supra note 207, at 178 (“With every foot of distance there is a
corresponding decrease in reality. Imagination flags and fails altogether when distances become
too great.”).
221. GROSSMAN, supra note 194, at 108.
222. See GWYNNE DYER, WAR 57 (rev. ed. 2004).
223. GROSSMAN, supra note 194, at 31, 58.
224. Id. at 128.
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“Looking another human being in the eye, making an independent
decision to kill him, and watching as he dies due to your action combine
to form one of the most basic, important, primal, and potentially
traumatic occurrences of war.”225 When you cannot see the enemy’s
face, killing becomes less difficult.226 Even snipers, who are able to see
and select their individual targets but are removed therefrom by means
of the riflescope, are mostly immune to psychiatric trauma.227
Distancing makes easier both the act of killing and the ability to justify
and rationalize it, to others and to oneself.228 It makes war seem less
hellish and more antiseptic.229 It offers the possibility of killing with
impunity, which has become a defining feature of modern warfare and
of the anonymous soldiers who do the fighting.230
However, the trend towards increasing the distance between
opposing enemy forces has faced two different challenges. First is the
long-standing challenge of accuracy of the weapons used. A second,
much more recent challenge derives from the realities of
counterinsurgency operations and asymmetric warfare. For the most
part, guerillas and insurgents shun open confrontation with their far
stronger opponents. Instead, they channel fighting to heavily populated
urban areas in order to minimize their own casualties while, at the same
time, deliberately exposing civilians to harm. This type of action may
well deter the stronger force from attacking otherwise legitimate
military targets due to concerns over the proportionality of the response
and excessive collateral damage among civilians and civilian targets.231
225. Id. at 31. Soldiers on patrols behind enemy lines generally do not suffer psychiatric
stress because the most common factor “causing combat stress is not present: they are not
obligated to engage in face-to-face aggressive activities against the enemy. Even though these
missions are highly dangerous, danger and the fear of death and injury are quite obviously not
the predominant cause of psychiatric casualties in battle.” Id. at 60–61.
226. Id. at 128 (“Not having to look at the face of the victim provides a form of
psychological distance that . . . assists in . . . subsequent denial and the rationalization and
acceptance of having killed a fellow human being.”). This factor also explains why executions
are traditionally conducted from behind the victim or when they are blindfolded or hooded. Id.
227. Id. at 108–10.
228. Grossman states that, “[t]he burden of killing is so great that most men try not to
admit that they have killed. They deny it to others, and they try to deny it to themselves.” Id. at
91.
229. See IGNATIEFF, supra note 196, at 215 (“We see war as a surgical scalpel and not a
bloodstained sword. In doing so we mis-describe ourselves as we mis-describe the instruments
of death.”). The statement “war is hell” is attributed originally to William Tecumseh Sherman.
See JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS 705 (14th ed. 1968).
230. See CHRISTOPHER COKER, THE WARRIOR ETHOS 106 (2007) (“For good or ill, weapons
have long determined the view we in the West have had of warriors—their skill at using
weapons that kill anonymously, from a distance, and their ability to withstand for hours on end
high attritional rates of firepower from a largely unseen enemy.”).
231. The use of the euphemism “collateral damage” to refer to unintended civilian
casualties is now commonplace. It ought to be noted that the AP I refers to such injury or death
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For a military response to be effective, the more powerful military must
engage with the enemy on the latter’s own turf, in low-tech battles at
close quarters. While distancing through advanced weapons minimizes
the twin risks of being killed and of killing, the realities of modern
asymmetric warfare have re-raised and strengthened those risks: the
overwhelming technological advantage of the strong side is negated.
Soldiers often have to resort to house-to-house fighting, which
exacerbates the feeling of being alone since “[t]he nature of urban
terrain with its walls, compartmentalization, and limited visibility
enforces isolation.”232 From the perspective of the insurgents, such
warfare has yet another benefit—it increases the death toll among, and
is demoralizing to, their opponents.233
B. Lethality: Responding to Lack of Accuracy
Distance and accuracy are inversely related.234 Once discharged,
projectiles—arrows, cannon balls, artillery shells, bullets, missiles, and
bombs—are all subject to factors that are beyond the operator’s control.
Weather conditions and the laws of physics participate in shaping the
trajectory of the projectile. Moreover, the time the projectile takes to
cross the distance between the point of origin and its target may allow
the target to parry the attack by changing its position or taking cover.235
To address this conundrum, fighting forces have augmented both the
quality and the quantity of projectile weapons. Making each projectile
more lethal improved the chances that even if the target were not hit
directly it would be destroyed.236 Similarly, if a single weapon could not
guarantee a sufficient probability of hitting the target, deploying a larger
number of weapons against the same target would improve the odds.
of civilians as “incidental” rather than “collateral.” AP I, supra note 60, art. 51, § 5(b). For
clarity’s sake, this Article retains the widely used term “collateral damage.”
232. Daddis, supra note 197, at 24. On the contribution of distancing to isolation on the
battlefield see BOURKE, supra note 198, at 65 (“[L]ong-distance weapons separated soldiers
from each other, making the battlefield one of the loneliest places on earth . . . .”).
233. MARTIN VAN CREVELD, THE CHANGING FACE OF WAR 227 (2008) (“[F]or the strong,
every soldier, policeman, or civilian killed becomes one more reason to end the struggle. For the
weak, it is one more reason to continue until victory is won.”).
234. As Professor Michael Schmitt notes, there is a distinction between accuracy and
precision: “Accuracy is the ability of a weapon to strike a specified location, known as the
aimpoint. Precision, by contrast, involves identifying targets in a timely fashion and striking
them accurately.” Schmitt, supra note 58, at 146 (footnote omitted).
235. See KOPLOW, supra note 138, at 81 (“Accuracy may be the single most important and
most elusive factor in armed conflict. No matter how big, destructive, and deadly a bomb you
build, if you cannot deposit it reasonably close to the intended target, it will not do the enemy
much harm or you much good.”).
236. Obviously, this bigger-is-better view had to be balanced against other concerns such
as mobility and flexibility. See, e.g., BOOT, supra note 193, at 1–6 (discussing King Charles VIII
of France’s “blitzkrieg” throughout Italy in 1494 using light, mobile artillery).
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World War II led the United States to all but abandon precision
aerial bombing for two main reasons. First, the adoption of strategic (or
area) bombing and “fire bombing,” required little precision.237 Instead
of striving for an elusive greater precision, the Army Air Forces opted
to use larger bomber formations and to drop an increased number of
bombs in order to increase the probability of hitting the target.238
Second—and more significant—was the development of the atomic
bomb and its deployment against Japan in 1945.239 In the aftermath of
the war, and with the advent of the Cold War, the United States turned
its attention almost exclusively to nuclear weapons.240 Military doctrine
developed around the possible use of these ultimate weapons, which did
not require much precision or accuracy.241 Some have argued that in its
most narrow version the lesson of World War II was that wars could be
won just by using air forces as, after all, two aircraft managed to bring a
country to its knees while avoiding the inevitable further American
casualties that would have resulted had U.S. troops continued to battle
their way to Tokyo.242 Less myopic versions indicate a continued role
for ground troops and naval forces but relegate them to roles supporting
the air force. Indeed, military restructuring and downsizing after the war
saw the emergence of an independent coequal fourth armed force (the
U.S. Air Force) and the redirection of resources to it and to nuclear
weapons and platforms.243
Similarly, the American use of air power in Vietnam followed this
well-established pattern. Massive bombs, such as the 15,000-pound
BLU-82 “Daisy Cutter” bomb, compensated for a lack of pinpoint
accuracy with their large high-explosive payload.244 Cluster bombs
237. See GILLESPIE, supra note 133, at 37–38.
238. See CONRAD C. CRANE, BOMBS, CITIES, AND CIVILIANS: AMERICAN AIRPOWER
STRATEGY IN WORLD WAR II 139–40, 146 (1993).
239. See id. at 146.
240. JOHN LEWIS GADDIS, STRATEGIES OF CONTAINMENT 146–47 (rev. ed. 2005).
241. Id. at 169–71.
242. Similar arguments have been made in the aftermath of many other armed conflicts
such as Operation Desert Storm and Operation Allied Force. See, e.g., HICKEY, supra note 184,
at 173–74 (noting the “near-perfect” performance of PGMs in Operation Desert Storm, which
performance removed the necessity for ground fighting altogether).
243. GILLESPIE, supra note 133, at 40 (noting the fundamental changes in the American
approach to airpower after World War II). This trend still continues today. Technology makes
force reductions and downsizing possible. Schmitt, supra note 58, at 149. See also Lauren
Carroll, Lindsay Graham: Army Is Smallest Since 1940, Navy Smallest Since 1915, TAMPA BAY
TIMES (Oct. 5, 2014, 5:44 PM), http://ec2-50-17-62-213.compute-1.amazonaws.com/truth-ometer/statements/2014/oct/05/lindsey-graham/lindsey-graham-army-smallest-1940-navy-small
est-19/ (According to the Quadrennial Defense Review, Army troops will decrease to 440,000
by 2019 and Navy ships will decrease to 234 by 2019, which are the lowest numbers since 1940
and 1915, respectively).
244. GILLESPIE, supra note 133, at 99.
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dispersed small bomblets over a large area.245 Finally, aerial
bombardment missions brought an increase in the number of aircraft
participating in the attack, either as support against surface-to-air
defense systems or for the actual attack.246
C. Back to Accuracy
The shift to precision weapons has its origins in the Korean War247
and, even more so, in the experience of the Vietnam War and the
realization that nuclear weapons, while the basis for the United States’
deterrence strategy against the Soviet Union, were unusable in any
conflict short of a third world war.248 Any real-world “limited” conflict
required the capacity to exercise limited force.249 With the focus turning
back to conventional weapons, the need for greater accuracy became
apparent. And with the introduction of television crews into the fighting
in Vietnam, the need to limit collateral damage among civilians became
as much a pressing political interest as a legal and moral concern for the
Johnson and then Nixon Administrations.250 Moreover, the desire to
limit collateral damage among civilians matched military needs—the
need to prevent fratricide (“friendly fire”) in the jungles as well as the
demonstrated need not merely to identify targets more clearly but to
attack them with greater efficiency.251 In 1972, this latter point was
demonstrated during Operation Linebacker and, more famously, with
the destruction of the Thanh Hoa Bridge in North Vietnam, which
involved twelve F-4 aircraft armed with various types of guided
bombs.252 Previously, the bridge had survived seven years of aerial
bombings in which twenty-nine U.S. aircraft were lost in over 700
sorties dropping 12,500 tons of bombs.253
245. Id.
246. Id. at 98.
247. Id. at 62.
248. Id. at 65, 67. For a discussion of the use of precision-guided bombs by the United
States in Vietnam, see id. at 96–122; HICKEY, supra note 184, at 75–110; BENJAMIN S.
LAMBETH, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN AIR POWER 39–41 (2000).
249. HERBERT Y. SCHANDLER, AMERICA IN VIETNAM 169 (2009); see GILLESPIE, supra note
133, at 65.
250. See DAVID OCHMANEK, MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST TERRORIST GROUPS ABROAD:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES AIR FORCE 18 (2003).
251. See Charles R. Shrader, Friendly Fire: The Inevitable Price, PARAMETERS, Autumn
1992, at 29, 32, 38–39 (1992). See also Drones Reduce the Number of American Troops, PR
NEWSWIRE (Oct. 10, 2014), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/drones-reduce-numberof-american-troops-former-clinton-white-house-spokesman-robert-weiner--defense-analyst-tomsherman-say-liberals-and-conservatives-should-both-advocate-them-278770111.html (claiming
that drones make American troops three times safer from friendly fire attacks compared to
traditional warfare).
252. See GILLESPIE, supra note 133, at 115–16; LAMBETH, supra note 248, at 38–39.
253. GILLESPIE, supra note 133, at 194 n.63.
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Early weapons systems offered limited guidance and their operation
was greatly dependent on weather conditions,254 necessitating daytime
attacks under clear skies, as the bombardiers needed to see the target in
order to aim their bombs.255 These limitations made precision systems
less desirable as they placed aircrews at great risk of attack by enemy
fighters and anti-aircraft fire.256 In the late 1960s, new “second
generation” in-flight guidance systems that offered greater targeting
precision were deployed.257 Electro-optical guided bombs (EOGBs),
such as the AGM-62 Walleye and the AGM-65A/B Maverick missiles,
transmit images—they initially used TV to provide visual images and
later on used infrared imaging—in real time to their launchers through a
camera installed in the bomb or missile’s nose.258 The launching aircraft
can designate a specific target as the bomb approaches the ground.
Providing much improved accuracy and targeting,259 EOGBs still had
254. The most poignant reminder of the dependency of bombardiers on the vagaries of
weather came on August 9, 1945 when the pilots of Bock’s Car failed to visually sight the city
of Kokura due to cloud cover and, with fuel running low, turned to drop Fat Man on their
secondary target, Nagasaki. Nicholas D. Kristof, Kokura, Japan: Bypassed by A-Bomb, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 7, 1995), http://www.nytimes.com/1995/08/07/world/kokura-japan-bypassed-by-abomb.html. That the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki missed their aim points by
some 800 and 1500 feet, respectively, made, of course, little practical difference. See Mark Van
Rhyn, The Atomic Bomb (6 and 9 August 1945), PBS (Sept. 2007),
http://www.pbs.org/thewar/detail_5234.htm.
255. GILLESPIE, supra note 133, at 26. Some systems depended on the operator or operators
maintaining uninterrupted, continuous, visual contact with the bomb during its flight, contact
that was extremely hard to maintain under battle conditions. Some depended on means of
controlling the bomb or missile, such as a radio command link, that were susceptible to
interruption either due to natural causes or due to enemy jamming and interference. See, e.g.,
STEPHEN ROBERT TWIGGE, THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF GUIDED WEAPONS IN THE UNITED
KINGDOM, 1940–1960 6–12 (1993).
256. See, e.g., GILLESPIE, supra note 133, at 26 (noting the “considerable cost” of daytime
bombing to aircrews). One major concern with a precision bomb used early in the Vietnam
War—the AGM-12 Bullpup—was the need for the delivery aircraft to maintain its heading
straight toward the target until impact. Understandably, “this feature did little to endear the
weapon to flight crews, who incurred considerable risk approaching well-defended targets headon, bereft of the option for evasive action.” Id. at 102.
257. Id. at 103, 112.
258. KOPLOW, supra note 138, at 84. The Maverick entered service with the United States
Air Force in 1972. The original models of the Maverick, AGM-65A/B, which used an electrooptical TV guidance system, are no longer in use by the United States military. See Andreas
Parsch,
Raytheon
(Hughes)
AGM-65
Maverick,
DESIGNATION-SYSTEMS,
http://www.designation-systems.net:80/dusrm/m-65.html (last updated Apr. 7, 2005). More
advanced models of the missile now use an imaging infrared seeker, laser guidance, or an
enhanced electro-optical TV guidance system (using a charge-coupled device seeker which,
through digital imaging, offers three times the range of the original TV sensor and is well suited
for desert operations). AGM-65 Maverick, U.S. AIR FORCE (Aug. 18, 2003),
http://www.af.mil/AboutUs/FactSheets/Display/tabid/224/Article/104577/agm-65-maverick.
aspx; see also KOPLOW, supra note 138, at 84–85.
259. HICKEY, supra note 184, at 98.
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certain inherent limitations: for the bomb to “lock” on the desired target,
the cameras required sharp contrast between the target and its
surroundings.260 Thus, target acquisition was greatly dependent on the
weather and, particularly, lighting conditions, and could be made
difficult by the enemy’s use of camouflage, smokescreens, or highcontrast decoy targets.261 It also meant that very symmetrical targets
could also fool the system and prevent a lock.262 Laser-guided bombs
and missiles (LGBs), such as the Paveway series, use a laser-seeker to
home onto laser beams that a target designator points at the target and
which are then reflected off that target.263 Once detected, the laser
seeker and a built-in computer system automatically activate a control
augmentation system that guides the bomb to its target. Both EOGB and
LGB systems are relatively cheap and offer significantly greater
accuracy than traditional gravity (“dumb”) bombs.264 The measure of a
bomb’s accuracy is its circular error probable (CEP), which is defined
as the radius of a circle within which half the bombs or missiles fired
would be expected to hit.265 In the fall of 1944, the CEP for a bomb
released at a medium altitude by a fighter-bomber in an optimal attack
angle of forty-degree dive was about one thousand feet (305 meters).266
In comparison, LGBs have a CEP of approximately three meters.267

260. Donald I. Blackwelder, The Long Road to Desert Storm and Beyond: The
Development of Precision Guided Bombs 29–30 (May 1992) (unpublished thesis, Air
University), available at http://uploads.worldlibrary.net/uploads/pdf/20121023214138road_to_
desert_pdf.pdf.
261. See id. at 30; GILLESPIE, supra note 133, at 105.
262. GILLESPIE, supra note 133, at 192 n.29.
263. See Blackwelder, supra note 260, at 23–24 (describing the target-detecting capabilities
of LGBs and the “Paveway” designating system affixed thereto).
264. GILLESPIE, supra note 133, at 113 (referring to the Paveway I LGB as “a precision
guided weapon with a price tag palatable enough to use against common, everyday targets”). In
addition, LGBs require less training for combat pilots on target accuracy and can be used by
virtually every aircraft “compatible with an unmodified general-purpose bomb.” Id. at 114.
265. Blackwelder, supra note 260, at 10 n.22.
266. Richard P. Hallion, Precision Guided Munitions and the New Era of Warfare 4
(Air Power Studies Ctr., Working Paper No. 53, 1997), available at http://airpower.air
force.gov.au/Publications/Details/110/Precision-Guided-Munitions-and-the-New-Era-ofWarfare.aspx. However, since the official figures did not include any bomb that struck outside
three thousand feet, the actual CEP is probably significantly higher. Randy L. Kaufman, Precision
Guided Munitions: History and Lessons for the Future 24 (June 2004) (unpublished thesis, Air
University).
267. MICHAEL RUSSELL RIP & JAMES M. HASIK, THE PRECISION REVOLUTION 473 n.34
(2002) (noting a CEP of approximately three meters for an LGB dropped by an F-117A stealth
strike); Carl Conetta, Operation Enduring Freedom: Why a Higher Rate of Civilian Bombing
Casualties (Jan. 18, 2002), available at http://www.comw.org/pda/0201oef.html.
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However, weather conditions continue to limit the usability of LGBs.268
Furthermore, for an LGB to function properly, the target must be
continuously “painted” by laser, either by an aircraft or by ground
troops, until the moment of impact.269 Thus, while allowing the delivery
platform a safer distance from which to target the enemy, LGBs still
require the presence of friendly aircraft or ground troops in the general
zone of operations.270 And while the delivery pilot could engage in
evasive maneuvers against hostile enemy fire, such actions may well
have meant breaking the continuous target tracking, (if the target was
tracked from the air by the same aircraft) turning the “smart” bomb into
a garden-variety “dumb” one.
The use of “smart” precision bombs by the Coalition forces during
Operation Desert Storm, the 1991 campaign against Iraq, captured much
of the public attention and signaled the promise of bombing the enemy
with relative safety for one’s own soldiers.271 The computerization of
battlespace turned the business of war into a deadly video game, at least
for one party.272 The new weapons offered the U.S. armed forces
overwhelming military advantages and “full spectrum dominance,”273
allowing them to “shock and awe”274 their opponents while, at the same

268. While LGBs may be used during either daytime or nighttime attacks, laser beams
dissipate when the air is dusty, smoky, or debris-ridden—precisely the conditions that are
“common features of a battle environment.” KOPLOW, supra note 138, at 85.
269. KOPLOW, supra note 138, at 84; RIP & HASIK, supra note 267, at 213; see also Tom
Harris, How Smart Bombs Work, HOWSTUFFWORKS, http://science.howstuffworks.com/smartbomb.htm (last visited Dec. 28, 2014).
270. For ground troops tasked with maintaining direct contact with the target while trying
to keep a safe distance from it, this presents an increased risk of being discovered and engaged
by enemy forces.
271. See Paul G. Gillespie, Precision Guided Munitions: Constructing a Bomb More Potent
Than the A-Bomb 202–05 (June 2002) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Lehigh University),
available at http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a406542.pdf (“Because of the vivid video
images of the destruction of Iraqi bridges and other structures on the television news, including
one particularly memorable scene of a guided bomb going down the ventilation shaft of an
office building, the American public very easily accepted laser guided bombs as virtually
infallible.”); HICKEY, supra note 184, at 173 (“The public perception of the near-perfect
performance of PGMs in these two case studies only served to enhance the reputation that had
first emerged during Operation DESERT STORM.”).
272. IGNATIEFF, supra note 196, at 168 (“The bombing of Baghdad was the first war as
light show and the aerial bombardment of Iraqi forces was the first battle turned into a videoarcade game. . . . Having been told to prepare for as many as 25,000 casualties, the electorate
discovered the intoxicating reality of risk-free warfare.”).
273. See JOINT VISION 2020, supra note 136, at 6–11 (underscoring the importance of
information superiority and technological innovation to future U.S. military success).
274. FREDERICK W. KAGAN, FINDING THE TARGET 230 (2006) (explaining that the
Department of Defense’s Joint Vision 2010 is “little more than Shock and Awe watered down”);
see also JOINT VISION 2010, supra note 136.
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time, reducing the risks to American soldiers.275 These weapons provide
their launchers the safety of distance while assuring a high degree of
accuracy and precision. For example, the United States fired Tomahawk
missiles against Iraqi targets from ships in the Red Sea.276 These
systems are almost as accurate as LGBs.277 Yet despite their obvious
advantages, such smart ordnance constituted no more than 8% of the
total ordnance dropped during the operation.278 The use of this relatively
small percentage of smart bombs was due to weather and budget
constraints. With the Gulf experiencing the worst weather conditions in
decades, the ability to use LGBs was severely compromised.279 This
factor, combined with the fact that unguided “dumb” bombs were much
cheaper than their smarter relatives,280 led the U.S. military to make
heavy use of the former.281 However, in order to avoid anti-aircraft fire,
275. NATO ended its aerial operations in Kosovo in 1999 without a single combat fatality.
Javier Solana, NATO’s Success in Kosovo, FOREIGN AFF., http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles
/55610/javier-solana/natos-success-in-kosovo (last visited Dec. 28, 2014). Operation Desert
Storm resulted in approximately 148 U.S. combat fatalities and approximately sixty-five
additional combat deaths among the rest of the Coalition troops. THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MIDDLE
EAST WARS: THE UNITED STATES IN THE PERSIAN GULF, AFGHANISTAN, AND IRAQ CONFLICTS 264
(Spencer C. Tucker ed. 2010).
276. War Chronology: January 1991, NAVAL HIST. & HERITAGE COMMAND,
http://www.history.navy.mil/wars/dstorm/dsjan2.htm (last visited Dec. 28, 2014).
277. The Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) kit has an advertised CEP of thirteen
meters when using GPS and thirty meters when using the secondary INS. U.S. Air Force Fact
Sheet: Joint Direct Attack Munitions GBU 31/32/38, DEP’T OF THE AIR FORCE (Jan. 2006),
http://www.minot.af.mil/library/factsheets/factsheet_print.asp?fsID=3900. Such systems are
now considered “near-precision” guided weapons. For a weapon to be “precision-guided” it
must have a CEP of three meters. Jack Sine, Defining the “Precision Weapon” in Effects-Based
Terms, AIR & SPACE POWER (Mar. 6, 2006), http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.
mil/airchronicles/apj/apj06/spr06/sine.html.
278. HICKEY, supra note 184, at 136.
279. Id. at 141.
280. Some of these systems are significantly more expensive than alternative guided
weapons—the most advanced models of the sea-launched TLAM cost approximately $1.5
million per unit. Sam LaGrone, CNO: Navy Will Need More Funds if Syria Standoff Extends
into October, USNI NEWS (Sept. 6, 2013, 1:34 PM), http://news.usni.org/2013/09/06/cno-navywill-need-funds-syria-standoff-extends-october. The approximate price range of a Joint Standoff
Weapon air-to-surface missile (JSOW) is about $280,000–$720,000 (depending on the
configuration). AGM-154A Joint Standoff Weapon [JSOW], FAS MILITARY ANALYSIS
NETWORK, http://fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/smart/agm-154.htm (last updated June 27, 2000, 7:53
PM). Other systems are more akin to the Paveway series—kits that fit onto the existing arsenal
of gravity bombs—and, as a result, are cheaper than the standalone systems. Thus, for example,
the JDAM kit costs merely $25,000. Bootie Cosgrove-Mather, Weapons Stockpile Meant for
Saddam, CBS NEWS (July 16, 2002, 1:55 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/weaponsstockpile-meant-for-saddam/.
281. Other countries that participated in the “Coalition of the Willing” against Iraq lagged
substantially behind the United States as far as PGMs were concerned. See GORDON ADAMS &
GUY BEN-ARI, TRANSFORMING EUROPEAN MILITARIES 3–5 (2006). Thus, U.S. forces launched
the vast majority of guided munitions during the campaign.
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aircraft were ordered to fly at high altitudes.282 While that may not have
made a great difference for those platforms using precision-guided
munitions, it had a significant impact on the accuracy of unguided
munitions.283
Eight years later, a “zero-casualty” policy led to the imposition of
similar restriction on low altitude flying during NATO’s seventy-eightday aerial campaign over Kosovo.284 During that operation, the military
was more concerned with a zero-casualty policy of force protection than
with power projection when making its decisions.285 Political and
national elites shared (and continue to share) the belief that the
American people have no stomach for casualties, leading to strong
casualty-averse policies.286 Indeed, so prominent has force protection
become in American policy that some have dubbed it a fetish of
American policy makers.287 Carrying out operations at a minimal
altitude of 15,000 feet protected the lives of NATO pilots—the
Operation ended with no combat casualties for NATO despite over
38,000 sorties—but reduced the accuracy of unguided munitions and
increased the likelihood of collateral damage.288 In addition, flying at
282. Kaufman, supra note 266, at 37.
283. Id.
284. See Trevor A. Keck, Not All Civilians Are Created Equal: The Principle of
Distinction, the Question of Direct Participation in Hostilities and Evolving Restraints on the
Use of Force in Warfare, 211 MIL. L. REV. 115, 123–24 (2012); Tania Voon, Pointing the
Finger: Civilian Casualties of NATO Bombing in the Kosovo Conflict, 16 AM. U. INT’L L. REV.
1083, 1098 (2001); Thomas Michael McDonnell, Cluster Bombs over Kosovo: A Violation of
International Law?, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 31, 39–40 (2002) [hereinafter McDonnell, Cluster Bombs
over Kosovo]; A.P.V. Rogers, Zero-Casualty Warfare, 82 INT’L REV. OF RED CROSS 165, 168–
69, 173 (2000). But see David Luban, Risk Taking and Force Protection, in READING WALZER
277, 279 (Yitzhak Benbaji & Naomi Sussmann eds., 2014) (arguing that the possibility of lowrisk or risk-free warfare came to prominence when the U.S. dropped the atomic bomb on
Hiroshima).
285. See Jon D. Michaels, Beyond Accountability: The Constitutional, Democratic, and
Strategic Problems with Privatizing War, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1001, 1043–44 (2004); cf. Keric D.
Clanahan, Drone-Sourcing? United States Air Force Unmanned Aircraft Systems, Inherently
Governmental Functions, and the Role of Contractors, 22 FED. CIR. B.J. 135, 154 (2012) (noting
that many “military decisions are more concerned with force protection than power projection”).
286. GILLESPIE, supra note 133, at 156 (“[I]ntolerance for loss of life has virtually
guaranteed that recent and future U.S. military interventions consist principally of precision air
strikes.”); KOPLOW, supra note 138, at 221–22 (noting “the psychic eddy of casualty aversion”
both with respect to our own soldiers returning in body bags and a “general social
squeamishness about imposing unnecessary casualties upon an enemy state’s civilians, or even
upon its soldiers”).
287. Jeffrey Record, Force-Protection Fetishism: Sources, Consequences, and (?)
Solutions, AEROSPACE POWER J., Summer 2000, at 4, 4, 7–8 (2000). Vietnam Syndrome, driven
by the Weinberger–Powell Doctrine, turned into force-protection fetishism. Id.
288. McDonnell, Cluster Bombs over Kosovo, supra note 284, at 48–49; Eric Schmitt, The
World; It Costs a Lot More to Kill Fewer People, N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 1999), http://www.nytim
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such altitudes also meant that adverse weather conditions were more
pronounced.289 At the same time, all-weather guided weapons, which
had made their first appearances during the Gulf War, left their first
substantial imprint.290 Some of the new weapons systems operated on
the basis of a terrain-contour-matching radar that scanned the ground
over which the missile was flying and compared the readings to digital
maps that had been stored in advance in the missile’s computer; they
could adjust the missile’s flight to correct any deviation detected.291
Some systems combined this further with GPS navigation in order to get
to the predesignated target.292 For example, the Tomahawk Land Attack
Missile (TLAM) uses an inertial navigation system (INS) or GPS to
follow a preset course when flying over water.293 Once over land, the
missile utilizes a Terrain Contour Matching (TERCOM) system, and
upon closing in on the target, the missile’s guidance is enhanced by a
Digital Scene Matching Area Correlation (DSMAC).294
IV. THE PROMISE OF DRONES: REDUCING RISKS TO OUR SOLDIERS AND
THEIR CIVILIANS
The precision-guided-munitions revolution promised engagement in
armed conflicts that were relatively risk-free for U.S. soldiers while also
es.com/1999/05/02/weekinreview/the-world-it-costs-a-lot-more-to-kill-fewer-people.html (“[I]t’s
difficult to distinguish a farmer’s truck from [an] armored infantry vehicle at 20,000 feet.”).
289. ANTHONY H. CORDESMAN, THE LESSONS AND NON-LESSONS OF THE AIR AND MISSILE
CAMPAIGN IN KOSOVO 48–49 (2001) (“Weather forced NATO to cancel at least half of its total
number of planned sorties on 39 days of the 78-day campaign . . . .”); Kaufman, supra note 266,
at 51 (“[C]louds covering more than 50 percent of the sky impeded operations 70 percent of the
time, allowing unrestricted air strikes on only 24 of 78 days.”); Schmitt, supra note 288
(“Politics and the elements have conspired to level out the allies’ technological edge.”).
290. PGMs constituted 8% of all bombs deployed against Iraq in Operation Desert Storm
in 1991. EUGENE MIASNIKOV, INT’L COMM’N ON NUCLEAR NON-PROLIFERATION &
DISARMAMENT, LONG-RANGE PRECISION-GUIDED CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS: IMPLICATIONS FOR
STRATEGIC BALANCE, ARMS CONTROL AND NON-PROLIFERATION 4 (2008), available at
http://www.armscontrol.ru/pubs/en/em090918.pdf. In Operations Allied Force in 1991,
Enduring Freedom in 2001, and Iraqi Freedom in 2003, around 30%, over 50%, and over 60%
(respectively) of bombs dropped were precision-guided. Id.
291. See KOPLOW, supra note 138, at 85.
292. RIP & HASIK, supra note 267, at 219.
293. Id. at 219, 256–57. The INS is used as a backup for the GPS system. See id. at 219.
While it is less accurate than GPS (INS has been referred to as a “get you in the ballpark”
system), INS has the advantage that, unlike GPS, it does not depend on receiving externally
communicated signals and, therefore, cannot be jammed or otherwise become ineffective when
the signal is “lost.” See id.
294. Id. at 164, 219. The TERCOM system uses a digital map based on terrain elevation
data that is loaded onto the missile. Id. at 164, 166. During flight, the missile automatically
compares the stored data with radar data that is collected as the missile flies over land. Id. at
164. Comparing the two sets of data, the missile corrects its course. Id. DSMAC compares
actual images of the target as “seen” by the missile with digitized images that have been
preloaded into the missile’s mission control system. Id.
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potentially resulting in fewer military and, importantly, civilian
casualties for the enemy due to improved precision.295 PGMs changed
the relationship between distance, accuracy, and lethality. Distance was
no longer necessarily gained at the expense of accuracy. In turn, greater
overall accuracy meant that smaller, less-lethal munitions could be used.
Greater precision and smaller armaments, in turn, brought a potential
reduction in collateral damage.
Yet, PGMs are not without their limitations. First, there is the matter
of cost. Not only is the initial price tag of PGMs relatively high,296 but
there is also the cost of training the aircrews in using the smart
munitions as well as that of fitting the various aircrafts with the
requisite support equipment needed for the use of such advanced
weapons systems. Second, there exists a certain trade-off between
weather and the dynamism of the target. GPS-based PGMs, such as the
Tomahawk missile, can be used in practically all weather conditions.297
Yet their usefulness is limited when the target of the attack is dynamic
rather than stationary. Other PGMs, such as LGBs, have a greater
capacity to adjust to the movements of the target but may not be used in
certain weather conditions.298 Third, to be accurate, PGMs require
accurate intelligence. Smart bombs and “dumb” intelligence can only
lead to potentially disastrous—yet nonetheless accurate—strikes on the
wrong targets.299 The available capacities to collect intelligence will,
therefore, bear great impact on the ability to use PGMs effectively.
The American wars in Afghanistan and Iraq (in the latter case, once
the “mission [was] accomplished”)300 have highlighted these
shortcomings. Rather than facing regular armies, the United States and
its allies have found themselves dealing with paramilitary terrorist
organizations and insurgents who cannot be easily distinguished from
civilians and indeed have been using civilians and civilian locations as
cover and shield from attacks and as logistical bases. Insurgents,
guerillas, and terrorists have harnessed asymmetric warfare, turning

295. IGNATIEFF, supra note 196, at 164–65.
296. See Stuart Walters Belt, Missiles over Kosovo: Emergence, Lex Lata, of a Customary
Norm Requiring the Use of Precision Munitions in Urban Areas, 47 NAVAL L. REV. 115, 167
(2000) (analyzing arguments that the cost of PGMs are prohibitive).
297. See Jefferson D. Reynolds, Collateral Damage on the 21st Century Battlefield: Enemy
Exploitation of the Law of Armed Conflict, and the Struggle for a Moral High Ground, 56 A.F.
L. REV. 1, 101 n.398 (2005) (suggesting that the development of “new PGM like the
Tomahawk” mitigates the vulnerability of the PGM to weather and other conditions).
298. See RIP & HASIK, supra note 267, at 216.
299. See, e.g., John Sweeney et al., Nato Bombed Chinese Deliberately, GUARDIAN (Oct.
16, 1999), http://www.theguardian.com/world/1999/oct/17/balkans.
300. Judy Keen, Bush to Troops: Mission Accomplished, USA TODAY (June 5, 2003, 3:31
AM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/world/iraq/2003-06-05-bush-qatar_x.htm.

http://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol67/iss1/1

48

Gross: The New Way of War: Is There A Duty to Use Drones?

2015]

IS THERE A DUTY TO USE DRONES?

49

their apparent weakness into strength.301 In this kind of low-tech war of
attrition, the technological and military dominance of the United States
is practically negated.302 The prolonged wars in Afghanistan and Iraq
took a significant financial toll on Coalition forces, first and foremost
the United States. Fighting insurgents who move in and out of civilian
areas and who disguise themselves as civilians—farmer by day, fighter
by night303—requires constant monitoring and continuous real-time
intelligence in order to be able to credibly distinguish combatants from
civilians, targeting the former while minimizing harm to the latter. And
as the United States discovered, much to its chagrin, its intelligence
capabilities were woefully lacking.304 The perception of military
dominance and disparity in force between the armed forces of the
United States and its allies and the insurgents has made both sides to the
conflict acutely aware of the impact of body-bag politics.305 At the same
time, the realities of asymmetric warfare—battling enemies who shun
open confrontation with their far stronger opponents and who, instead,
channel fighting to heavily populated urban areas in order to minimize
their own casualties while, at the same time, deliberately exposing
civilians to harm—challenge the more powerful military to engage with
301. VAN CREVELD, supra note 233, at 269 (“[M]ost guerrillas and terrorists won their
struggles precisely because they were weak. It was their weakness that enabled them to hide;
even more important, it was their weakness that permitted them to do what they wanted to do
and what had to be done.”). Historian Martin van Creveld argues that “from 1945 on, almost all
attempts to deal with insurgencies have ended in failure” and that “most guerrillas and terrorists
won their struggles precisely because they were weak.” Id. at 268–69; see also HAMMES, supra
note 137, at 3–4 (“Not only is 4GW [(fourth-generation warfare)] the only kind of war America
has ever lost, we have done so three times: Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia. . . . The message is
clear . . . only unconventional war works against established powers.”).
302. See VAN CREVELD, supra note 233, at 227–28 (discussing the prolongation of war as a
strategic concept for insurgents). This has also been the lesson of the second Lebanon War
waged between Israel and Hezbollah, a terrorist organization numbering no more than 4000
men, in the summer of 2006. Id. at 225. During the forty days of the war, the Israeli Defense
Forces (IDF) fired 170,000 artillery shells against terrorist targets, twice as many as it had fired
during the Yom Kippur War in which Israel had faced three Arab armies consisting of 500,000
men and more than 4,000 tanks. Id. Each precision kill during the war cost the IDF over
$2,000,000. Id. at 272. The Israeli Air Force ran out of high-end targets after four days of
fighting, and merely 3% of ordnance dropped actually hit any target. Id. at 272–73. Van Creveld
concludes that “against a lightly armed enemy . . . the Revolution in Military Affairs proved all
but impotent.” Id. at 272.
303. See Michael W. Lewis, Drones and the Boundaries of the Battlefield, 47 TEX. INT’L
L.J. 293, 311 (2012).
304. See, e.g., Diane Jean Schemo, A Nation Challenged: The Academics; U.S. Finds Itself
Lacking Experts on Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 11, 2001), http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/
11/us/a-nation-challenged-the-academics-us-finds-itself-lacking-experts-on-afghanistan.html.
305. VAN CREVELD, supra note 233, at 227 (“[A] strong army beating down on a much
weaker insurgent will necessarily ask itself if its losses were avoidable and feel itself foolish for
not having taken the measures necessary to avoid them.”).
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the enemy on the latter’s own turf, in low-tech battles in close quarters.
Drones offer a “seductively attractive” response to these
challenges.306 The main attraction of all of the robotic systems described
in Part I is the fact that they distance soldiers from harm and contribute
significantly to force protection. Force protection—taking “preventive
measures” to “mitigate hostile actions against” troops, military
resources and facilities, and critical information307—has played a
significant role in U.S. military policy at least since the 1990s’ military
engagements in Kosovo and Somalia.308 The teleoperated drone serves
to distance, indeed remove altogether, its operator from the battlefield,
offering her maximum protection.309 Drone pilots are able to fly their
aircraft over Afghanistan (and Pakistan) from ground control stations
located in Nevada and Langley, Virginia.310 At the same time, the fact
that these aerial vehicles are unmanned means that they do not need to
fly at high, risk-free altitudes. That means, in turn, that accuracy need
not be significantly compromised.
Most debates about the concept of force protection pertain to the
question of whether soldiers must accept greater risks to themselves in
order to protect enemy civilians from harm, and if so, to what extent
they must do so.311 Force protection has, in this equation, an inverse

306. David Ignatius, Dazzling New Weapons Require New Rules for War, WASH. POST
(Nov. 11, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/10/AR2010
111005500.html; see also Michael W. Lewis & Emily Crawford, Drones and Distinction: How
IHL Encouraged the Rise of Drones, 44 GEO. J. INT’L L. 1127, 1152 (2013) (“Because observing
these restrictions when fighting an enemy that conducts its operations in close proximity to the
civilian population effectively negates much of the firepower advantage enjoyed by state armed
forces, regular militaries involved in asymmetric conflicts have reacted to the restrictions in one
of two ways. They have either ignored the restrictions imposed by international humanitarian
law (IHL) or they have attempted to comply with them by changing their weaponry and tactics
to better account for the modern interpretation of distinction.”). See generally Mary Ellen
O’Connell, Seductive Drones: Learning from a Decade of Lethal Operations, 21 J.L. INFO. &
SCI. 116 (2011) (discussing the use of drones and precision satellite technology from 2001 to
2010).
307. DEP’T OF DEF., DICTIONARY OF MILITARY AND ASSOCIATED TERMS 98 (2010),
available at http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.
308. Record, supra note 287, at 5.
309. See, e.g., Lewis & Crawford, supra note 306, at 1133 (“Today, cruise missiles and
UAVs, such as the Predator drone, can strike targets hundreds of miles from their launch point
and are often controlled by operators located thousands of miles from the ‘battlefield.’”).
310. Vogel, supra note 6, at 133. To clarify, throughout this Article, references to drone
“pilots,” include both the drone’s pilot, who controls the aircraft flight maneuvers, and the drone
sensor operator (or “sensor” for short), whose job it is to control the drone’s various input
sensors (such as cameras), aim the weapons at the target, and be in charge of the weapons’
terminal guidance once they have been launched.
311. See, e.g., Gabriella Blum, The Dispensable Lives of Soldiers, 2 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS
115, 116, 137, 149 (2010).
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relationship to protection of innocent civilians.312 But in the context of
drones, force protection and minimizing collateral damage are not
mutually exclusive. This is so for several interrelated reasons. First, as
noted above, drones can fly at lower altitudes than fighter jets without
exposing their operators to any harm. Lower altitude means, almost by
definition, greater capacity for accuracy. Second, drones are armed
almost exclusively with PGMs such as Hellfire missiles.313 That means
that they enjoy the dual benefits of great accuracy and precision, which
allow them to carry smaller weapons, resulting in reduced zones of
lethality. Third, drones have the capacity to endure in the air for hours
on end and hover over their targets.314 In aerial attacks carried out by
manned aircraft such as fighter jets or helicopters, the pilots are over the
target for a very short time. In fact, with some of the advanced weapons
that are available, often the pilots are not physically “over” the target at
all and do not establish visual contact without the aid of machines.315
This is not the case with drones. Drones hover over the target, collecting
information and real-time intelligence about it.316 This increases the
likelihood of correct identification of the target, which has been
significantly augmented with the introduction of ever more advanced
high-resolution sensors on board drones.
Significantly, staying with the target for a long duration also allows
establishing a “pattern of life analysis.”317 As noted, in the context of
asymmetric warfare it is all too frequently difficult to distinguish
combatants from civilians. Indeed, this forms a critical component of
the military strategy of urban guerillas, terrorists, and insurgents. The
difficulty is especially significant when we consider the problem of
312. Ziv Bohrer & Mark Osiel, Proportionality in Military Force at War’s Multiple Levels:
Averting Civilian Casualties vs. Safeguarding Soldiers, 46 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 747, 749
(2013) (“Military concern with force protection has increased as Western publics have grown
averse to suffering military casualties, even as most people recognize that force protection often
comes at the price of increased civilian harm.”).
313. See, e.g., McDonnell, Sow What You Reap?, supra note 24, at 253–54 (discussing the
Predator Drone MQ-1 and its capacity to be equipped with Hellfire missiles).
314. Afsheen John Radsan & Richard Murphy, Measure Twice, Shoot Once: Higher Care
for CIA-Targeted Killing, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 1201, 1203 (“A small drone—unburdened by a
pilot who must protect himself from enemy fire—can hover unseen above a potential target for
many hours.”).
315. See Bruce T. Smith, Air Force Medical Personnel and the Law of Armed Conflict, 37
A.F. L. REV. 239, 245 (1994).
316. Robert Molko, The Drones Are Coming! Will the Fourth Amendment Stop Their
Threat to Our Privacy?, 78 BROOK. L. REV. 1279, 1286–87 (2013).
317. Blank, After “Top Gun,” supra note 58, at 693 (internal quotation marks omitted);
Michael N. Schmitt, Drone Attacks Under the Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello: Clearing the
“Fog of Law,” 13 Y.B. INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 311, 311–26 (2011), available at http://journ
als.cambridge.org/action/displayFulltext?type=1&fid=8354058&jid=YHL&volumeId=13&issu
eId=-1&aid=8354057.
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shifting identities or dual status, known also as the phenomenon of
“farmer by day, fighter by night.”318 The laws of armed conflict make it
clear that while civilians may not be targeted directly, they lose this
protection from attack when they “directly participate in hostilities.”319
While the exact contours and content of this concept are subject to
much debate,320 there is little doubt that whatever view one holds as to
what constitutes direct participation in hostilities, establishing such
participation to justify attacking civilians is easier in theory than in
practice.321
The capacity of drones to stay with the target closes the gap between
theory and practice by allowing precise targeting at the relevant
timeframe—while the target is directly participating in hostilities.
Furthermore, staying with the target also means that drone pilots can
carefully choose the moment of engagement with the target in order to,
once again, minimize the potential harm to innocent civilians. The
notion of “targets of opportunity,” with its greater propensity for errors,
has, similarly, less purchase when drones are concerned. At the same
time, drones have a greater ability to successfully engage dynamic
targets at the best opportunity—maximizing the probability of critically
damaging the target itself while minimizing collateral damage—than
either manned aerial aircraft or “fire and forget,” GPS-based precisionguided munitions.
Removed from harm’s way, drone pilots can fly their vehicles and
launch attacks relieved of much of the battlefield stress. The distancing
of the pilot from the battlefield does not merely reduce, but eliminates
altogether, his fear of being killed.322 The pilot engages the target
318. See, e.g., SOLIS, supra note 162, at 208 (“During the U.S.–Vietnam War, an oftenheard phrase regarding the Viet Cong, a Vietnamese civilian group of clandestine fighters, was,
‘Farmer by day, fighter by night.’”).
319. Laurie Blank & Amos Guiora, Teaching an Old Dog New Tricks: Operationalizing
the Law of Armed Conflict in New Warfare, 1 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 45, 73 (2010) (“Persons who
directly participate in hostilities a single time or intermittently are legitimate targets only when
they are preparing for, engaged in, or returning from hostilities.”).
320. See, e.g., HCJ 769/02 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Gov’t of Isr. 62(1) PD
507, [2006] (Isr.); INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF
DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 11–12
(2009); Geoffrey Corn & Chris Jenks, Two Sides of the Combatant Coin: Untangling Direct
Participation in Hostilities from Belligerent Status in Non-International Armed Conflicts, 33 U.
PA. J. INT’L L. 313, 313–14 (2011); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, The ICRC Interpretive
Guidance on the Notion of Direct Participation in Hostilities Under International Humanitarian
Law: An Introduction to the Forum, 42 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 637, 637 (2010); Keck, supra
note 284, at 115–16; Michael N. Schmitt, The Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of Direct
Participation in Hostilities: A Critical Analysis, 1 HARV. NAT’L SECURITY J. 5, 5–6 (2010).
321. See Karl S. Chang, Enemy Status and Military Detention in the War Against alQaeda, 47 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 31 n.164 (2011).
322. See supra Section III.A.
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without being subject to the heightened negative emotions that soldiers
on the battlefield experience.323 Indeed, the specter of dispassionate
killing from afar has been one of the persistent battle cries against the
use of drones.
The image of “cubicle warriors” with a “Playstation mentality”
engaged in a “turkey shoot,”324 conducting “push button” killing in
faraway lands of images on their screens, losing sight of the humanity
of those targets—colloquially referred to by drone pilots as
“squirters”325—while spending the evening having dinner with their
own families and friends, has been at the forefront of challenges to the
new American way of war. Drones, it is argued, make it easier to kill.326
However, pattern-of-life analysis and hovering over the target mean that
drone operators spend much more time “with” their target compared
with fighter pilots, both before the attack and after it has been carried
out.327 Fighter pilots rarely, if ever, see the actual damage caused by
their bombs and missiles; drone pilots often do. It is such “voyeuristic
intimacy”328 that results unsurprisingly, yet often without
acknowledgment, in drone pilots developing PTSD.329
323. See supra note 309 and accompanying text; JOHN KEEGAN, A HISTORY OF WARFARE
3–4 (1993) (“Warfare is almost as old as man himself, and reaches into the most secret places of
the human heart, places where self dissolves rational purpose, where pride reigns, where
emotion is paramount, where instinct is king.”).
324. IGNATIEFF, supra note 196, at 161.
325. See Mayer, supra note 6.
326. Blank, After “Top Gun,” supra note 58, 688.
327. See, e.g., Matthew Power, Confessions of a Drone Warrior, GQ (Oct. 23, 2013),
http://www.gq.com/news-politics/big-issues/201311/drone-uav-pilot-assassination (“[Brandon
Bryant, a drone ‘sensor’] watched the targets drink tea with friends, play with their children,
have sex with their wives on rooftops, writhing under blankets. There were soccer matches, and
weddings too. He once watched a man walk out into a field and take a crap, which glowed white
in infrared. . . . After a strike he was tasked with lingering over a site for several haunting hours,
conducting surveillance for an ‘after-action report.’”).
328. Id.
329. Id. In addition to the story of Airman First Class Brandon Bryant who “fell into a
black depression” and would “drink himself to blackout . . . vanishing for days or weeks on
end,” the article also mentions other drone pilots who, “whenever [they] made a kill, went home
and chugged an entire bottle of whiskey,” and others who “refused to fire again even under the
threat of court martial,” and who suffered from nightmares. Id.; see also Elisabeth Bumiller, Air
Force Drone Operators Report High Levels of Stress, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/19/world/asia/air-force-drone-operators-show-high-levels-ofstress.html; Michael Cochrane, Far from Battle, Drone Pilots Still Feel Stress of War, WORLD,
(Oct. 6, 2014), http://www.worldmag.com/2014/10/far_from_battle_drone_pilots_still_feel_str
ess_of_war; Dao, supra note 34; Robert Johnson, ‘Did We Just Kill A Kid?’—Six Words That
Ended a US Drone Pilot’s Career, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 17, 2012, 6:59 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/did-we-just-kill-a-kid-nicola-abe-der-spiegel-brandon-bryant2012-12; Hernando J. Ortega, Jr., Challenges in Monitoring and Maintaining the Health of
Pilots Engaged in Telewarfare, MED. SURVEILLANCE MONTHLY REP., March 2013, at 2,
available at www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA578676; Scott Fitzsimmons & Karina
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Carrying out aerial strikes on the battlefield using drones offers realtime situation awareness and intelligence gathering (and processing). At
the same time, the characteristics of drones, as detailed above, also offer
a critical possibility of real-time legal review of the operation.330
Military lawyers can review the images sent in by the drones and assess
the attack in terms of the rules of LOAC. Moreover, with operators
removed from harm’s way and with the virtually continuous presence of
drones in the sky, time is not as much of the essence as it used to be.
The lawyers can evaluate the situation coolly, seek further information
if need be, revisit the data and cross check it, and consult their manuals,
all without losing the possibility of hitting the target either immediately
or at some future time. And once the attack has been carried out, drones
may offer robust accountability. Their high-powered sensors and
cameras can record the scene.331 If retained and reviewed in a later
debriefing, this recording can enable an ex-post review in a manner that
is often not possible in ordinary combat operations. In fact, the ability of
drones to capture images and record incidents without interruption for a
length of time has also been invoked by some human rights activists
who sought to harness drones to monitor human rights violations in
places such as Syria.332
This results in lower numbers of casualties from collateral damage
when drones are used to launch the attack than is the case with
alternative means and methods of warfare. Exact figures of civilian
casualties in the various drone campaigns conducted by the United
States since the mid-2000s are hard to come by because the identity of
those killed may be hard to ascertain and their status as combatants or
civilians is often a matter of controversy and dispute. However, the
figures provided by the three most credible independent sources that
follow drone strikes in Pakistan333 put the estimated numbers of civilian
Sangha, Killing in High Definition: Combat Stress Among Operators of Remotely Piloted
Aircraft, CANADIAN POL. SCI. ASS’N 2 (2013), http://www.cpsa-acsp.ca/papers2013/Fitzsimmons.pdf; Anna Mulrine, Drone Pilots: Why War is Also Hard for Remote
Soldiers, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Feb. 28, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/20
12/0228/Drone-pilots-Why-war-is-also-hard-for-remote-soldiers.
330. On the role played by Judge Advocate General lawyers in targeting decisions in
previous wars, see Vanessa Blum, JAG Goes to War, LEGAL TIMES, Nov. 11, 2001, at 1, 13;
Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., The Revolution in Military Legal Affairs: Air Force Legal Professionals
in 21st Century Conflicts, 51 A.F. L. REV. 293, 308–09 (2001).
331. See Hillary B. Farber, Eyes in the Sky: Constitutional and Regulatory Approaches to
Domestic Drone Deployment, 64 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1, 12 (2014) (“All drones can be fitted with
high-resolution cameras and imaging technologies, the capabilities of which advance year after
year.”).
332. Andrew Stobo Sniderman & Mark Hanis, Drones for Human Rights, N.Y. TIMES (Jan.
30, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/31/opinion/drones-for-human-rights.html.
333. Problematic as the data about drone strikes may be, the best information is available
with respect to strikes carried out in Pakistan.
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deaths at between 5.7% and 25.7% of total deaths caused by the
attacks.334 Furthermore, all three sources also agree that the rate of
civilian deaths has seen a significant decline in recent years. According
to these sources, in the years 2012–2013, the civilian death ratio in
drone attacks in Pakistan was about 2% to 3%.335 Although these are by
no means insignificant rates of civilian deaths, they ought to be put in
context. First, under LOAC’s principle of proportionality, the critical
question with regard to collateral damage is whether it is “excessive,”
not whether it is “extensive.”336 As Professor Yoram Dinstein notes, the
two terms ought not to be confused and are not interchangeable:
‘“[I]njury/damage to non-combatants can be exceedingly extensive
without being excessive, simply because the military advantage
anticipated is of paramount importance.’”337
The number of injured or dead civilians is, therefore, insufficient in
and of itself to establish that the attacks were disproportionate. Rather,
the numbers ought to be evaluated against the military advantage that
was reasonably anticipated to result from the attack. Second, one ought
also to consider the alternatives. Although estimates of civilian death
rates in past wars vary greatly, a conservative estimate is that, “[o]n the
average, half of the deaths caused by war happened to
civilians . . . . The civilian percentage share of war-related deaths
remained at about 50% from century to century.”338 Whatever the exact
334. The Long War Journal estimates that 156 civilians have been killed in drone attacks in
Pakistan between 2004–2013, compared with 2574 deaths among Taliban and al-Qaeda
members, putting the total civilian death rate at 5.7%. Charting the Data for US Airstrikes in
Pakistan, 2004–2014, LONG WAR J., http://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-strikes.php (last
updated Jan. 4, 2015, 11:10 AM). As of the date of this writing, the New America Foundation
gives the figures of 560 civilian and “unknown” deaths compared with 2455 militants’ deaths
between 2004 and January 15, 2015, putting the civilian death rate at 18.6%. NEW AM. FOUND.,
supra note 16; The Bureau of Investigative Journalism puts the numbers at between 416 and 951
civilians killed out of between 2534 and 3642 total deaths from 2004 to November, 2013.
November 2013 Update: US Covert Actions in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, BUREAU
INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM (Dec. 3, 2014), http://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/2013/12/03/
november-2013-update-us-covert-actions-in-pakistan-yemen-and-somalia/.
335. E.g., Key Findings, NEW AM., http://securitydata.newamerica.net/drones/pakistan/keyfindings (last visited Dec. 28, 2014) (noting that “2% of the drones’ victims were characterized
as civilians in news reports” in 2012, and “civilian casualties were at their lowest ever” in 2013).
336. See Geoffrey S. Corn & Gary P. Corn, The Law of Operational Targeting: Viewing
the LOAC Through an Operational Lens, 47 TEX. INT’L L.J. 337, 353 (2012) (“The LOAC
principle of proportionality prohibits the selection of any means or method of attack anticipated
to produce collateral damage or incidental injury that is excessive in relation to the concrete and
direct military advantage anticipated.”).
337. SOLIS, supra note 162, at 280 (quoting Yoram Dinstein, Discussion: When Civilian
Objects Become Military Objectives, in 78 INT’L L. STUD., LEGAL AND ETHICAL LESSONS OF
NATO’S KOSOVO CAMPAIGN 215 (Andru E. Wall ed., 2002)).
338. William Eckhardt, Civilian Deaths in Wartime, 20 SECURITY DIALOGUE 89, 97 (1989),
available at http://sdi.sagepub.com/content/20/1/89.full.pdf.
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figures, there is little doubt that the civilian death ratio in previous wars
using means of warfare less discriminating than drones was
significantly higher than even the highest estimated civilian death rates
resulting from the American drone campaign in Pakistan (and
presumably in other countries as well).339 As Journalist William Saletan
pithily put it, drones may well be “the worst form of warfare in the
history of the world, except for all the others.”340
A final argument in favor of drones as a means of warfare is that
they are cost-effective. They come with a significantly lower initial
price tag than fighter jets; the costs for drone flight hours are lower than
those for fighter jets; and drone pilots require significantly less training
than do the pilots who man the cockpits of fighter planes.341
To be sure, using drones comes with its own share of pragmatic
challenges. As humane as removing soldiers from harm’s way (and
reducing civilian casualties) may seem,342 it is precisely that attribute of
drones that lowers the costs of going to and fighting war, making it
politically more acceptable to embark on military operations. Wars may
become more frequent, and once combat operations have begun there
may be fewer incentives to terminate the violence. With few, if any
body bags coming back home, a government may find more sustained
support for its military adventures. Indeed, the lower cost of war may
result in countries (at least those that possess the technology) resorting
to force not as a last resort but as a measure to be considered equivalent
to nonviolent alternatives such as diplomatic efforts or economic
sanctions.

339. Cf. Lewis & Crawford, supra note 306, at 1154–56 (arguing that the American turn to
drones was, among other things, the result of pressure due to mounting criticisms of excessive
civilian casualties caused by conventional airstrikes and night raids by special forces in
Afghanistan and Pakistan and that “what is inarguable is that civilian casualties from drone
strikes have declined sharply in the past few years”).
340. William Saletan, In Defense of Drones, SLATE (Feb. 19, 2013, 11:40 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/human_nature/2013/02/drones_war_and_civil
ian_casualties_how_unmanned_aircraft_reduce_collateral.single.html; see also Romesh
Ratnesar, Five Reasons Why Drones Are Here to Stay, BUS. WEEK (May 13, 2013), http://www.
businessweek.com/articles/2013-05-23/five-reasons-why-drones-are-here-to-stay (“By those
standards, U.S. drones strikes have been remarkably precise—and their accuracy has improved
with time.”); Scott Shane, The Moral Case for Drones, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/15/sunday-review/the-moral-case-for-drones.html.
341. Ratnesar, supra note 340; Ashley Boyle, The US and Its UAVs: A Cost–Benefit
Analysis, AM. SECURITY PROJECT (July 24, 2012), http://www.americansecurityproject.org/theus-and-its-uavs-a-cost-benefit-analysis/.
342. But see Paul Kahn, Imagining Warfare, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 199, 218–19 (2013)
(discussing the “ethos of reciprocity” that underlies traditional war as comprised of reciprocal
acts of self-sacrifice, and questioning to what extent the introduction of drones undermines our
understanding of the nature of war).
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The very promise of greater accuracy and precision offered by
drones creates expectations that are both unrealistic and dangerous.
Speaking after the conclusion of Operation Allied Force, General
Anthony Zinni, commander of U.S. Central Command, stated that
precision-guided munitions created “expectations [that] are so great
now: zero casualties, perfect execution, completely flawless.”343
However, such expectations are unrealistic, as mistakes can be, and are,
made. Flawed intelligence,344 information overload,345 human errors,346
active defensive countermeasures taken by the potential targets,347 the
“soda straw” effect of targeting (zooming in on the target and losing
sight of the larger picture—missing, for example, the fact that civilians
have entered the target area),348 and a whole range of technological
malfunctions349 may result in missing the intended target or hitting the
wrong target, causing excessive loss of civilian lives.
Although mistakes are an unfortunate part of the reality of any war,
judged against the background promise of accuracy, they seem
politically and morally (if not legally) unacceptable. On the one hand,
accuracy and precision may encourage mission expansion—carrying out
strikes in densely populated civilian areas or areas that are otherwise
protected from attack under LOAC—that would not have occurred but
for the promise of pinpoint targeting accuracy, thus increasing the

343. See HICKEY, supra note 184, at 180 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also
IGNATIEFF, supra note 196, at 186 (“Sacrifice in battle has become implausible or ironic in the
course of the twentieth century as the gulf between military and civilian values has grown. To
some extent, this reflects the gradual banishment of death as the over-riding pre-occupation of
civilian society. As infant mortality has declined, as life expectancy has increased, as peace has
become a settled expectation of civilian populations, the idea of martial sacrifice and the
nobility of death in combat have become ever more extreme destinies, now seen as increasingly
implausible to cultures raised to count on a full adult life.”); Michael N. Schmitt, Precision
Attack and International Humanitarian Law, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 445, 445 (2005).
344. McDonnell, Sow What You Reap?, supra note 24, at 258–59; Shah, supra note 52, at
3.
345. See, e.g., Thom Shanker & Matt Richtel, In New Military, Data Overload Can Be
Deadly, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 16, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/17/technology/17brain.
html.
346. See, e.g., David Zucchino, U.S. Drones Suffer from Human Error, Computer Glitches
in Afghanistan, HUFFINGTON POST (July 7, 2010), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07/07/us
-drones-suffer-from-hum_n_637767.html.
347. See, e.g., Al-Qaida Engineers in Pakistan Developing System to Counter Drones,
TIMES INDIA (Sept. 4, 2013, 10:52 AM), http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/pakistan/AlQaida-engineers-in-Pakistan-developing-system-to-counter-drones/articleshow/22281116.cms.
348. Shah, supra note 52, at 2–3.
349. Id. at 3 (noting why the overreliance on drone technology may result in “mistakes in
targeting and, ultimately, civilian casualties”); see also McDonnell, Sow What You Reap?, supra
note 24, at 256–59 (referencing jamming, taking over drones, and the quality of sensors’ output
which puts tall, bearded men in Pakistan particularly at risk).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

57

Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 1

58

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

magnitude of potential mistakes.350 On the other hand, adversaries and
critics are unlikely to accept that such collateral damage is the result of
mistake, arguing that precision technology must necessarily mean that
the target was intentionally hit, and that the harm caused was similarly
intended.351
Drones, like PGMs more generally, may minimize the frequency of
mistakes, but they make every mistake made that much more costly in
terms of the ability to continue with effective military operations,352 and
the impact on the civilian population in the country where the bombing
takes place.353 Furthermore, the very perception that accuracy and
precision mean elimination of collateral damage may, paradoxically,
increase the incentive of insurgents and terrorists to use the civilian
population as human shields and to actively blur the distinction between
themselves and the civilians around them. Indeed, the nature of warfare
has seen tactical and strategic paradigm shifts in precisely this direction:
weaker forces avoid open clashes and channel fighting to heavily
populated urban areas in order to minimize casualties among the
insurgents; they also seek to deter the stronger force from attacking
otherwise legitimate targets, while deliberately exposing civilians to
harm with the hope that, should such harm materialize, it might be used
as a propaganda tool against the stronger force.354
Then there is the question of military honor. Honor has long been
intertwined with the turn to weapons that create (or increase) distance
between soldiers of different armies. In Homer’s The Iliad, the Cretan
captain Idomeneus answers a man who has come to him asking for a
spear to fight by saying that “if it’s spears you want you’ll find not one
but twenty . . . . It’s not my way, I’d say, to fight at a distance, out of
350. See, e.g., Sweeney et al., supra note 299 (discussing the NATO bombing of the
Chinese Embassy in Belgrade); Thomas Keaney, Collateral Damage in the Gulf War:
Experience and Lessons (2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.hks.harvard.
edu/cchrp/Use%20of%20Force/June%202002/Keaney_Final.pdf (discussing the bombing of the
Al Firdos command and control bunker in Baghdad); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WHY THEY DIED
8, 119 (2007), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/lebanon0907.pdf
(discussing the Qana incident during the Second Lebanon War of 2006).
351. To illustrate this point, if you kill a civilian it is not because of a mistake but rather
because you intended to kill that civilian; if you hit the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade it is not
because of a mistake but because you meant to do so. Precision seems to remove the ability to
argue mistake.
352. See supra notes 343–49.
353. Some see drones as a cause for radicalization of the population and as a recruiting
tool. Audrey Kurth Cronin, Why Drones Fail: When Tactics Drive Strategy, FOREIGN AFF.,
July/Aug. 2013, at 44, 46; Knoops, supra note 5, at 716; Ofek, supra note 9, at 38; Gregory P.
Gilbreath, America’s Targeted Killing Policy: Is it Right? Is it Working? 11–12 (March 2013)
(unpublished research paper, U.S. Army War College), available at http://public.carlisle.army.
mil/sites/Landpower/Shared%20Documents/Gilbreath%20Gregory%20SRPA.pdf; see also
DAVID PETRAEUS, U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL NO. 3-24, COUNTERINSURGENCY
§ 1-141 (2006) (“An operation that kills five insurgents is counterproductive if collateral
damage leads to the recruitment of fifty more insurgents.”).
354. VAN CREVELD, supra note 233, at 226–27.
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enemy range.”355 Similarly, the code of chivalry, which governed the
conduct of the knights, rejected the use of long-distance weapons that
were mostly used by lower-class infantrymen.356 In 1139, the Second
Lateran Council forbade, under penalty of anathema, the use (“against
Christians and Catholics”), of “that deadly and God-detested art of
slingers and archers.”357 Colonel G.I.A.D. Draper notes that to the
Church, the crossbow and the arrow “were hateful to God. To the
knights they were weapons whereby men not of the knightly order could
fell a knight. . . . Worse, they were weapons that enabled a man to
strike without the risk of being struck.”358 For similar reasons, the
Corpus Juris Canonicus forbade the use of darts and catapults.359
“Distancing” weapons raise questions about the honor of soldiers killing
from a distance as well as of those killed from a distance by an unseen,
“cowardly” enemy, especially when that enemy uses high-tech
weapons.360 Such weapons have had a significant role to play in
ushering in the post-heroic military age, in which material realities of
weapons trump heroic will power and the cult of the heroic warrior361
and facilitate the instrumentalization of war through technology.362
Thus, even if we accept honor as a social and individual measure of
worth,363 the concerns mentioned above are neither new nor unique to
drones.
355. HOMER, THE ILIAD 350 (Robert Fagles trans., 1990).
356. LESLIE C. GREEN, Cicero and Clausewitz or Quincy Wright: The Interplay of Law and
War, in ESSAYS ON THE MODERN LAW OF WAR 41, 54 (2d. ed. 1999).
357. MATTHEW BENNETT ET AL., FIGHTING TECHNIQUES OF THE MEDIEVAL WORLD 232
(2007) (internal quotation marks omitted); STUART CROFT, STRATEGIES OF ARMS CONTROL 24
(1996) (“Crossbows were used by relatively unskilled lower class soldiers, yet were able to
pierce the armour of the knights . . . . Thus the crossbow was a weapon with potentially socially
revolutionary implications.”).
358. G.I.A.D. Draper, The Interaction of Christianity and Chivalry in the Historical
Development of the Law of War, 5 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 3, 18–19 (1965) (emphasis added);
see also COKER, supra note 230, at 105.
359. GREEN, supra note 356, at 54.
360. George Monbiot, With Its Deadly Drones, the US Is Fighting a Coward’s War,
GUARDIAN (Jan. 30, 2012, 4:00 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2012/jan/30/
deadly-drones-us-cowards-war.
361. See COKER, supra note 230, at 113.
362. Id. at 114 (“In [the United States’] obsession with technology it has instrumentalised
war almost entirely.”).
363. Contrast, for example, the idea of “Death before Dishonor,” which is often associated
(albeit informally) with the U.S. Marine Corps, with the following observation set forth by
Michael Ignatieff:
In a society increasingly distant from the culture of war, the rhetoric politicians
use to mobilize their populations in support of military operations becomes
unreal and insincere. As commanders-in-chief of their armed forces, Presidents
and Prime Ministers are required to use a language saturated with military
values: sacrifice, honor, courage. But to leaders and voters who have never
gone to war, these phrases have a nostalgic, inauthentic feel and the consensus
that the rhetoric creates is bound to be skin-deep . . . .
IGNATIEFF, supra note 196, at 189.
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V. A DUTY TO USE DRONES?
Imagine the following scenario: A military commander engages in
the planning of an operation against the enemy in a densely populated
urban area. Unfortunately, such an operation may result in collateral
damage—loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, or damage to civilian
objects. Despite such harms, the attack may still be carried out lawfully
under the law of armed conflict since LOAC merely aims at minimizing
civilian casualties, not eliminating them altogether. But, if the
commander is to attempt to minimize such casualties, is she not
required to employ the most precise weapons in her arsenal? Should she
not deploy the most discriminating means of warfare at her disposal,
allowing her to distinguish combatants from civilians and to attack the
former while sparing the latter? If, in fact, drones offer the promise of
both greater precision and reduced lethality, should not the commander
deploy them over less discriminatory means? And if that is the case, is
there (or should there be) a duty for states to research, develop, procure,
and field the appropriate technology and make it available to their
armies?
This Part argues that although there are no treaties that deal
specifically with the use of drones in armed conflict and no customary
norms obligating the use of drones, such a duty may be derived from the
cardinal principles of the law of armed conflict. It argues that such an
interpretation is merited if we accept that drones offer the possibility of
a more humane war by combining remote and accurate use of force and
reduced lethality among both friendly forces and innocent civilians.
This Part concludes by setting out further challenges that ought to
receive careful attention in developing and elaborating on the obligation
to use drones on the battlefield.
A. Might Makes Ought?
In light of the successful use of precision-guided munitions during
Operation Desert Storm and Operation Allied Force, some writers
explored whether a legal duty requiring the use of such weapons had
emerged in international law.364 For the most part their conclusion was
that such an obligation did not exist de lege lata, i.e., under the existing

364. See, e.g., Belt, supra note 296, at 116, 164; Frederic L. Borch, Targeting After
Kosovo: Has the Law Changed for Strike Planners?, 56 NAVAL WAR C. REV. 64, 67 (2003);
Nathan A. Canestaro, Legal and Policy Constraints on the Conduct of Aerial Precision Warfare,
37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 431, 434, 459–60, 465 (2004); Danielle L. Infeld, Note, PrecisionGuided Munitions Demonstrated Their Pinpoint Accuracy in Desert Storm; But Is a Country
Obligated to Use Precision Technology to Minimize Collateral Civilian Injury and Damage?,
26 GEO. WASH. J. INT’L L. & ECON. 109, 133–40 (1992); Puckett, supra note 180, at 681–83.
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norms of international law.365 While “planners and operators choosing
between laser-guided ordnance or ‘dumb’ bombs now more than ever
must consider collateral damage,” it remains the case that “there is no
legal requirement to use PGMs.”366 The same can be said about the use
of armed drones in the battlefield. Briefly put, to date, there is no treaty
that deals specifically with the use of drones in armed conflict, nor can
it be seriously argued that customary norms have emerged obligating
the use of drones.367 There is very little relevant state practice on the
matter and the practice that does exist is far from being generally
consistent,368 or reflecting “sufficient density, in terms of uniformity,
extent and representativeness,”369 let alone amounting to the level of
“extensive and virtually uniform”370 practice. Further, no opinio juris
has emerged with respect to a duty to use drones as a means of warfare.
Thus, the truly challenging question is whether an obligation to “use”
drones in the battlefield ought to exist, and if so, what the possible
contours of such an obligation would be.
Drones offer the specter of aerial attacks that are more accurate and
precise against the intended military targets while, at the same time, less
lethal to civilians.371 Of course, to say that a weapon is more precise
does not necessarily mean that the attack actually carried out is going to
be accurate. For example, as noted above, faulty intelligence can result
in an accurate strike on the wrong target.372 However, such is the case
with all means and methods of warfare. At the same time, drones do (at
least potentially) offer more significant and robust accuracy and reduced
365. See Belt, supra note 296, at 158–67, 173 (recognizing the emergence of a norm in
customary international law on the use of precision weapons in urban settings); Puckett, supra
note 180, at 681–82 (“[A] review of the relevant provisions of international agreements shows
that there is no textual basis for concluding that the United States should ever be obligated by
law to use only precision-guided munitions in a conflict.”).
366. Borch, supra note 364, at 67; see also SOLIS, supra note 162, at 275 (“Precisionguided munitions are not a LOAC/IHL requirement, but a failure, or inability, to discriminate
may be inherently disproportional.”).
367. Michael Shank & Elizabeth Beavers, Sign a Drone Treaty Before Everyone Does as
We Do, U.S. NEWS (Feb. 4, 2014, 1:35 PM), http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/worldreport/2014/02/04/us-must-support-an-international-drone-treaty.
368. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 198
I.C.J. 14, ¶ 186 (June 27).
369. INT’L LAW ASSOC., COMM. ON THE FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY (GEN.) INT’L LAW,
STATEMENT OF PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO THE FORMATION OF GENERAL CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW 20 (2000) (footnote omitted).
370. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 4, ¶ 74 (Feb.
20).
371. See, e.g., Blank, After “Top Gun,” supra note 58, at 687 (“The ability to track a target
for hours, even days, before launching an attack facilitates accurate targeting and enhances the
protection of civilians by giving drone operators the ability to choose the time and place of
attack with an eye towards minimizing civilian casualties or damage.”).
372. See supra notes 343–53 and accompanying text.
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lethality together with greater accountability. Drones may be “the most
humane form of warfare ever.”373 Their use on the battlefield has the
potential to “enhance the protections to which various persons and
objects are entitled under international humanitarian law.”374 This
makes the case for their use on the battlefield compelling. But should
drones be used instead of traditional, less-precise alternative means and
methods of warfare? If drones are the worst form of war, “except for all
the others,”375 should drones be the first choice on the menu of military
commanders over all the others?
There are several initial challenges to the imposition of broad legal
obligations on states to use drones as their go-to weapon in war. The
very precision that characterizes drones may not be required or even
desirable in all scenarios. When the targets are enemy forces spread
over a large area where no civilians are to be found, pinpoint accuracy
is unnecessary under LOAC. Even in urban settings, where collateral
damage is a highly relevant consideration (politically, morally, and
legally), there may be circumstances in which the use of unguided
weapons may be preferable—both from a tactical standpoint and in
order to minimize collateral damage—to the use of precision-guided
munitions.376
Even if we could define and accurately capture the circumstances in
which the use of drones may be preferable to the alternatives,
significant challenges remain. Although drone technology is rapidly
proliferating—estimates are that currently between seventy-five and
eighty-seven countries possess drone technology, and twenty-six of
those have systems that “are already armed or of a model that has been
armed in the past”377—not all states have the requisite technology and
373. Michael W. Lewis, Drones: Actually the Most Humane Form of Warfare Ever, THE
ATLANTIC (Aug. 21, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/
2013/08/drones-actually-the-most-humane-form-of-warfare-ever/278746/.
374. Schmitt, supra note 317, at 313; see also Frederik Rosén, Extremely Stealthy and
Incredibly Close: Drones, Control and Legal Responsibility, 19 J. CONFLICT & SEC’Y L. 113,
115 (2014) (States may have an obligation to employ drone technology “to exhaust all feasible
means of information gathering if any doubt exists as to whether an attack may lead to civilian
casualties.”).
375. Saletan, supra note 340.
376. Puckett, supra note 180, at 717–18 (concluding that unguided cannons mounted on
helicopters may often be more accurate than Hellfire missiles—for example, when the target is
found in a densely populated urban area and when “[c]oncrete dust and dirt from previous
explosions in the area make use of the Hellfire difficult [or where] the building has a large
amount of glass which, like the dust, will cause a specular reflection instead of the diffuse spot
needed to fire a laser weapon”).
377. P.W. Singer, The Global Swarm, FOREIGN POL’Y, (Mar. 11, 2013),
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2013/03/11/the_global_swarm; see also Maggie Ybarra,
Europe, Asia Plan to Spend Big on Drone Development, WASH. TIMES (Apr. 28, 2014), http://
www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/apr/28/europe-asia-plan-to-spend-big-on-drone-develop
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capacity to operate drones or the financial resources and capabilities
necessary to have available a fleet of unmanned aircraft.378 In short,
drones are not available to all. In these circumstances, imposing an
obligation to use drones would result either in preventing some
countries from fighting even in self-defense (or at least severely
curtailing their options) or, more likely, precluding those countries from
adhering to the relevant rules of international law. It is with this
challenge in mind that some scholars have considered the possibility of
introducing normative relativism or differential rules to the law of
armed conflict379: imposing different normative obligations on different
states based on each nation’s capabilities.380
Professor Gabriella Blum notes that the idea of correlating
obligations with resources and capabilities, and the concomitant notion
of common-but-differentiated responsibilities, is a widely accepted
norm in the fields of international trade and environmental law.381 Yet
its possible adoption into the law of armed conflict is controversial.
LOAC—premised on notions of sovereign equality,382 the principle of
parity or moral equality of combatants,383 and the rejection of
ment/?page=all (noting that he “U.S. military’s unquestioned lead in drone technology is
narrowing,” and estimating that by 2022, the United States will spend less than half the
worldwide total on drone research and development).
378. Michael N. Schmitt, Bellum Americanum: The U.S. View of Twenty-First Century
War and Its Possible Implications for the Law of Armed Conflict, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1051,
1088 (1998) (noting that “due to their high cost, not all states can afford the precision munitions
that help foster discrimination and proportionality”).
379. See, e.g., id. at 1088 (discussing “normative relativism” to confront issues of unequal
military capabilities between different states); Gabriella Blum, On a Differential Law of War, 52
HARV. INT’L L. J. 164, 165–66 (2011) (introducing the concept of differential law based on the
concept of “Common-but-Differentiated Responsibilities”).
380. E,g., Blum, supra note 379, at 165.
381. Id. at 177–85.
382. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 1 (“The Organization is based on the principle of the
sovereign equality of all its Members”); see also Blum, supra note 379, at 171 (“The fiction of
sovereign equality undoubtedly features in IHL.”).
383. The principle of parity means that LOAC applies to any armed conflict regardless of
the legality of its inception. The jus in bello is, therefore, independent from jus ad bellum
considerations. Fighting a just war does not give one party privileges vis-à-vis jus in bello. Nor
does fighting a war of aggression limit the means and methods of warfare that would otherwise
be lawful under international law. In other words, the justness or lawfulness of one party’s cause
does not change—neither expands nor contracts—the scope of the means and methods of
warfare that are available to it and to its soldiers. Blank, Targeted Strikes, supra note 44, at 1659
(“The basic principle that the rights and obligations of jus in bello apply regardless of the
justness or unjustness of the overall military operation thus remains firmly entrenched. Indeed,
if the cause at arms influenced a state’s obligation to abide by the laws [of armed
conflict] . . . states would justify all departures from jus in bello with reference to the purported
justness of their cause.”); Louise Doswald-Beck, International Humanitarian Law and the
Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, 316 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 35, 53 (1997) (“For at least two centuries it has
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reciprocity as a condition for compliance384—has always been applied
equally to all belligerent states, as well as to all individuals based on
their status as combatants or civilians.385 Attempts to deviate from this
universality and generality in application of LOAC have been branded
“double standards” and “lawfare” or, on the other hand, castigated as
serving the interests of a few powerful countries at the expense of
weaker members of the community of nations.386 Indeed, it seems
unlikely that any changes to the universality of LOAC norms can come
about by modifying the norms by treaty or through the more arduous
and less certain processes of customary international law (this Article
refers to this as the legislative track). Examining, among other things,
the imposition of differential obligations pertaining to the use of
precision-guided munitions, Blum argues that the adoption of a
“differential legislative scheme that . . . applie[s] explicitly different
rules to differently situated parties or exempt[s] weaker parties from
compliance with certain humanitarian obligations” or imposes
“heightened obligations on richer countries” is politically unlikely.387 If
this is true in the context of precision-guided munitions, it is all the
more so in the context of drones. The widespread opposition to drones
around the world makes any progress towards imposing an explicit legal
been absolute dogma that international humanitarian law applies equally to all parties to a
conflict, irrespective of which is acting in self defence; this has been confirmed by very longstanding State practice and universally acknowledged in legal literature.”); Robert D. Sloane,
The Cost of Conflation: Preserving the Dualism of Jus ad Bellum and Jus in Bello in the
Contemporary Law of War, 34 YALE J. INT’L L. 47, 56 (2009) (“Just war theory is much older
than international law. It originated and evolved principally in theological and ethical, not legal,
terms.”); MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 41–47 (1977). But see Michael Walzer,
Coda: Can the Good Guys Win?, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 433, 440 (2013) (“[T]he ad bellum/in bello
distinction is not absolute. Fighting a just war does not give you privileges vis-à-vis jus in bello,
but fighting unjustly may in some cases de-privilege you vis-à-vis jus ad bellum.”); Jeff
McMahan, On the Moral Equality of Combatants, 14 J. POL. PHIL. 377, 378 (2006) (discussing
the moral equality of soldiers who fight in “unjust wars”).
384. One party’s violations of LOAC do not justify reciprocal violations by the other
parties to the conflict. This foundational concept should be distinguished from what Professor
Paul Kahn calls the ethos of reciprocity by which he refers to war as comprised of reciprocal
acts of self-sacrifice. Paul W. Kahn, Imagining Warfare, 24 EUR. J. INT’L L. 199, 218–21
(2013).
385. Adam Roberts, The Equal Application of the Law of War: A Principle Under
Pressure, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 931, 945–46 (2008).
386. See, e.g., Cherif Bassiouni, The New Wars and the Crisis of Compliance with the Law
of Armed Conflict by Non-State Actors, 98 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 711, 783 n.292 (2008)
(discussing examples of the “application of double standards that reflect non-compliance by one
set of combatants and in a perverse way invite or enhance non-compliance by non-state actor
groups”); Blum, supra note 379, at 175–76 (“Variously defined, lawfare captures everything
from manipulating legal rules to one’s advantage to using courts as an alternative
battleground.”).
387. Blum, supra note 379, at 186.
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duty to use such aerial platforms by legislative measures highly
unlikely. To be sure, there are some voices calling on the United States
to take the lead in drafting an international agreement that would
regulate the use of drones.388 However, those who do not wish to ban
drones outright seek to strictly limit their use by raising the specter of
proliferation of drone technologies among other countries and non-state
actors as an incentive for the United States to lead the way. There is, at
present, no talk of imposing an affirmative duty to use drones whatever
the circumstances. Nor does such conversation seem politically feasible
any time soon.389
A much more realistic path to introducing differential norms into
LOAC is the interpretive track—adapting the substantive content of
existing norms and rules and linking it to the different circumstances
and capabilities of the relevant different states.390 This may be
particularly possible in the context of such LOAC standards as the
prohibition on “excessive” harm to civilians or the existing duty to take
all “feasible” precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack
in order to minimize incidental loss of civilian life.391 As Blum correctly
notes,
the application of the principle of proportionality is highly
contingent on interpretation, context, and ultimately, the
development of a sub-codex of rules for particular
circumstances. These are susceptible to considerations of
relative power, capabilities, and resources, all of which
potentially affect the application of the standard to
differently situated parties.392
Interpretation of standards such as those related to proportionality or the
principle of avoidance allows for considerations of capabilities and

388. See, e.g., Ratnesar, supra note 340 (“For that reason, Obama should take the lead in
establishing an international protocol governing the acceptable use of drones.”).
389. Cf. Schmitt, supra note 378, at 1085 (noting that, in the context of less lethal
(sometimes referred to as “non-lethal”) weapons, “we can expect many of these weapons to be
targeted for prohibition, regardless of their military necessity or the possibilities they offer for
proportionate use”).
390. See id. at 1088 (“As the gap between the military ‘haves’ and ‘have nots’ widens,
there will be subtle stressors that encourage an interpretation of the law of armed conflict
relative to the state to which it is applied.”).
391. AP I, supra note 60, art. 51, § 4; id. art. 57, § 2; see Blum, supra note 379, at 188–95
(discussing the principles of civilian immunity and proportionality under international law); see
also Rosén, supra note 374, at 127–29 (arguing that drone technology removes two of the
classic dilemmas that arise in taking precautionary measures to assess targets: the need for
urgency that makes precautionary measures infeasible, and the need to protect human personnel
against the risks inherent in reconnaissance missions necessary to precaution).
392. Blum, supra note 379, at 192.
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resources to enter the equation.393 A party to an armed conflict that
possesses weapons, munitions, and modes of delivery capable of greater
precision in targeting than those possessed by its adversary may thus be
subject to a higher level of responsibility both with respect to the
enemy’s soldiers and, more significantly for our purposes, to innocent
civilians.394
Such differential interpretation may be based on more nuanced
understandings of the idea of responsibility. As Professor Michael
Walzer suggests, armed conflicts raise instances for both negative and
positive responsibilities.395 Thus, when insurgents deliberately use
civilians as human shields against attacks, they ought to “accept
responsibility for [civilian deaths], whether or not the number of likely
deaths is proportionate to the expected military advantage.”396 At the
same time, armies fighting insurgents bear their own responsibilities,
including the responsibility to act in positive, affirmative ways in order
to minimize collateral damage and mitigate harmful consequences to
innocent civilians.397 Such responsibility is not merely a moral matter. It
is incorporated into LOAC through the complementary principles of
proportionality and avoidance.398 The principle of proportionality
requires, as we have already seen, that military attacks that are
anticipated to result in “incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which
would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military
advantage anticipated,” must be cancelled or suspended.399
Proportionality’s emphasis on “excessive” harm clearly means that
LOAC recognizes that some civilian casualties are unavoidable in
war.400 Yet the principle of avoidance (taking precautions) imposes an
affirmative duty on military planners to “take all feasible precautions”
in the choice of means and methods of attack “with a view to avoiding,
and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
393. See, e.g., Schmitt, supra note 378, at 1088 (arguing that a disparity in capabilities may
create a disparate application of principles of proportionality between the “haves” and “have
nots”).
394. See id. (arguing that in the abstract “an identical standard is applied to both states,”
but that, in practice, “the developed state is held to a higher standard” and “belligerents are held
to the standards to which they are capable of reasonably rising”).
395. Walzer, supra note 383, at 437.
396. Id.
397. Id.
398. AP I, supra note 60, art. 51, § 5(b); id. art. 57, § 2(a)(iii).
399. Id. art. 57 § 2(a)(iii).
400. This recognition goes against what Walzer identifies as the modern trend towards
“restrictive proportionality” that “permits hardly anything at all in the way of collateral damage
and seems almost designed to make it difficult for states and armies to fight.” Walzer, supra
note 383, at 438.
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civilians and damage to civilian objects.”401 This principle of avoidance
means, in other words, that it is not enough to not intend to kill civilians
while attacking legitimate targets. Rather, a deliberate, affirmative effort
has to be made not to harm them.402 Military commanders must exercise
due care when selecting their targets and matching the weapons and
tactics to use against those targets.403 Thus, even when the
proportionality calculus indicates that the likely collateral damage is not
going to be excessive when compared with the anticipated military
objective sought by the attack, LOAC imposes a duty on soldiers to take
precautions—all feasible precautions—in order to minimize that
otherwise proportionate harm to civilians.404 Whatever else such a
positive obligation may mean,405 it “comes first, without regard to
proportionality calculations.”406
Notions of moral and legal responsibility can be harnessed to the
issue of drones in warfare. If one accepts, as this Article argues above,
401. AP I, supra note 60, art. 57, § 2(a)(ii).
402. Walzer, supra note 383, at 437 (“[I]t was not enough not to intend civilian casualties;
it was necessary to intend not to inflict such casualties.”).
403. See Schmitt, supra note 378, at 1082. On matching weapons to targets, see, for
example, U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., CONDUCT OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR: FINAL REPORT TO
CONGRESS, at T-76 to T-79 (1992), available at http://www.dod.mil/pubs/foi/operation_and_pl
ans/PersianGulfWar/404.pdf.
404. See CHIEFS OF STAFF, supra note 150, ¶¶ 2.6, 2.7, 2.7.1–.2.
405. During the Gulf War of 1990–1991, which followed Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, the
United States argued that general warnings—by using leaflets dropped from aircraft or radio
calls—advising the civilian population to avoid remaining in proximity to military objectives
were sufficient. Id. ¶ 5.32.8 n.207.
During Operation Cast Lead, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) used both general warnings
and specific warnings to civilians in or near military targets that were about to be attacked.
Pnina Sharvit Baruch & Noam Neuman, Warning Civilians Prior to Attack Under International
Law: Theory and Practice, 87 INT’L L. STUD. 359, 370–71 (2006). The warnings included media
broadcasts to the local population, leaflets dropped from planes, phone calls warning of
impending attack, and a procedure known as “roof-knocking” (firing non-explosive munitions at
a roof in order to warn the inhabitants of an impending attack) which was used in particular in
response to Hamas’s forcing civilians to go to the rooftops of houses marked for targeting by the
IDF. Id.
The procedures adopted by the IDF were criticized in the Goldstone Report without offering
any viable alternatives short of abandoning the attack and rewarding those who use civilians as
shields with impunity from attack. See Moshe Halbertal, The Goldstone Illusion, NEW REPUBLIC
(Nov. 6, 2009), http://www.newrepublic.com/article/world/the-goldstone-illusion; U.N. Human
Rights Council, Rep. of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict 498–540,
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/12/48 (2009), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/
docs/12session/A-HRC-12-48.pdf.
As noted above, while it is generally accepted that soldiers must assume certain risks to
themselves in order to reduce risk of harm to civilians that is brought about as a result of the
soldiers’ actions, it is a matter of debate how far the soldiers, and the military sending them,
should go.
406. Walzer, supra note 383, at 437.
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that drones offer the possibility of more accurate and precise attack
against the intended military targets and, at the same time, of reduced
lethality among civilians, then there is a strong case to be made that
their use in the battlefield, compared with the alternatives, is in line with
the idea of responsibility to take positive measures to reduce the harm to
civilians in war. Moreover, this would be the case both from a moral
perspective and from the perspective of the laws of armed conflict. In
fact, even in the absence of treaties (or customary norms of international
law) that deal specifically with drones, the analysis above suggests that
we can derive a duty to use drones in the battlefield from the very
foundational principles of LOAC.407
B. Scope of Obligation: The Road Ahead
To argue, as this Article does in the previous Section, that LOAC
can already be interpreted as imposing a duty to use drones in the
battlefield (and, in any event, ought to include such a duty), does not put
an end to our inquiry. Rather, if we accept the existence of such an
obligation, either de lege lata or as de lege ferenda, we must then
attempt to define the substantive scope of such an obligation.
Unfortunately, the precise criteria for the imposition of an affirmative
duty to use drones may prove extremely difficult to set out and define in
advance. The duty to use drones that this Article seeks to identify and
defend is a positive, affirmative duty. It is a duty to use a weapon rather
than to refrain from doing so. It is (by extension) a duty to study,
develop, acquire, or adopt a weapon rather than to refrain from doing
so. And it is precisely this essential character of the duty that makes it
harder to capture and define.
As already noted, when the targets are enemy forces spread over a
large area where no civilians are to be found—in circumstances in
which there is no risk of collateral damage—pinpoint accuracy is
unnecessary under LOAC.408 Moreover, even in urban settings, where
collateral damage is highly likely, there may be circumstances in which
the use of unguided weapons may be preferable, both from a tactical
standpoint and in order to minimize collateral damage, over the use of
precision-guided munitions.409 Indeed, the very distinction between the
two scenarios may be difficult to make in the abstract. Such difficulties
suggest that the answer ought to be fashioned not through the legislative
track (at least not initially) but rather through the interpretive track.
Rather than attempting to delineate, in advance, the contours of the
407. See also Schmitt, supra note 378, at 1088 (suggesting that a “move towards a
capability-based humanitarian regime may play itself out in an obligation to field weapons that
pose the least risk to protected persons and objects”).
408. See supra Section V.A.
409. See supra Section V.A.
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obligation to use drones, a better method would be to approach the issue
on a case-by-case basis, building experience as we go along and as
practice is accumulated. Such a casuistic approach would also mean
that, again at least initially, questions about the duty to use drones and
the violations of such duty are unlikely to come about in the context of
enforcement of international criminal legal norms if only because the
scope of the obligation and its substantive contours are uncertain and illdefined. This is true even if we agree that an identifiable core of
obligation does exist. The actual practice of states together with
international reports by credible organizations that monitor armed
conflicts around the world, as well as the possibility of invoking the
duty to use drones as part of a state responsibility challenge, may prove
more hospitable venues for the further clarification of the scope of the
obligation.
An additional challenge in imposing a duty to use drones concerns
the identification of the states that may be subject to such a duty. If, as
suggested by Blum in a different yet related context, the obligation is to
be correlated and linked to capabilities,410 we will need to identify those
capabilities that are relevant for the purposes of the specific obligation.
Should we consider in this context military, financial, or technological
capabilities? Responsibilities that are linked to capabilities surely mean,
if anything, that countries lacking the above-mentioned capabilities do
not bear the same obligation to use drones.411
But what should we make of a country that does have the financial
and technological capacities to develop, manufacture, and acquire
drones, but chooses not to do so? Should the policy reasons underlying
that choice be relevant? In other words, does it matter if the country
chooses not to develop drone technology because it professes objection
to the use of such weapons; because it wishes to keep its military
expenditures low; because it does not anticipate being involved in
international armed conflicts; or because it wishes to direct its resources
in other directions, be they civilian or military? Indeed, would not an
imposition of a duty to use drones create incentives to states to divert
resources from research, development, production, and procurement of
such aerial platforms to other means of warfare, precisely so as not to be
subject to such a legal obligation? On the other hand, if we find that an
obligation to use drones does exist under the principles of LOAC (or,
according to the alternative argument that it ought to exist as a legal
norm), how far upstream does the obligation extend? If an obligation to
use drones exists, must it not, logically, extend to a duty to develop,

410. Cf. Blum, supra note 379, at 164–66, 195.
411. See Schmitt, supra note 378, at 1088.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2016

69

Florida Law Review, Vol. 67, Iss. 1 [2016], Art. 1

70

FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

manufacture, or procure such weapons?412 Moreover, if an obligation to
use drones exists, if it applies differentially to states based on their own
capabilities, and if we accept that such a duty is based on the fact that
drones offer a more precise and less lethal way of war, should
international law impose a corollary obligation on states that possess
drone technology to share the technology with those states that do not?
After all, if drones can make war more humane, does not their
proliferation—precisely that proliferation of which we are currently
warned—hold the promise of maximizing human welfare by spreading
the promise to a greater number of conflicts?
What if, the duty to use them notwithstanding, drones cannot
actually be used in specific circumstances—perhaps because of
countermeasures by the defenders (e.g., jamming of radio signals
between the operators and the drone) or due to finite supply of human
resources that are needed to fly a great number of drones?413 Under such
circumstances, must the attacking forces abandon (at least temporarily)
their plans of attack, awarding the enemy with immunity from attack, or
can they turn to alternative means and methods of warfare—e.g., using
manned aircraft or unguided bombs?
To a large extent, the issues raised here derive from a basic
conundrum. Although the principles of LOAC impose both negative
and positive duties on the parties to an armed conflict,414 as far as the
rules that pertain to weapons are concerned, the obligations are, for the
most part, structured as negative obligations. The overarching principle
that pertains to weapons systems is the prohibition of superfluous injury
or unnecessary suffering.415 It is true that AP I imposes a positive
obligation on each High Contracting Party—as part of any “study,
development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon”416—to
determine whether the employment of a new weapon will be prohibited
under international law. However, this obligation is ancillary to the
basic prohibition on weapons that cause unnecessary suffering.417 The
duty to use drones that this Article seeks to identify and defend is a
positive, affirmative duty. It is a duty to use a weapon rather than to
412. Id. at 1088–89 (raising the possible claim that “if a wealthy state has the economic
wherewithal to arm its forces with precision weapons, it should be obligated to do so, . . . so
long as doing so is otherwise operationally sound”).
413. See, e.g., Brannen, supra note 1 (noting the inability of the U.S. to deploy sufficient
drones in Syria and Iraq because its capabilities are used up in Afghanistan).
414. See supra note 395 and accompanying text.
415. AP I, supra note 60, art. 35, § 2; Hague Regulations IV, supra note 139, art. 23(e).
416. AP I, supra note 60, art. 36; see, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 145 (requiring a
LOAC compliance review to be conducted for every new weapon and ammunition used by the
U.S. military).
417. See AP I, supra note 60, art. 35 (“In any armed conflict, the right of the Parties to the
conflict to choose methods or means of warfare is not unlimited.”); id. art. 35, § 2.
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refrain from doing so. It is, by extension, a duty to study, develop,
acquire, or adopt a weapon rather than to refrain from doing so. It is
precisely this essential character of the duty that makes it harder to
capture and define ex ante and which would entail a careful
development and elaboration on a case-by-case basis.
CONCLUSION
Journalist Matthew Power suggests that drones are “too easy a
placeholder or avatar for all of our technological anxieties—the
creeping sense that screens and cameras have taken some piece of our
souls, that we’ve slipped into a dystopia of disconnection.”418 This
criticism is not unique to drones. Technology has often provoked
opposition. Romanticism,419 religious beliefs, environmental issues,
safety considerations, socio-economic and cultural concerns, rejection
of human hubris, and even gender have all contributed to versions of
technophobia.420 Opposition to technology has always been particularly
pronounced when the relevant technology at issue is military in
nature.421
Almost all of human history has witnessed advances in military
technology that have made war an increasingly more lethal and more
destructive affair. The very destructiveness of new technologies has
often been touted as a promise for a more peaceful future. Famously,
Alfred Nobel argued (at first) that the destructive force of dynamite

418. Power, supra note 327.
419. COKER, supra note 230, at 114 (“Many (including myself) fear that scientists may well
be on the way to eradicating the last vestiges of the romantic world view from which the warrior
myth still continues to draw its popular appeal.”).
420. See generally, e.g., JACQUES ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY 132 (1964)
(discussing the tragedy of a civilization increasingly dominated by technology and technique
and the erosion of moral values brought about by technical specialization); STEVEN E. JONES,
AGAINST TECHNOLOGY (2006) (examining the history and ideas of the Luddites and discussing
how those ideas have permeated culture and society). But see Daniel H. Wilson, The Terrifying
Truth About New Technology, WALL ST. J. (June 11, 2011), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/
SB10001424052702304392704576375473021288898 (“We think we’re afraid of the
technology. But we’re really afraid of getting old.”).
421. See, e.g., EUROPEAN COMMISSION, SOCIAL VALUES, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 74
(2005), available at http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/ebs/ebs_225_report_en.pdf
(providing data on perceptions of military technology). The survey discovered that, on the
whole, a majority of European Union respondents believed that the development of various
surveyed new technologies would have a positive effect on society in the next twenty years. Id.
While this finding held true across all areas covered in the survey except nanotechnology, it is
noticeable that two areas received a significantly lower show of optimism, namely military and
security equipment and nuclear energy (both scored at 52%). Id. at 76. It is also notable that in
almost half the countries, (twelve out of twenty-five) those surveyed had an overall negative
view about the prospects of military technology. Id. at 180.
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would make war unthinkable.422 Similar arguments have been made
with respect to gunpowder, artillery, and more recently, nuclear
weapons.423 This sorry history ought to be considered and reflected
upon when developing the argument that drones may offer the
possibility of a more accurate and “humane” war. There is much to
oppose with regard to the current use of drones for the CIA’s covert
operations in countries such as Pakistan and Yemen. Yet we should not
close our eyes to the possibilities that drones may offer in places that
are, in fact, active combat zones. At the end of the day, drones may well
be “the worst form of warfare in the history of the world, except for all
the others.”424 Hyperbolic proclamations that “drones kill civilians” thus
miss the point.425 Ill-guided drone attacks may certainly cause loss of
civilian life; so, too, do other means and methods of warfare. It is war
that kills civilians (as well as combatants), and for as long as war is with
us we may as well recognize that some means and methods of warfare
kill fewer civilians than others. Refusing to discuss the right and duty to
use more discriminating means and methods would not contribute to
lessening collateral damage to civilians. It may, in fact, facilitate it.

422. ULF LAGERKVIST, THE ENIGMA OF FERMENT 136 (2005). Notably, Alfred Nobel wrote
a letter to Baroness Bertha von Suttner, stating: “My factories may make an end of war sooner
than your [peace] congresses. The day when two army corps can annihilate each other in one
second, all civilized nations, it is to be hoped, will recoil from war and discharge their troops.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
423. JOSEPH MASCO, THE NUCLEAR BORDERLANDS 5 (2006); George Orwell, You and the
Atomic Bomb (1945), reprinted in 4 THE COLLECTED ESSAYS, JOURNALISM AND LETTERS OF
GEORGE ORWELL: IN FRONT OF YOUR NOSE, 1946–1950, at 6–7 (Sonia Orwell & Ian Angus eds.,
1968).
424. Saletan, supra note 340.
425. Schmitt, supra note 378, at 1089 (noting that “[i]n terms of humanitarian principles,
opposition to weaponry may not always be a positive stance. After all, much of the
weaponry . . . will effectively reduce collateral damage and incidental injury to civilians and
civilian objects”).
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